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Abstract
This dissertation is a study of Herman Merivale’s relationship 
to the British Empire from 1 83 7, when he first began to take an 
interest in the subject, until his death in 187^. The most important 
aspect of Merivale's career was the great discrepancy between his 
imperial ideas, formulated when he was a professor of classical 
political economy at the University of Oxford, and his administrative 
career as permanent undersecretary at the Colonial and India Offices 
from I8V 7 to 187^. When confronted by the enormously complex 
problems of the Empire Merivale's ideas changed considerably. The 
idealistic liberal panaceas which he had put forward in his Lectures 
on Colonization and Colonies in 18^1 were inadequate and his 
administrative career was largely characterized by failure. As 
Merivale realized by i860 the Colonial Office was incapable of dealing 
with, much less ruling the white settlement colonies. At the 
India Office from i860 to 187^ he had scant opportunity to influence 
British policy because of his own inexperience and the manner in 
which the British government was attempting to govern India after 
the Mutiny of 1857-58.
The introduction and Chapter one analyze Merivale's ideas 
concerning liberalism and the British Empire from I806-I8 7^« Chapter 
two evaluates his role at the Colonial Office. Chapters three through 
eight compare his ideas and actions upon v/hat Merivale conceived to 
be the most important problems facing the Office: free trade,
colonial self-government, the ’’native" question and its administration, 
the Hudson's Bay Company's monopoly and licence of exclusive trade
in the Pacific Northwest and Rupert's Land. Chapter nine briefly 
describes Merivale?s ineffective and miscellaneous role at the 
India Office* Although Merivale's private papers have not survived 
there is no dearth of source material* This study is based upon 
manuscript collections of Merivale's colleagues, his minutes and 
memoranda at the Colonial Office in the Public Record Office as well 
as his written work at the India Office in the India Office Library. 
His published works, especially the two editions of his Lectures 
and his essays in the leading Victorian periodicals are also 
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There is one attitude which a study of the British Empire in 
the nineteenth century evokes and that is humility. The complexity 
of the imperial process is so great in both time and space that it is 
obvious that the generalizations which have been made in the past are of 
little use when examining a particular aspect of the British Empire, such 
as a study of the imperial career of Herman Merivale as a commentator, 
and administrator. Nevertheless the work of the pioneers of British 
imperial historiography should not be denigrated. The research of 
W.P. Morrell, C.A.G. Bodelsen, P. Knaplund as well as the revisionists 
have all contributed to a greater understanding of early and mid-Victorian 
imperialism. This study would not have been possible without their 
efforts.
Merivale's private papers are not extant. As a consequence I had 
to travel to the many private manuscript collections and public archives 
in Britain and Canada in order to locate the enormous number of sources 
relating to his imperial career. In doing so I had unfailing aid and most 
pleasant experiences with librarians and archivists from Vancouver Island 
to the Cambridge University Library where the research was originally 
begun in March of 1973. My debt to all of these people is very great.
I would also like to thank a number of other people who helped to 
encourage me to complete this study. To Dr. J.M. Mackenzie I owe an 
especial thanks for permitting me to research this topic under his 
guidance from three continents, Europe, Africa and North America, and 
for his aid in writing innumerable recommendations for grants and
fellowships. Without this support, in the form of a Canada Council 
Fellowship in 1975 to 1976 and an Interuniversity Centre for European 
Studies Grant in the summer of 1975, I would not have had the time or 
the money to continue with my research. In this regard the History 
Department at Wilfrid Laurier University has also been helpful in allowing 
me to teach either on a full or part-time basis since the summer of 
1973. I thank my colleagues at that institution, especially Dr. B.M.
Gough, Dr. R.H. Dumke, Dr. D.A. Lorimer and Professor Harry S. Coblentz 
at the University of Waterloo for their constant criticism. The actual 
typing of the dissertation was done at a remarkable speed and accuracy 
by a number of people, Edith Whitney, in particular, one of Canada's native 
peoples, stepped into the "imperial breach" when my original typist, 
an alcoholic "white settler", failed to produce. This dissertation was 
therefore only typed in time, ironically, with the aid of "native labour".
Above all, I wish to thank my colleague and wife, Ute, for her 
stylistic and grammatical appraisals of my work during the past four 
years. I could not have had a better critic. Nevertheless I can only 
take full responsibility for all the weaknesses of this dissertation.
Introduction
A study of Herman Merivale1s career is significant because of his 
involvement in the problems of the British Empire for over thirty-five 
years as an influential administrator and commentator. His ideas and 
actions accurately reflected the dilemma of the early and mid-Victorian 
Empire— the conflict between an imperial policy that was intent on 
economy and consolidation and yet an Empire which expanded rapidly. The 
cause of this expansion was the encounter between the agents of Empire 
and the social and economic characteristics of each region within the 
British Empire.^ Merivale was, by 1860, very critical of the consequences 
of the actions taken by himself and his colleagues at the Colonial Office, 
but he had no solutions for imperial problems. For various reasons, he 
was also unable to effect any change at the India Office from 1860-1874.
While most British imperial administrators were attempting to imple­
ment new panaceas for the devolution of British responsibility for the 
white settlement colonies, Herman Merivale was attempting to deal with the 
practical problems involved in the changing relationship between Britain 
and these colonies. As a consequence he was more cautious in his espousal 
of imperial policies such as responsible government and federalism. Unlike 
his predecessor, James Stephen, and his successor, Frederic Rogers, Merivale, 
as permanent undersecretary at the Colonial Office, was not at all certain 
that responsible government or imperial federation would provide satis­
factory solutions for imperial problems. He realized that the most important
1
2problems with which the Empire had to deal was the conflict between the 
demands by the white settlement colonies for political freedom and the 
needs of the native population for protection against the white settlers. 
British imperial policy, or more accurately the process of policy forma­
tion, was delicately balanced between liberalism and imperialism. British 
imperial administrators had to be liberal with regard to the requests of 
the white settlement colonies for internal self-government because there was 
the danger that these colonies might leave the Empire as the Thirteen 
Colonies had done during the American Revolution. At the same time they 
had resolved to protect the aboriginal population from the white settlers. 
Merivale recognized that when these disparate interests clashed, as they 
frequently did during the early and mid-Victorian period, the dilemma 
which was created for the imperial administrator was almost insoluble.
During the past twenty years the nature and consequences of British 
imperialism in the nineteenth century have been vigorously debated. No 
attempt has, however, been made to evaluate the role of Herman Merivale 
in this process. Merivale has not been ignored by historians of the 
British Empire. In addition to his minutes written at the Colonial Office, 
the usual allusions are to his Lectures on Colonization and Colonies, 
first published in 1841 when he was Professor of Political Economy at the 
University of Oxford, and his article "The Colonial Question in 1870" in 
the Fortnightly Review, February, 1870. These references are, however, 
frequently taken out of context and are used to suit the purpose of the 
particular work. As a consequence Merivale has appeared fleetingly as a 
type of historical chameleon, usually as a "separatist" or an "optimist". 
Both appellations are misleading because they do not describe fully
3o
Merivale's relationship to the British Empire.
Merivale was not only an imperial commentator. From 1847 until his
death in 1874 he was an administrator as well. In the former year he
was appointed assistant undersecretary at the Colonial Office and, by
March 1848 he had replaced James Stephen as permanent undersecretary.
Until 1860 Merivale was the chief adviser to the Secretary of State for
the Colonies. From 1852 to 1860 there were frequent changes of ministries
because of political instability in Britain and he had a major role to
play in the transition of the white settlement colonies toward colonial
self-government. In 1860 he was appointed to a similar position at the
India Office and became involved in the changes which occurred in the
governing of India after the Mutiny of 1857-1858 but with much less effect.
At the same time he continued to write articles on diverse topics for the
leading periodicals of the day as well as biographies of two British
imperialists in India, Sir Philip Francis and Sir Henry Lawrence. Despite
this great activity, Merivale's work has not been adequately analyzed by
historians of the British Empire.
A study of Merivale's career has not been undertaken for two reasons.
One is that he left behind no collection of private papers as so many
of his contemporaries had done, for example, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton,
and the third Earl Grey. Merivale's letters are scattered throughout the
many private manuscript collections of his friends and colleagues, thereby
making it very difficult to reconstruct his life and work. In addition,
there have been relatively few studies of the early and mid-Victorian 
3
Empire. The 1850's have been particularly neglected because, when 
compared with the 1840's and the "great struggle for responsible govern­
ment" and with the 1860's with its "forward policy" of federalism,
4this decade has appeared to be an imperial interlude. If, however,
one views the 1850's as a decade of great economic and social change
then the work of Merivale at the Colonial Office does not seem to be
4
merely an appendage of the "titan", James Stephen. During these years, 
problems of colonial self-government were worked out on a practical 
basis in each colony.
The references by British imperial historians to Merivale and his 
work have been for the most part inaccurate and contradictory. In C.A.G. 
Bodelsen's Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism he was categorized as a 
"separatist" and one of the chief "architects of the policy of abandonment 
in the Colonial Office". In this interpretation Merivale was depicted 
as an anti-imperialist who was attempting to rid Britain of its colonies.^ 
Recent studies have revealed that the early and mid-Victorian Empire was 
certainly more imperialistic than Bodelsen thought It was.^ Merivale 
has also been seen as an able administrator who was, unfortunately, 
working in a period of lull between two decades of spectacular constitu­
tional growth. In this view he was an "optimist" concerning the fate 
of the Empire at least until 1870. After 1870 he was an imperial ana­
chronism because his ideas and actions did not foreshadow that of the
7
twentieth century British Commonwealth of Nations. This explanation 
does not account satisfactorily for the changes which took place in 
Merivale’s ideas from 1837 to 1874 nor does it judge him in the context of 
early and mid-Victorian imperialism. When evaluated in the latter framework
Merivale was a competent, influential administrator as well as a critical 
and prescient commentator.
Merivale1s influence on the decision-making process at the 
Colonial Office was significant. In the period before the
5professionalization of the British civil service in the late nineteenth 
century the Colonial Office was run by men who, like Merivale, had
g
other, mainly literary, interests. Imperial affairs were run by a 
small group of administrators and politicians which included the 
Secretary of State, the permanent undersecretary, assistant under­
secretaries and chief clerks. The remainder of the clerks were merely 
gradgrinds. Within the Office, Merivale's role was to read the 
despatches, comment on them in the form of a minute or a memorandum 
and then make a decision which would then be sent to the Secretary of 
State for approval. With the exception of major policy decisions which 
had to go to the Cabinet, other government departments and eventually 
the House of Commons, most of the recommendations of the permanent 
undersecretary were immediately acted upon by the Secretary of State.
Once the despatches were sent to a particular colony, they were subject 
to the interpretation of the colonial governor or his representative.
Merivale's influence was circumscribed because the process of 
Victorian imperialism was a product of a complex situation involving a 
great many people who were operating in different contexts, in Britain 
or in the colonies, and within the severe constraints imposed upon them 
by time and distance. British imperialism in the nineteenth century 
can therefore only be understood by examining the work of various offi­
cials, commercial companies, indigenous populations, traders and 
missionaries within the context of the major economic, political and social 
forces of the century. This study will compare Merivale's ideas and . 
actions with other imperial commentators and administrators and with the 
historical forces which were operating upon all of them. One of the most
important of these was liberalism.
6In the nineteenth century, liberalism meant a great many things to many
people and much more than the Liberal political platform of "peace,
9
retrenchment and reform". Nevertheless, three characteristics were common 
to most nineteenth century British liberals. They included: the idea of
’individual political liberty, the economic policy of free trade and a 
faith in material progress. All three were present in Merivale!s liberalism.
Merivale's faith in material progress was to a great extent determined 
by his view of the past. He adopted an eighteenth century German philosopher 
of history, J. G. Herder's idea that history was an organic, evolving 
p r o c e s s . I n  the imperial context the growth of a colony to a nation 
was, in this view of history, compared to the growth of a child to maturity. 
Merivale also believed in the plurality of cultures, that each culture 
was different because it had developed at a specific time and in a particular 
place. Unlike Herder, however, Merivale did not entertain the idea that 
history was cyclical. He did not believe that all the basic characteris-- 
tics inherent in one culture would in a later point in time be repeated 
in another culture. As a consequence, each society was not unique but 
always different. Unlike many other Victorians he did not believe that 
European civilization was innately superior but he argued that Britain
was materially superior to that of any other country in the nineteenth 
century.
Merivale qualified the liberal doctrine of material progress. Modern 
European civilization was in many ways not better than that of ancient 
Greece or Rome. He even thought it probable that the original inhabitants 
of North America and Africa had experienced, at one time in their history, 
a civilization as intellectually and as morally advanced as that of Europe 
in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, "each generation" did not
necessarily "enjoy the accumulated knowledge of preceding ones".
Merivale's interpretation of both history and material progress was 
more discriminating than many of his contemporaries. However, another 
characteristic of his liberalism, free trade, was less discerning.
Free trade, for Merivale, was the unshakable foundation of his
ideas concerning the British Empire and its future. He concluded that the
more "mature", white settlement colonies would become full-fledged trading
partners with Britain and then the Empire would become "a vast confederacy
of nations". Separation would not necessarily follow inexorably. Merivale
was not a "separatist" although he constantly recalled the separatists’
metaphor of growth, with Britain as the tree and the colonies as the
ripe fruit almost ready to tumble to the ground. He changed the analogy
considerably. In his version the colonies were not the fruit of the
tree but grafts from the parent stem. In time, instead of a complete
break, the grafts would become new plants and would thus "afford a more
pleasing object of contemplation than the slight changes which may be
produced in the condition of the old familiar tree." It was not a question
of "separatism" but rather the extent and the manner in which the colonies,
when and if they became self-governing, would emulate the mother-country.
Merivale never believed that the fate of the Empire would be decided by
reference to any analogy whether propounded by "separatists" or any other 
12
group.
From 1861 Merivale argued that the "colonial question" would never 
be answered simply by the rhetoric of "abstract political philosophy" or 
by totalling up a balance of "profit or loss" in any "imperial account book". 
Like the Thirteen Colonies at the time of the American Revolution the 
"colonial question" would be resolved by an imperial crisis. At this
8juncture the most important factors would be the ’’irrational" ones.
Imperial statesmen would be, he declared, more concerned with such
intangibles as "a sense of national honour, pride of blood, a tenacious
spirit of self-defence, sympathies of kindred communities, instincts
of a dominant race and a vague but generous desire to spread our civili-
13zation and our religion over the world." As a liberal Merivale
attempted to solve the "colonial question" according to the circumstances
of Britain and each colony.
Herman Merivale’s career was significant for his work as an imperial
administrator and commentator rather than as a profound liberal thinker.
His ideas concerning the fundamental problem which confronted the Empire
14in the nineteenth century were important and influential. He was 
primarily interested in colonial self-government and its relationship 
to the "native question", the need to protect the indigenous population 
from economic exploitation and ultimately, extinction. Merivale’s 
attempts to solve this imperial problem created many conflicts in his 
ideas and actions. Until 1847 he had hoped, rather naively, that both 
liberalism in the guise of colonial self-government for white settlers 
and religious instruction for the native population would solve these 
problems.
Merivale discovered, as an administrator, that these liberal 
panaceas were divorced from imperial realities in each region of the 
Empire. He knew that the problems arising from white-aboriginal contact 
would never be satisfactorily settled because there were simply too 
many economic, political and cultural differences between Europeans 
overseas and the native peoples. At the same time MerivaleTs faith in 
colonial self-government was also shaken. For example, the colonial
legislatures were unwilling to become self-sufficient in such important 
areas as defence and adequate provision for the protection of the native 
population. After I860, Herman Merivale*s successors at the Colonial 
Office misunderstood the "native question** and failed to develop a 
native policy. Both the European settlers and the native peoples had 
to work out their own problems and, in this uneven struggle, the latter 
had little chance against the actions of white settlers, merchants, 
traders and missionaries.
By 1874 Merivale knew that no panacea such as responsible govern­
ment, federalism or imperial federation would be able to provide a 
permanent solution to the problems confronting the British Empire. He 
completely rejected imperial federation as propagated by the "empire 
enthusiasts** from 1868-1871. This scheme was totally unpractical because 
the "imperial tie*’ was only "voluntary". No central authority could 
possibly create such an imperial "fabric" as imperial federation. Even 
if a central authority and the machinery to operate it were set up, it 
would immediately break down in any imperial crisis because the interests 
of Britain and the white settlement colonies were now too different.
During the colonial agitation of 1869-1870, which followed Lord Granville* 
attempt to withdraw imperial garrisons, Merivale remained aloof. Like 
other "traditional defenders" of colonial interests he did so not because 
he lacked imagination. His administrative work in the Empire had made '
him aware of the complex problems involved and he was, therefore, more
15
realistic than the "empire enthusiasts". However, imperial federation 
was not Merivale*s only b£te-noire in the 1860*s and in the early 1870's.
Colonial federation which had been put forward as an immediate 
solution for the political problems of Upper and Lower Canada was now
. 10
being implemented in southern Africa and the British West Indies. Merivale
rejected this panacea completely. He argued that even Upper and Lower
Canada with which he had a close association in the 1850*s had not been
ready to adopt federalism in 1867 and had done so only "to meet a mere
emergency of local politics." The federation of these colonies had been
"simply one of the casualties of human affairs" and was therefore not a
model for other regions of the Empire.
In 1870 Merivale was more cautious concerning the future of the
British Empire. He did not believe that the "Doom of Athens is already
ours". With colonial trade thrown open to all nations and colonization
at an end, the problem of maintaining the political and economic bonds
of the Empire appeared to him to be almost "insoluble", but at the same
time he was aware that many administrative changes would come with the
development of "rapid telegraphic communication". For example, eventually
"one central management" for colonial affairs would have to be created
or they would continue to be "conducted without the slightest attempt
1 fi
at system or unity". Merivale was also prescient with regard to the
development of the so-called "new imperialism" in the late nineteenth 
17century.
In the following chapters the development of and the relationship 
between Merivale*s ideas and actions as a commentator and an administrator 
will be analyzed. The first chapter will examine Merivale*s early life, 
his attachment to liberalism and his interest in the British Empire 
from the 1830*s to 1874. Chapters two to eight analyze and compare his 
ideas as an imperial commentator with the actions he took as permanent 
undersecretary at the Colonial Office from 1847 to 1860. The following
11
topics were chosen because of Merivalers primary interest in 
them: free trade and imperialism, colonial self-government, the
"native question" and its administration and the Hudson's Bay 
Company, The last chapter will examine Merivale*s limited role 
at the India Office,
Most of the examples of Meri vale's work at the Colonial 
Office were taken from two geographical areas, British North America 
and southern Africa because these colonies were the primary 
objects of Merivale*s attention as permanent undersecretary. They 
were considered by Merivale and his colleagues to be extremely 
valuable colonial possessions although not as economically 
advantageous to Britain as was India, A complete study of Merivale's 
involvement with every British colony would have taken many years 
of research and was far beyond the scope of this work.
Notes to Introduction
1. In this dissertation I have followed closely the definition of the
terms "imperialism11 and "mid-Victorian" established by C.C. 
Eldridge, England's Mission, The Imperial Idea in the Age of 
Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880, London, 1973, xv-xvii, 
largely because they are directly applicable to Merivale*s 
ideas and actions.
2. For the most important examples of references to Merivale see the
following: C.A.G. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Im­
perialism, London, I960 (First Edition, 1924), W.P. Morrell, 
British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell, Ox­
ford, 1930, British Colonial Policy in the Mid-Victorian Age, 
Oxford, 1969, J.W. Cell, British Colonial Administration in 
the Mid-Nineteenth Century: The Policy-Making Process, New 
Haven, 1970, C.C. Eldridge, England's Mission, J.M. Ward, 
Colonial Self-Government, The British Experience,1759-1856, 
Toronto, 1976, Ronald Hyam and Ged Martin, Reappraisals in 
British Imperial History, Toronto, 1975, B. Porter, The 
Lion's Share, A Short History of BritishImperialism. 1850- 
.1970. London, 1975. The most notable exception in which 
Merivale appears as the primary focus is A. Harvey, "Herman 
Merivale, The Colonial Office and the Australian Colonies, 
1848-1860", Journal of the Royal Australian Historical 
Society, Vol. 60, Pt. 2, June 1974, 89-104.
3. The best studies of early and mid-Victorian imperialism from the per­
spective of London and the Colonial Office are the two books 
by Morrell above, Eldridge's England's Mission and Cell's 
British Colonial Administration. Until the 1970*s the most 
influential was Bodelsen's Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperial­
ism.
4. John M. Ward, " The Retirement of a Titan: James Stephen, 1847-50",
Journal of Modern History, Vol. 31, 1959, 189-205. See 
also Cell, British Colonial Administration, 17. For a con­
trary view see H.T. Manning, "Who ran the British Empire? —  
1830-1850", Journal of British Studies, Vol. 5, 1965, 88-121.
5. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, 35, 38, 45, 58.
For the first comprehensive attack on this myth see J.S. 
Galbraith, "Myths of the 'Little England' Era", American 
Historical Review, Vol. 67, 1961, 34-48. For the first full- 
length revision see Eldridge's England's Mission, 25-52.
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B.A. Knox, "Reconsidering Mid-Victorian Imperialism", The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 1,
No. 2, January 1973, 155-172. Also see R. Robinson and 
J. Gallagher (with Alice Denny), Africa and the Victorians; 
The Official Mind of Imperialism, London, 1961, 472 and Cell, 
British Colonial Administration 211.
Cell, British Colonial Administration, vii.
Ibid., 3-25.
G.S.R. Kitson Clark, An Expanding Society: Britain, 1830-1900. 
Melbourne, 1967, 12-13 and for its institutionalization see 
Harold Perkin, The Origins of Modern English Society. 1780- 
1880, London, 1969, 376-380.
Herman Merivale, Lectures on Colonization and Colonies, (Second
Edition), London, 1861, 552-553. All further references will 
be made to this edition.
Herman Merivale, Historical Studies, London, 1865, 444.
Herman Merivale, "The Colonial Question in 1870", Fortnightly Re­
view, N.S., Vol. 7, No, 37, February 1870, 153-175.
H. Merivale, Lectures, 675.
For MerivaleTs influence on his own age see, for example: Sir
George F. Bowen, Thirty Years of Colonial Government, 1859- 
1888, 2 Vols., London, 1889, Charles W. Dilke, Problems of 
Greater Britain, London, 1891. James Winter, Robert Lowe, 
Toronto, 1976, 16. Merivale has remained of historical im­
portance largely because of the Lectures which were original­
ly published in 1841. A second edition appeared in 1861, 
reprints of the second edition were made in 1928 and in 1967.
Eldridge, England1s Mission, 135-138.
H. Merivale, "Colonial Question in 1870", 175.
On this important question see the excellent analysis in Eldridge, 
England1s Mission, 234-255.
Chapter 1: Liberalism and the British
Empire, 1806-1874
It is now commonplace for historians of the British Empire to 
assert that the causes and the consequences of the expansion of the 
nineteenth century Empire were both complex and pervasive.^ Never­
theless, three main themes are usually evident in any work written on 
the subject: the nature of changes within British society, the
development of colonial societies overseas and their relationship with 
the native populations after the initial period of contact. The extent 
of the British impact upon British North America, southern Africa and 
India varied enormously. These general statements concerning British 
imperial historiography are also applicable to a study of the career 
of Herman Merivale who spent most of his life engaged in these questions 
both as a commentator and as an administrator. More case studies of 
individual imperialists are necessary in order to understand more 
clearly the complexity of British imperialism in the nineteenth century. 
Merivale's imperial ideas and his actions were chiefly influenced
by liberalism. His response to his own society and the Empire were
3derived from his professional middle class background. Liberalism
was the amorphous creed of the British middle class in the nineteenth 
4century. Liberal doctrines of moral and material progress, social, 
political reform and free trade were often interpreted in a bewildering
14
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variety of ways. As a consequence its appeal was vast and debates 
concerning its tenets were fiercely waged in the leading periodicals 
of the day."* Merivale was a direct participant in these debates and 
he supported the idea of material but not moral or intellectual 
progress. He desired gradual reform in politics and education in 
Britain and the colonies and he believed in the efficacy of free 
trade. The latter tenet was most cogently argued in his Lectures on 
Colonization and Colonies which were initially delivered at the 
University of Oxford and published in 1841.
All of the elements which constituted nineteenth century liberalism, 
progress, reform and free trade, shaped Merivale*s attitudes towards 
the British Empire. They were, however, applied in very different ways 
at various times throughout his career according to whether he was 
writing as an imperial commentator or minuting despatches as an adminis­
trator. These two roles were sometimes contradictory when they 
concerned such practical imperial questions as free trade, the "native 
question" and its administration and the development of colonial 
self-government.
Herman Merivale*s life, until he became Professor of Political 
Economy at Oxford in 1837, was unusual if compared with his contempo-* 
raries in the professional middle class. Born in 1806 as the eldest 
son of a poor London lawyer, John Herman Merivale, Herman Merivale, 
like his contemporary, Thomas Babington Macaulay, was a child prodigy. 
Despite a lack of money, Merivale attended Harrow because his uncle
16
had been the Headmaster. At Harrow Merivale excelled academically and
this success led him to Oriel College, Oxford, where he studied literature
and history. Graduating in 1827 he became, in the following year, a
Fellow of Balliol College at the age of twenty-two. ^ While at Oxford
he met Henry Maine, an acquaintance with whom he would work in the India
8
Office in the I860’s. If it had not been for his poor health in the
early 1820’s he would have obtained a writership in Bengal instead of going
to Oxford. After a tour of Europe in 1829 he became a law student and
was called to the Bar in 1832. When the revolution broke out in France
in 1830 he rushed off to Paris to view these events. At the same time
he began his literary career with articles to Blackwood’s Magazine and
9
a prize essay at Oxford on Socrates.
During the 1830’s Merivale married and settled down to life in
London practising law and writing articles for the Edinburgh Review.
He exemplified what has been identified as the "forgotten middle class'1^
and he saw his class just in those terms in 1845:
...the most helpless and least influential class of subjects.
Of course the much more powerful body of the mercantile and 
manufacturing interest are partakers in the grievance, but 
perhaps to a less striking extent; inasmuch as their gain 
is greater from the remission of other duties on articles 
of consumption. The poor are exempt: their dissatisfaction
might be dangerous. The higher class makes the law, and 
lays on the load with due regard to personal interest: 
the intermediate order must submit--the real peuple taillable^  ^
et corveable a merce et a volonte, of the nineteenth century.
By the time he was appointed Professor of Political Economy in 1837
Merivale, because of his education and profession as a lawyer, was a
member of the professional middle class, but certainly not wealthy.
During the 1830's Merivale became a liberal. There is no evidence
concerning his attitude to the debate on the passage of the Great Reform
17
12Bill of 1832 but both his father and his uncle had been "staunch Tory".
His interest in history and literature,.his decision to write for the
Edinburgh Review, his growing concern with the relatively new science
of political economy and his aversion to the Oxford Movement, all contri-
13buted to his conversion to liberalism. The last reason contributed
to his appointment as Professor of Political Economy at the University
of Oxford almost by "default". The opposition candidate had unorthodox
ideas concerning infant baptism which, in Merivale's words, "sealed his
fate as a Political Economist, and I being protected by the obscurity of
my tenets on these subjects, which have never been exposed to the public,
14
got to windward of him." He may also have been appointed because of 
his previous connections with the University although there is no firm
evidence on this point.
While at Oxford, Merivale criticized the impact of the Oxford Movement
upon the Church of England and, more particularly, its effect upon the
University. The latter had, he believed, "become dead and spiritless-
paralyzed from the dread which prevails of giving mutual offence. Men
stand carefully aloof from free intercourse with each other on questions
which excite them, and the place supplies no topics of neutral and harmless
interest." Knowledge, he argued, should be placed on a plane with faith,
if not above, because "all learning is discipline--all discipline self-
denial-all denial has the nature of virtue." He concluded that the
University should be a place of learning, not of promulgating a creed.
The liberal ideal of the separation of church and state was, of course,
15
assumed. This view accounted for his response to one of the leading 
members of the Movement, Dr. Pusey, in the latterrs sermon of November 5, 
1837 on the Great Revolution of 1688.
18
Merivale did not take exception to Dr. Pusey's remarks on the Glorious 
Revolution because that event had "no more sanctity than any other great 
political act of which the consequences still survive: the State, by
fencing it round with an imaginary sacredness, and intruding the commemora­
tion of it into the solemn service of the Church, did, in our opinion, 
nothing more than provoke mocking and encourage hypocrisy." It was, he
16concluded, good "to see its principles attacked in fair and open controversy."
He also applied this tolerant approach to other religious groups. He.
was opposed to "fanaticism" in all its guises.^
Such "fanaticism", which Merivale believed the Oxford Movement
espoused, meant a serious lack of or even an absence of reason and a
18
rejection of the historical bases of modern European history. Pusey's
sermons were a threat to political liberty and, eventually, would lead
19to the acceptance of the doctrine of the divine right of kings.
During the 1830's Merivale was also concerned with material progress
and its basis--history. His idea of progress changed considerably between
20
the 1830's and the 1870*s. The idea of progress was used synonymously 
by Merivale and his contemporaries with that of material improvement and 
the general advancement of European civilization. Its significance was 
directly dependent upon the historical context of the argument used.
As early as 1834 Merivale had a clear notion of both progress and its 
historical basis when he became concerned with the impact of the Oxford 
Movement upon British society. Speculating upon Pusey's motives with 
regard to the Movement, Merivale concluded that Pusey appeared to be 
"actuated by a sincere desire to heal, as far as in him lies, the breaches 
of the Christian commonwealth; and to point out as subjects of rational 
rejoicing, those few steps which the world seems to have gained in its
19
dark and vacillating progress towards better and nobler views of 
21
religion." He did, however, disagree with the means which Pusey 
was taking towards that goal. For Merivale, progress in its moral and 
religious aspects, was not very important. This conclusion was based
upon his interpretation of the past. Merivale was, for the most part,
92
what has been termed a "Whig" historian. ~ The reasons for his cri­
tical judgments of other cultures in the past were however, not based 
entirely upon the attitudes of nineteenth century British society 
because of his philosophy of history. The past provided continuity 
in both time and space. It also enabled him to understand more clearly 
the ideas being propounded in the 1830Ts and after. Unfortunately, 
the study of the past did not always provide continuity. He was not
worried about the possibility of radically differing interpretations 
23
of history because the "laws of nature" were just as important in
2 Aleading men from individualism through "self-guidance" to "liberty".
This preoccupation with history lasted until the end of his life. 
In review articles in the prominent journals of the day, in his two 
editions of Lectures on Colonization and Colonies (1841 and 1861), in
M s  Historical Studies (1865) and in his biographies of Sir Philip
Francis (1867) and Sir Henry Lawrence (1872) Merivale approached the 
past from many different perspectives.^ Despite this eclecticism 
he was able to formulate a relatively coherent philosophy of history 
which at the same time coincided with his more particular descriptions 
and analyses of people, events and societies.
History, as a discipline, was in the first half of the nineteenth
century largely the preserve of amateurs and the writing of history
was much more of a pleasure than thinking abstractly about its 
26purpose. "History", in Merivale's opinion in 1837, ". . . presents
the man, surrounded by opposing circumstances and petty agencies,
his thoughts and purposes moving only the slow gradations of real
life, — and leaves the enquirer to abstract the essential man within
for himself . . History, by this definition, was limited to
the "outside" of an event only. Merivale was aware of the problems .
27created if the historian attempted to get "inside" the event. It
was, he argued, a "very simple law of our natures" that "what we see
dimly and distantly, we can colour as we please, and bring.as near
2 8
as we please by the power of fancy." Historians have never been
able to deal adequately with this problem.
Merivale had very specific ideas about the roles of men, events
and societies in the past. Like other early nineteenth century
historians he was concerned with the function and importance of the
great man in history, but he was never an advocate of hero-worship
although his biographies of Sir Philip Francis and Sir Henry Lawrence
29often came close to being hagiography. He was, however, criticized
by his contemporaries for being too "loyal to historical fact" and
pointing out the failings of heroes and their reliance upon the
30"necessities of the age". A "trite rule" but one frequently for­
gotten was that the historian should judge the individual within the
31context of his own. age. For Merivale, individuals were most
important because of what they told the historian about the age itself
33Events were secondary.
Merivale also differed from his contemporaries in his refusal to
21
see history solely in terms of morality. Individuals or periods of history
should not be given good or bad marks according to an absolute standard
of moral progress. The job of the historian, he reiterated, was quite
clear: "We are not, therefore, anxious to lament over the degeneracy of
the times, or to quarrel with those who may sensibly prefer the present
to the past. We only wish to restore in imagination that which has become
34
obsolete; and this is not as easy as it might seem." The limitations
35of the historian to account for changes in the past were readily apparent.
Merivale also saw the dangers of historicism. He believed there was
continuity in every age and it was supplied by "those general characteris-
36
tics common to men in all circumstances." He hoped that "posterity"
37would judge Victorian Britain in the same manner.
History, despite its limitations, was useful in helping men and women
understand the world in which they lived and the changes which occurred
but history could not predict the future of any society because similar
38"conditions" did not exist in every age. For example, he argued that no
one could have foreseen the "mysterious potato blights" which caused the
great famine in Ireland and the subsequent Irish emigration to British
North America. The same was true of the gold discoveries in Australia
and British Columbia in the 1850's. Only in this manner he postulated:
...the world advances: its ordinary cycle of progress and 
retreat interrupted ever and anon by strange, comet-like 
phenomena, which seem to have their origin far away in 
another order of things, and yet are, doubtless, not less 
reducible to general principles than the recurring events 
of ordinary life, and not less regularly interposed, as 
secondary causes, between us and that remote but infinite 
will which governs all.^
40
He retained this historical perspective throughout his life.
Above all the historian should develop a critical sense of his own 
age and the particular age with which he was concerned. He must use his
22
sources warily as they constituted his only link with the past. After
reading nine volumes of the Memoirs of Marshal Marmont in 1856 Merivale
came to the conclusion that the increase in quantity of one's knowledge
about the past does not necessarily result in a corresponding addition to
historical knowledge. Upon turning the final page of the last volume of
these Memoirs he realized that "...our new guide, like former guides,
is of especial value only so far as regarded the limited range of objects
41within his own particular sphere of vision." The historian must delineate
as far as possible between fact and fiction in the past and in his own 
42
age. A critical sense of history provided the basis for Merivale's
commentary and actions within the context of the British Empire in the 
nineteenth century.
This abstract analysis of Merivale's philosophy of history was linked 
to his attitudes towards empires. In 1844 in the Edinburgh Review he 
examined British involvement in Aden. In a few more years, with a guarantee 
of "security", he predicted, Aden would become "one of the great emporia 
of the East". He concluded that empires "...come and go like shadows-- 
cities disappear from the map--all but their traditions vanishes: the
same spot of earth witnesses the waxing and waning of several successive 
births of human pride or industry; yet man remains unchangeable all the
/ Q
while...." Later Merivale applied this view to the British 
Empire.
Merivale was even more critical of liberalism and liberals who misinter­
preted their own national history. Exponents of the ideals of liberalism 
such as William Gladstone and Thomas Babington Macaulay came under his
attack.^ Merivale's judgments were usually balanced and just and, in
45
some cases, his conclusions still warrant close reading. As early as
23
1842 he was aware of the chief weaknesses of nineteenth century 
British historiography. The great amount of religious, political 
and national bias up to and including the early nineteenth century 
was caused by a lack of critical analysis. Unless something was done 
British history 11. . .will still be, as heretofore, an exercise for 
clever pleaders while England remains divided between Whigs and Tories, 
Dissenters and Churchmen; while each holds himself personally answer- 
able for the character of all his race, down from Thomas a Becket and 
Wycliffe respectively; and each closes his argument with the honest 
avowal of the Duchess de la Ferte— Tiens, mon enfant, je ne vais que 
moi qui aie toujours raison." Merivale accused British historians of 
writing "Whig" history despite the fact that he was often guilty of 
the same bias as an imperial commentator.
Despite his emphasis upon the weaknesses of British historio­
graphy Merivale was not always negative in his comments. In 1842 he 
thought he discerned signs of change in historical writing because of 
the influence of the historical novels of Sir Walter Scott. Scott, 
he believed, had aided in the process whereby British history was 
changing from a "picturesque" style to a more "philosophical" one and 
thereby becoming more critical. This innovation was a consequence of 
the "same advantages which improved communication, and the passion for
travelling, have performed for us in regard to space, have been achieved
46
for us in regard to time by our antiquarians." He urged that these 
source materials, essential to the study of history, must be collected 
and be made available to all historians, but he was sceptical because 
he feared the task would be "insufficient .. . towards reproducing the 
image of that former world which it explores."
24
Merivale also put forward a method by which "social science"
could deal with this problem of source materials. Statistics, he
hoped, would be used more than ever in the task of determining the
state of a society at any particular point in time or space.^
Although he was aware of the limitations of statistics he still
believed that it was a much more accurate method than engaging, as
many of his contemporaries were doing, in the "profoundest a priori 
49
speculations". In 1839 this suggestion was not mere idle talk on 
his part because he was preparing his comparative study of European 
expansion which was published in 1841 as his Lectures on Colonization 
and Colonies. In that volume and in his other works Merivale used
statistics to support his arguments.
Herman Merivale’s historical focus was usually directed towards 
three countries— Germany, France and Britain. With each his chief con­
cern, as might be expected of a liberal, was on social and political 
reform and law and order. Whether discussing the reforms of Frederick 
the Great in helping the German states to recover from the Thirty Years 
War or Robespierre’s role in the French Revolution in 1789, the relation­
ship between individuals, ideas and the societies in which they lived 
and the development of political liberty were his constant themes. As 
he made very clear, the historical development of the idea of liberty 
was not inevitable, much less constant. Liberty did not begin with the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688.50 He believed that the eighteenth century 
"enlightenment" and the French Revolution were of much greater impor­
tance. He was, unlike most of his fellow British historians, decidedly 
more European in outlook and this characteristic complemented his ideas 
on free trade.
As has already been noted, Merivale, upon hearing of the outbreak
25
of the revolution in France in 1830, set out immediately for Paris.52
In subsequent years he maintained this deep interest in European political
life by travelling frequently on the continent— for example, by visiting
Paris again during the "revolution" in 1848. He never became a republican,
viewing with extreme distaste the lack of law and order in both France and
the United States. Robespierre, to say the least, was never one of his
53
favourite historical characters. He preferred the great politician and
administrator, Cardinal Richelieu. For him France was the "cradle of social
civilization" primarily due to the efforts of Louis XIV and his administrators.
He did not ascribe these changes in France to one person. Louis XIV was a
"very ordinary" person and was not able to change the "unbending law of
54nature, which forbids individual greatness to arise without freedom."
The beginning of the French Revolution in 1789 marked the turning point in 
the development of liberty.
Merivale believed the Revolution was important not for its exhibition 
of violence and ultimately, tyranny, which he deplored,55 but rather for 
its illustration of the principle of liberty overcoming "repression". One 
of the most important factors in this process was the work and ideas of the 
philosophes especially Montesquieu,Saint Simon and Voltaire. They had
proved that "tyranny is its own Nemesis, and sows the dragon's teeth from 
which its own future destroyers are to spring."56 Notwithstanding the fact
that Merivale's interpretation of the causes of the Revolution was far too
simplistic, it indicated precisely one of the sources of his liberalism 
and the role which liberty played in social and political change. His view 
of liberty meant freedom for the bourgeoisie not for the sans culottes.
Merivale was also concerned with consequences of the Revolution
especially the intellectual impact of the "Gospel of Rousseau". He disliked
26
the idea which the prophet11 Rousseau had passed on to later generations
of Europeans, the "perfectibility of man". This "new guide" had led man
to believe that he was 1 indeed a law unto himself" and to an uncritical
faith in human progress. It was, therefore, very fortunate when both
time and circumstances "tamed and disciplined" this powerful intellectual 
58
current. From these comments, it is clear that Merivale was extremely 
concerned about the "dangerous" impact of liberty upon the lower orders 
of society.
The real "heroes" of the French Revolution in his interpretation 
were not the "revolutionaries" like Robespierre but the members of 
Merivale’s own class, the "Bourgeoisie and the Professions" especially 
the "lawyers", who were presumed to be in their own day: "mere
'formalists', 'makers of paper theorems', 'constitution builders by 
trade'. Such ignoble tailors have no lustre of popularity with mankind 
in general. When their work is accomplished, they are commonly dis­
missed into nothing with indifference, or rather contempt." Merivale 
was, like most nineteenth century British liberals, quite conscious of
class differences. As an historian he appeared to be aware of this 
59bias. But as an administrator when dealing with white settlers or 
indigenous peoples within the British Empire he was much less cognizant 
of xt.
Merivale was contradictory when writing about the French Revolu­
tion. The "essence" and "chief historical value" of this event was 
that it granted social and political equality, yet it also broke down 
parochialism and created a strong nation and an empire, all of which 
he approved. Liberalism, imperialism and nationalism were not, for him,
incompatible ideas. He seemed unaware of the inequalities which were
61
created as a consequence of imperialism and nationalism. He realized
27
that the ordinary sympathy of the English people for oppressed nation­
alities who were struggling for civil freedom as well as independence” 
blinded the British to the fact that this sympathy, if actively under­
taken, might also become in time the doctrine of the "white man1 s burden" 
or in MerivaleTs own words the "trusteeship of savage races". Trustee­
ship became, ultimately, a form of economic and political control 
within the framework of the British Empire.
Merivale’s interpretation of British history provided the rationale
for empire. While not adhering to the idea of uninterrupted progress
6 ^
of liberty in British history, he still emphasized the significance of
the Long Parliament for putting an end to the use of torture in 
64England, and the Great Revolution of 1688 for bringing about an
65increase in political liberty. On the other hand he gloried in the
heroism of the British overseas, for example, the victories of Drake,
the "distinguished warrior", against the Spanish during the Elizabethan 
66
age. This age marked the beginnings of the British Empire and he
6 7concluded that Britain was "even from old, the paragon of countries".
With regard to the development of material progress in his own day 
Merivale was extremely consistent and specific. If progress meant the 
"gradual improvement" of European civilization then he was not opposed 
to it.68 This was a very qualified view of progress, never one of 
"universal" progress, with which he believed his contemporaries were 
obsessed.69 Intellectual or religious progress had no basis in the past, 
or for that matter, in the present. lor example, although the United 
States had been founded in the same manner as modem Europe, and had 
improved materially, that country was still confronted with a struggle 
in which the banner of progress appears for some time past to have been
28
giving way before that of barbarians; in which the prevalence of the
coarser element tends to keep the grown intellect of the country down to
the level of childhood; and its public morality down to the lowest standard
71compatible with the preservation of society*" Despite this fact, he
complained in 1854 that the "North American pronounces Europe retrograding,
simply because the rapid advance of his republic outstrips that of the old
quarters of the world." He rejected this North American judgment as
fallacious. He pointed out that material progress was entirely different
from the moral state of any society because an "obstinate vitality. '. .often
72animates what are termed worn-out races and institutions."
Most of his examples of progress were drawn from British society.
Improvements in transportation with the advent of railways and steamships
were the most apparent. Although they enabled the British to travel to
almost every part of the world, they made it inevitable that one travelled
for "thousands of miles, pent up with mobs of fellow creatures in steamers,
railways and overgrown inns." While the "smartest young Oxonian" was 
73roaming the globe Merivale contended that the condition of the "mass
74of people" had not improved very much, if at all. He could see this 
process at work first hand because he lived for a time in Devon and
had to take the train to London every week to reach his office in Downing
75 76Street. Progress, he concluded, was an extremely complex notion.
At times Merivale wished he had been b o m  in another age:
i
...we look to this portion of the past; and feel sometimes 
tempted to exchange all our refinement and luxury all our 
vast wealth and outward civilization— nay, even the opulence 
of imagination exhibited in our era, and the ardour of purpose 
which belongs to it— for the quiet industry, the rude plenty, 
the tasteless habits, and the unpoetical cast of thought of the 
first Brunswick reigns.77
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As a critic of British society Merivale deplored the bad taste of English 
architecture. It had been built far too quickly .and poorly. He hoped
78his contemporaries would build for the future, not just for the present.
In this instance, perhaps, he was unjust as his chief example was the
building of the National Gallery. The same was true when he compared
ancient and modern art. He preferred the sculptures of Aegina and "Gothic
79Cathedrals" to the creations of the nineteenth century. Merivale frequently
compared his own society to that of Greece and Rome. This love of classical
societies was probably a product of his studies at Oxford in the 1820's.
He did, however, take into account the differences in time and cultural
milieu. In 1865, in his Historical Studies, he wrote that the importance
of classical study to modern man revealed:
...the vast ocean of moral and intellectual being such as it 
really is, subject to aeons of rise and fall, and not a 
steady onward current continually gaining ground; and, by 
so doing, administers a reasonable check to that ambitious 
tendency which elevates but often misleads us--an indis- 
criminating confidence in the destiny and powers of our
species.80
It was precisely because "each generation" had not always enjoyed the
81
"accumulated knowledge of preceding ones" that the historian needed
82
to understand both his own world and that of the past. This rule
applied to any social reformer who should not mistake "improvements"
of a material kind as causes of change. They were merely "signs".
What was required to effect change, was "some new motive of action" from
83
individuals in any particular society.
The values which would bring about change would come from the 
middle class. The greatness of Elizabethan England, he pointed out, 
was a result of the development of a merchant or "middle class". A 
gradual social revolution had followed which made England, for the first
30
time, a great imperial power. Although England had become rich and
powerful he had to admit that the late sixteenth century was not a "golden
age" because the "labouring body of the people" were "getting rather worse
than better".^ The cause of inequality was inadequate education.^
Once again, Merivale’s middle class bias was evident. The working class
86were to be denied access to education because of economic exigencies.
On the issue of the condition of the working class Merivale became 
gradually more pessimistic in outlook. In 1835, he declared that the 
upper classes would eventually disappear because the English aristocracy 
was a mere "convention" which had been "founded on fortuitous circumstances", 
yet he never doubted that the backbone of the aristocracy, the system of
87property, was inviolable, something for the state to "cherish and defend."
Reform, whether social, economic or political, was therefore limited
because the lower classes would not improve themselves. However, most
of the educational institutions, such as Harrow and Oxford, were the
preserves of the upper and middle classes. Aware of this conundrum,
88Merivale was never able to solve it satisfactorily.
When Merivale linked his ideas of class to the economy of Europe
in the nineteenth century, further contradictions appeared. He noted
in the late 1830’s that very little economic progress had been made 
89
since 1815. The industrialization and urbanization of Britain, had 
caused this economic inequality and Britain was moving "...towards a 
state of society in which a few great capitalists— a vast multitude of 
dependent labourers— and an idle class living on fixed revenues derived 
in various ways from the income of the rest will form the whole population 
of our non-agricultural districts...." But he refused to consider, much
31
less advocate, any "radical” program such as socialism to ameliorate these
evils. Complacently he placed his hopes for gradual material improvement
on statistical research, the "well-directed efforts of the enlightened
classes" and the institutions of church (the Church of England of which
90he was a member) and state. This attitude reflected his relatively
pessimistic view of human nature, especially of the lower classes of
society who were lacking in "energy" and were for the most part unwilling
91to be improved by those who thought they knew better.
In 1848, after observing the revolution in Paris, Merivale began
to accept the class system as a sine qua non. He became more Wary of
the possible consequences if the lower classes ever assumed political 
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power. Property and law and order should be maintained at all costs
93against revolutionary change. Over the next twenty years, Merivale’s 
attitudes hardened on this point. By 1870, he concluded that the adapta­
bility of British institutions was largely a myth. They were
...not created by or for the people, but by and for powerful 
classes of the people. Their details— speaking for them of 
course in their early period— were little else than a series 
of contrivances to render the exercise of power by those classes 
safer and more complete. And when the possessors of power were 
obliged to admit a larger section of the community to partake 
it, they did so, not by fair and equal distribution, but by 
erecting new privileged classes, fenced by new barriers, 
alongside their own.94
By the late 1860?s, Merivale had become an authoritarian liberal like many
of his acquaintances, Sir Henry S. Maine,Sir George C. Lewis and Sir
James F. Stephen.
This attitude was further augmented by the apparent failure of
republicanism in the United States and, afterwards, by the attempts to
pass a reform bill in Britain in the 1860’s. Naturally he was influenced
32
by imperial events as well, particularly by the enormous problem which
had been created as a consequence of responsible government and the
Indian Mutiny of 1857-1858.
The American Civil War and its consequences dominated Merivale’s
attention in the early 1860’s. During the summer of 1868, he even
travelled to the United States to observe the consequences of the War on
the spot. His critical assessment was published in two perceptive articles
in Fraser’s Magazine. He had never been pleased with republicanism because
it was prone to lawlessness and violence. The same critique was applied
in the 1840’s to the United States although he was, then, more optimistic
concerning its future. Despite the political divisiveness of American
politics and the moral reprehensibility of slavery, the United States had
three redeeming features— the elements of future imperial greatness,
95large amounts of good land, and a vigorous labour force. One year 
later, in 1847, he began to have more doubts concerning American moral 
weakness and the "corruption of administrative departments" within its
4- 96government.
These misgivings grew after the "mad outbreak of 1848 and its first
97consequences" in Europe. In 1858, reflecting upon the changes which
had occurred over the past ten years Merivale regretted that Californians
had failed to place their political system on a "rational and solid basis".
Such a democracy, "pushed to the extreme", lacked law, order and respect
for authority. Comparing the social impact of the gold rushes upon
Australia and California, he restated his objections to republicanism:
There was fin Australia] no doubt a considerable amount of crime 
and violence; one serious insurrection, some sanguinary riots; 
but the still, regular voice of old English law and order was 
heard throughout. The true conservative element of society,
33
reverence for established institutions, insignificant in 
themselves, but most significant as parts of a whole, 
carried the community safely through a struggle of 
unparalleled intensity.
Because of the inherent weakness of republicanism and the volatile nature
of the slavery issue Merivale was not surprised by the outbreak of the
American Civil War.^
Having crossed the North Atlantic to New York in the summer of 1868
he immediately responded to the material splendour and then the "'loudness'
of the gay pattern" of New York. He praised Central Park equating it
99with a "paradise like Kubla Khan's." As he toured the country he became 
more critical of American life. Constitutionally he admired the Americans 
for creating on "utilitarian principles", something he had always decried, 
a state which had endured, by its "sheer elasticity", the ferocity of the 
Civil War. Nevertheless corruption in American life was still evident 
and was epitomized in his mind by the impeachment of President Johnson.
In the western states lawlessness was still rampant and would continue 
unless it was in some way checked by lawyers, "assisted by that of the 
bowie-knive and the revolver. American life would not be immune from 
the "great" and inevitable conflict of the future--that between the classes 
of society, but it did not overly concern him for as he put it: "Qui
- T M1 0 2vivra verra: not I ."
In Britain in 1866 and 1867 Merivale watched attempts at political 
reform with a jaundiced eye. Writing to Sir Henry Maine he declared that 
British politics was "quite asleep" despite news of heated debates over 
a reform bill and a major cabinet reshuffle. He told Maine he preferred 
a moderate reform bill--one which "might give us another quarter of a 
century to prepare for further change." When the bill was passed in
3^
1867 he was very displeased because it was:
A very wild measure indeed: But the oddest, almost the
wildest, part of it, to me, is the 'representation of 
minorities' dodge. As at present passed, it can only 
affect some twelve votes on both sides together, and 
therefore is nothing at all. But if meant as the thin 
end of the wedge to introduce a "principle"— and this 
is what its promoters say— then it ensures us a pleasing 
future of unlimited Reform discussion, to begin in the 
year 1869, and end in the first year of the first British 
Napoleon.
By 1 8 6 8, Merivale had grown so disillusioned that he had a greater
political allegiance to ,}steady Toryism" and he certainly admired the
103"fertile genius" of Disraeli. As a civil servant, however,
Merivale could only view party politics from the outside.
Merivale was influenced by events, ideas and individuals 
within Europe and Britain, nevertheless, his greatest interest 
after he became Professor of Political Economy in 1837 was the British 
Empire. During the five years Merivale was at Oxford he wrote 
and published a series of lectures on the economic history of the 
Empire. In the Lectures he commented upon British imperial policy 
in the l830's. Although he was critical of certain aspects of 
that policy Merivale did not attack the Colonial Office or 
James Stephen, the permanent undersecretary, as many other commentators 
had done. The Lectures established his reputation as a knowledgeable, 
sympathetic and constructive critic of the British Empire. When 
Stephen was forced to retire in the fall of 18^-7 Merivale was 
chosen as his successor. The next chapter will examine Merivale's 
role in the Colonial Office from l8V? to i860.
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Chapter 2: The Colonial Office, 1847-1860
Herman Merivale’s appointment to an assistant undersecretaryship at 
the Colonial Office in October 1847 gave him the opportunity to devote 
the rest of his life to imperial affairs. As his son, Herman Charles 
Merivale, recalled in 1902, his father had "liked his quiet influence" 
at Numbers 13 and 14 Downing Street. He left his mark upon successive 
Secretaries of State for the Colonies, on colonial governors and on 
colonial affairs in Britain and overseas. This was no small achieve­
ment, for during the years from 1847 to 1860 when Merivale was at the 
Colonial Office, significant changes occurred in the manner in which 
Britain was linked with its colonies.
In the late 1840’s steam was beginning to replace sail power and in 
the 1860’s the telegraph, began to be used in emergencies as a substitute 
for despatches as a mode of imperial communication. Changes were also 
occurring in the white settlement colonies particularly as a consequence 
of policies of self-government and defence, wars between white settlers 
and native peoples and, most importantly, territorial expansion of the 
Empire. In Britain there was political instability and frequent changes 
of ministries. In these circumstances Merivale was a steadying force 
supplying a good measure of continuity to the Colonial Office. Merivale’s 
greatest contribution was to bring about a change in the crucial relation­
ship between the Office and the colonial governors. Nevertheless, as he 
became aware throughout the 1850’s, neither he nor his colleagues in 
London were able to determine the manner or the degree in which the 
British Empire expanded at this time. The various complex changes, which
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were occurring overseas, proved to be far more significant than any 
direct actions taken by the Colonial Office in Downing Street.
The administrative workings of the Colonial Office have been ac­
curately and intensively explored by J. W. Cell in a number of studies 
the most important of which was his British Colonial Administration in 
the Mid-Nineteenth Century (1970). It is therefore unnecessary to re­
peat all his judgments which this study of Merivale merely confirms. It 
is sufficient to reiterate that the Colonial Office was run largely by 
a few men despite the size of the establishment (approximately 40). 
Theoretically the Secretary of State always had the prerogative to make 
the final decision on any matter—  even if it was trivial. The per­
manent officials, consisting of the permanent undersecretary, assistant 
undersecretaries and the chief clerks for each department acted as the 
Secretary of State’s advisers. The parliamentary undersecretary aided 
the Secretary of State with political matters and usually did not in­
terfere in the running of the Office itself. The operation of the 
Colonial Office depended on the abilities of the Secretary of State 
and how long he was in Office. In the 1850’s, as will be shown below, 
when the latter was sick, incompetent,disinterested or absent usually 
the functions of the Secretary of State devolved on the permanent 
undersecretary. Many times after 1852 Merivale possessed an inordinate 
amount of power within the Office. In addition the permanent members 
of the Office continually influenced the Secretary of State by their 
interpretation of the material which they received from the colonies, 
particularly the governor’s despatches which they wrote down in the 
form of minutes and memoranda. This state of things was not of course
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fully known by contemporary critics of the Empire.1
The chief complaint came from the Office's nineteenth century critics
who invariably assumed that James Stephen and his colleagues were 
actually running the Empire and when anything went wrong the latter
O
became the scapegoats for British imperial failures. A myth devel­
oped, chiefly propagated by the Danish scholar C.A.G. Bodelsen in 
his Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, that the permanent members 
of the Colonial Office were intent on getting rid of the British 
Empire: "Still more significant however than these proofs of Separatist 
leanings on the part of party politicians is the fact that Separatism, 
or at any rate the belief that separation was unavoidable, was for many
years accepted as a guiding principle by the leading permanent officials
3of the Colonial Office." Lacking an understanding of the internal
as well as the external administrative practices of the Colonial
Office many historians have continued to assert that the Colonial Office
1+
lacked "vision" and preferred a devolution of metropolitan influence.
In fact the Colonial Office in the early and mid—Victorian period 
did have long-range plans but it was severely circumscribed by the 
political situation in Britain, other departments within the British 
government, notably the Treasury, and most importantly, the existing 
circumstances in British colonies overseas. British colonial policy, 
to the extent it emanated from Downing Street, was therefore limited 
by the process of British imperialism itself.5
Merivale understood this relationship between Colonial Office 
policy and the process of imperialism. He was one of the few members
of the Office who wrote extensively about the problems which confronted 
the Empire. While the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and the 
parliamentary undersecretaries were busy with political matters and the 
lower level of clerks were intent on deciphering despatches and drafting 
or copying replies for the next mail, Merivale was able, because of 
the nature of his duties, to see the Empire as a whole. He wrote 
about all parts of the Empire and even travelled to a few colonies to
g
view conditions there for himself. Merivale’s administrative work
9reveals many influences which had an impact on the Empire.
Within the Colonial Office Merivale’s role changed considerably 
from 1847 to 1860. Appointed as an assistant undersecretary in an 
emergency with no experience as an administrator, later he became 
very powerful because of his knowledge and experience. A number of 
circumstances led to Merivale’s appointment in 1847. When his term 
as Professor of Political Economy at Oxford expired in 1842 he had 
failed to obtain a similar position as Regius Professor of Modern 
History at Oxford and he was forced to go back to the profession for 
which he was trained— the Bar. For the next five years Merivale 
"rode the Western circuit" but apparently did not do very well 
financially. He continued to write articles for the Edinburgh Review 
while maintaining his interest in the British Empire and in political 
economy.^  Merivale was therefore looking for a career which was 
more secure when Lord Grey contacted him in September 1847.
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Merivale's appointment by Lord Grey was unusual for a number of
reasons. The vacancy in the Colonial Office had come about quite
suddenly with the physical decline of James Stephen. Stephen had been
under attack in the 1840's by the Colonial Reformers for his dominance
of British colonial policy and for his "separatist" leanings. In
1 T
retrospect it is clear that both these charges were untrue. Never­
theless these pressures took a heavy toll on Stephen who was very, 
perhaps too, sensitive. The strain of work told upon his eyesight, 
his mental condition suffered and he became increasingly difficult to 
work with at the Colonial Office. Grey became aware of this deteriorat­
ing situation in August 1847. He had not been aware of it earlier be­
cause he seldom visited the Office and had let Stephen handle its
12day-to-day business. Grey had to find a replacement quickly.
The best candidate for the post, Sir Frederic Rogers, had been
transferred in 1846 to the Land and Emigration Board because Grey
13
did not value his work highly. The position was therefore offered 
first to Henry Taylor, a prominent literary figure, who had been the 
head of the West Indian Department for many years. Taylor declined on 
the ground of ill-health. He had ceased to come into the Office every 
day, had his work sent to him at home and realized he could not handle 
the volume of business of the Office. Grey then asked James Spedding, 
another senior clerk, who also refused to take on the responsibility.
14
The search was extended to include candidates from outside the Office.
Eventually, Grey, acting upon the advice of Stephen, appointed 
Herman Merivale and Thomas F. Elliot as assistant undersecretaries in 
October 1847 while Stephen went on a temporary leave of absence. Grey
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had hoped Stephen would recover and return to his post but by late
October after receiving another medical report on Stephen, he made up
his mind. In his journal he wrote that he had "...likewise finally
determined today to offer Mr. H. Merivale Stephen’s place, or at least
that he wd. be appointed Under Secty of State & Council to the depart
&ti 1500 a year during Stephen's absence 15 That day he wrote
to Merivale: "In making this offer to you I think it right to inform
you that I have been principally guided by the advice of Mr. Stephen,
who judging I believe from your reputation has proposed to me his
opinion that if you can be prevailed upon to undertake this duty it
16co. CuldJ} not be committed to better hands While Grey and
Stephen did not know Merivale personally, Stephen had recommended him 
based upon the reputation of his Lectures. Merivale undoubtedly 
appealed to Stephen because (Merivale's early view of the role of the 
permanent undersecretary was very favourable. Merivale had written in 
1842 that "... Colonial Secretaries ought to allow their office to be 
a sinecure, and let the whole be conducted by some strong permanent 
undersecretary."^
Merivale, who was then at Liskeard in Cornwall and, in his own 
words, "currently engaged in revising the parliamentary lists of voters 
for this district" responded promptly to Grey’s offer. By Wednesday 
the third Merivale had accepted the position and Grey noted in his 
journal "... I hope he will answer and I like what little I have seen 
of him."18 By the end of November it was obvious Stephen would never 
return to full-time duty. Elliot was also appointed assistant under­
secretary and was to become Merivale’s administrative lieutenant
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supervising the North American department. This change, as Grey put
it ...renders it indispensable to make, at once, an endeavour which has
perhaps been too long deferred, for placing the administration of the
Colonial Office on a footing of greater strength and efficiency.""^
The age of specialization had now come to the Colonial Office. While
Merivale's own responsibility was iess than Stephen's had been there
is no doubt that the efficiency of the Office increased considerably.
One month after his appointment Herman's brother, Charles Merivale,
the Roman historian and later Dean of Ely, visited him in London. In
a letter to their sister, Louisa, Charles wrote that Herman was very
much pleased with his new profession. He remarked that Herman told him
that the Colonial Office was "like a College". Charles continued that
he "...seems to take the greatest interest ... and has already before
him various questions of great importance, all quite in his line ... «
The only complaint he has to make is the great restraint under which he
is laid by official etiquette, and the state of representation in which
he is obliged to live, so different from independence, degenerating
20
into licence, of the lawyers." For the next few years after he 
became permanent undersecretary Merivale's role at the Office was cir­
cumscribed because Grey took a great interest in the internal workings 
of the Office and made most of the important decisions himself. Stephen
even helped out occasionally with legal memoranda and taught Merivale
21
a great deal concerning constitutional questions.
Until the winter of 1852, when Lord Grey left the Colonial Office, 
Merivale was relegated to tending the affairs of the less important 
regions of the Empire notably the Australian colonies, Natal and the
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Hudson’s Bay Company territories in British North America. Grey was 
one of the few Secretaries of State for the Colonies who took his role 
at the Colonial Office extremely seriously. He had a great amount of
knowledge and experience as attested by his journal and his defense of
99
lord John Russell s colonial administration. After Grey’s departure
Merivale s role increased considerably. There were frequent changes
in the position of Secretary of State for the Colonies because of
political instability within Britain. While Merivale could always be
overruled in theory, in practice he was, from 1852 to 1860, generally
able to lead his political masters and this situation made his position 
23
’’crucial". During his first four years at the Colonial Office, however, 
in comparison with that of James Stephen, Merivale’s role was a minor one.^ 
In 1853 Lord Grey published his Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell’s 
Administration. In it he described his relationship to the permanent 
officials in the Colonial Office. He attempted to put to rest the idea, 
propagated by the Colonial Reformers, that the "business of the Depart­
ment is conducted ... by some mysterious influence within the walls of 
the Colonial Office, which under every different Secretary of State 
prevents what is right from being done, and causes disappointment and 
discontent to the Colonists, and persons connected with the Colonies, 
who have business to transact with the Department." Grey wrote that the 
opposite was true and he acknowledged his debt to the permanent staff;
for the exceedingly able and willing assistance I received from 
them in conducting its business while I presided over it, I can 
assert, in the most positive manner, that never upon any occasion 
was there on their part the slightest attempt improperly to influence 
my decision upon questions brought before me, or to withhold the best 
aid they could afford, in the execution of measures which may have 
been decided upon contrary to their opinion.
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Grey was however, not the last Secretary of State for the Colonies 
who set out to confront the problems of the Empire. While many of 
his successors were disinterested or incompetent, the fifth Duke of 
Newcastle and Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton worked closely with Merivale 
and supplied the Office with continuity in the face of complex imperial 
problems.
Merivale possessed all the necessary characteristics of a good per­
manent undersecretary of state. Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, Secretary •. 
of State for the Colonies in 1858-1859, described him as "somewhat 
combative and formidable" in appearance and "massive in intellect".
A quiet person, he was also a "remarkably good and quick writer", being 
able to get through an enormous number of despatches every day. If 
there was "inconsistency" in British colonial policy it was not due to 
Merivale1 s presence. As one commentator has declared emphatically, 
"inconsistency" was "...repugnant to his logical mind. He knew that 
compromise, moderation and expedience must guide him in most con­
stitutional and semi-constitutional questions. But, upon occasion, his 
clear perception of consequences made him impatient of positions which
were only tenable for the time being." He was, as a consequence, "...
26
too advanced to be followed by his colleagues ...." There were very 
good reasons why British colonial policy has been characterized as a
"pattern of ’ drift
From 1852 to 1860 Merivale spent a great deal of his time helping 
the Secretaries of State for the Colonies adjust to the internal working 
of the Office. As soon as one Secretary of State began to understand 
colonial affairs the ministry fell and another politician appeared at the 
doors of Numbers 13 and 14 Downing Street. One example was Lord
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Palmerston, as Merivale's son later recounted:
And so it was that the airy and famous Minister introduced him­
self one morning. "Well, you hear that I've come to look after the 
Colonies myself now Russell's gone. In the first place, Mr. 
Merivale, where are the Colonies? Glad to see that you've plenty 
of maps about. °
With ministers such as Palmerston, Merivale gained more responsibility
in the Colonial Office but at the same time the work of the Office
became concerned with immediate problems rather than with any long-
range planning. More than ever Merivale and the Secretaries of State
29had to rely upon the reports of the colonial governors. Particularly 
with respect to the "native" question and responsible government, 
British colonial policy became Increasingly less influenced by Downing 
Street and more by individuals and events overseas.
Despite these trying circumstances Merivale got along very well 
with the clerks in the Office even if they failed to pass on an important 
document to him or misplaced one and he also had a sense of humour.
For example, in 1854 upon receiving a letter from a settler in southern 
Africa Droposing to send a gift of two lion cubs to Queen Victoria and 
asking whether the Queen would take the gift as a compliment or not, 
Merivale minuted to the parliamentary undersecretary of state: As to .
the lions you will be the judge: I should think the Queen would not 
look a gift lion in the mouth, and that Mr. Vowe may be safely informed 
that he need fear no such misconstruction of his present as he appre­
hended ...." The Secretary of State, the fifth Duke of Newcastle, ever




Ironically, the Duke of Newcastle and Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, 
with whom Merivale had the best relations, have been portrayed in­
accurately by imperial historians as incompetent. Lytton was the only 
Secretary of State with xdiom Merivale carried on an extensive private 
correspondence. Many of the important decisions made with respect to 
British North America and southern Africa in 1858 were taken by Merivale 
in consultation with Lytton at the latter’s estate in Hertfordshire. In 
August 1858 Lytton made a marginal note concerning their relationship: 
"The long experience of H. Merivale, the solidity and breadth of his 
intellect enable me to pause long before I dissent from any suggestions 
of his -- even tho' ~ he gave it at the impulse of the moment." Lytton
obviously thought about the last clause because, after he wrote it, he
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crossed it out. There is no doubt that the feelings were reciprocal.
Merivale accepted a "C.B." (the only public honour he ever received) in
September 1858 because it was recommended by Lytton. One year later he
refused a knighthood offered to him by the Duke of Newcastle because he
thought it would cause jealousy among his subordinates in the Colonial 
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Office.
The most accurate view of Merivale’s role at the Colonial Office 
came from the young and inexperienced parliamentary undersecretary of 
state, the fourth Earl of Carnarvon in 1858 and 1859. Carnarvon and 
Merivale differed in their imperial ideas, especially on colonial 
federation, but Carnarvon had an enormous amount of respect for Merivale 
describing him as " ’... 'a very able, clear-headed, cool, and remarkably 
good and quick writer. ' It took him some months to know and like him, 
but, 'when I see how completely the affairs of tne Office have been in
52
his hands and how steadily and safely he has guided them, I feel that
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much is due to him."1 With respect to imperial administration
Carnarvon realized the importance of Merivale’s vast amount of knowledge
and experience. In theory he believed quite correctly that he and
Merivale were equal in authority under the Secretary of State for the
Colonies. In practice he knew that when there was a difference of
opinion: "... I need hardly say that in his experience, intimacy with
colonial subjects and clear judgement, I have always seen good reason
for Mr. Merivale’s view and have often ultimately acquiesced in it
34myself after holding at first an opposite opinion."
It made little difference to Merivale whether his political
masters were Liberal or Conservative. He seems to have been just as
friendly with Conservatives as Liberals. His interest in the British
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Empire rather than British politics was paramount. While Merivale’s 
role changed considerably from 1847 to 1860 the physical surroundings 
'in which he worked did; not.
When Merivale arrived at Numbers 13 and 14 Downing Street in 
October 1847, he found himself in very delapidated quarters. Housed 
in two old dwellings which had been condemned as unsafe Merivale had 
found the conditions in which the permanent staff had to work appalling. 
All the rooms were used including the basements and the attics. There 
was no space for an adequate library and there were very few maps. In 
1859 the Colonial Office had requested that a "competent Architect" be 
sent to investigate the buildings "to make sure Number 14 Downing Street 
■yrj^ll not fall in." When the report was received one of the staff minuted 
that it was "by no means tranquillizing." Merivale commented that the
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situation was: "Very much the reverse, I think: but what can we do?
Nothing will be done until the public is shocked by some great accident.
No major change was made in these conditions until the 1870's.^
Fortunately, the internal administration of the Office did not at all
reflect its external appearance. It was not, at least for Merivale and i
the higher officials, a sleepy and humdripin" p l a c e . C o n f r o n t e d  with
changes in technology and an increasing number of despatches, Merivale
and his colleagues conducted their affairs, in comparison with other
branches of government at the time, with efficiency and, in most cases,
with humanity. The most important change which occurred included a
devolution of responsibility between the members of the Office and the
39colonial governors and an increasing amount of specialization.
The first important change in the internal organization of the 
Colonial Office came in 1853-1854 with the Northcote-Trevelyan 
Commission. The commissioners, investigating the Colonial Office as 
well as other branches of government, focused their attention on patron­
age in the civil service and attempted to determine whether or not greater 
efficiency could be achieved if appointments were made by means of com­
petitive examinations. The result was a compromise for the Colonial
Office largely because of Merivale's testimony to the Commission against
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the use of formal examinations. Only a limited form of competition
was adopted by the Office and then only for the lower ranks, not the higher.
Merivale’s testimony to the commissioners was equivocal. He believed 
that if competition was introduced to the civil service the "abuse of 
patronage would be altogether destroyed." Nevertheless, he refused to 
say to what extent patronage really "injures the Public Service . This
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fonn of competition for positions would, if established, not ensure 
that the clerks would be better qualified for their jobs because the 
work could only be learned through practice. It was a boring and 
tedious business because the copying of despatches required perseverance 
rather than originality. The important point he cautioned was that 
the l,motive,, for a candidate applying to the civil service was to make 
a "...livelihood:, and from no other motive. They go in to obtain a 
certain income, rising gradually, there is no lottery —  no expectation 
of prizes. The scant possibilities of what are called 'staff1 appoint­
ments, or removal to some other and better paid sphere of action are, 
as all acquainted with the Civil Service know, hardly admissible 
into the calculation. 11 In the Colonial Office, for example, it took 
at least twenty years before a clerk would reach a salary of £400 a 
year# but Merivale noted that they were not "underpaid" compared with 
other departments. He concluded by advocating "a very much modified 
system of competition". Appointments to the Colonial Office should be 
left in the hands of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the 
latter should encourage applications and compile a list. When a 
vacancy occurred the place should be filled by means of a 1 fair 
competition" preferably by an "independent body".
In 1855 Henry Labouchere, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
adopted Merivale!s recommendations and introduced a mixed system of 
patronage and merit with competitive examinations for junior clerks. 
Appointments to positions of responsibility such as assistant or per- 
manent undersecretaryships remained a matter of patronage. Early 
in 1856 Merivale confessed to Labouchere his doubts as to the efficacy
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of this scheme. The major drawback, he argued, was the manner in which 
the business of the Office was conducted:
... Division of labour is not practised in our office —  probably 
not in other offices -- as it ought to be. If we possessed a clerk 
with that not very uncommon faculty, a capacity for accounts, and 
a taste for them, he would be invaluable. To him we should submit 
the numerous & often ravelled questions which arise on colonial 
estimates. At present, these, when of importance, are generally 
referred to Mr. Strachey, the precis writer, who is able to deal 
with them very effectually: but we want to have him assisted, & 
there is, I fear, scarcely anyone capable of doing so. But one good 
accountant would serve our turn to exact of every candidate he 
should be a good accountant would be very superfluous, and deprive 
us of good men......
All this arises from the extremely miscellaneous character of 
our work: which you will appreciate, but which I doubt whether the 
examiners thoroughly do. This is the great difficulty in the way 
of any system of examination being of much real service to us. .
By 1860 he was less reserved in his comments. In the last five years
he admitted that the appointments had produced "on the whole" a "superior
class" of clerks than ever before. Nevertheless, he maintained that the
chief criterion should be that of intellect: "Taken all things to-
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gether, the man with the better brain will be the better man." This
dictum should not be taken too literally because Merivale used his
position at the Colonial Office to obtain posts in the civil service
44
for his friends and even his son.
Patronage within the Colonial Office was also present in the Office s 
relationship to individuals and departments m  Britain and in the colonies. 
White colonists who promoted the interests of the British Empire were 
sometimes given "honours" or material rewards for their services and 
there were even a few cases of nepotism. Many colonial governors 
received their initial appointment because of their friendship with the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies or Merivale. For example, Sir George 
Bowen, was appointed to the governorship of Queensland largely due to
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Merivalefs intercession on his behalf. 46 r™ , .
The problem was exacer­
bated by the fact that there was, at least in the early and mid-Vic­
torian period, a dearth of qualified candidates to undertake positions 
of responsibility in the civil service at home or overseas.4  ^ Any 
appointment was, however, dependent upon the ability of the person 
once in office.
The chief criterion in the Colonial Office for promotion was 
merit. While few clerks were ever fired, it was difficult for anyone 
who did not possess exceptional ability to be promoted. If anything, 
by the late 1850's, the office had fallen seriously behind other 
departments in salary increases because, as Merivale minuted:
... 1. The constitution of the office, being composed of many 
more juniors & fewer seniors, relatively, than other offices: 
which makes promotion relatively slow: 2. The accidental cir­
cumstance that the office was formed, about 1824, by appointing 
together a number of young men of the same age: You will observe 
that (after Mr. Smith) the next nine gentlemen were appointed 
almost simultaneously. All the rest are considerably their 
juniors: & kept from rising by the number thus stationed over
their heads ... .
This condition of the office has been recognized by suc­
cessive Secretaries of State, but the very rapid succession in 
that office of late years has prevented its being seriously 
considered.
Merivale supported the petition by his clerks, interceded on their
behalf with the Secretary of State and gained from the Treasury the
funds necessary to augment their salaries. He argued that the Colonial
Office was losing many competent individuals because of these conditions.
After a "paper war" with the Treasury Merivale, having nothing to gain
materially for himself, stood by his colleagues and their salaries were
increased. 48 For the most part he adopted the same attitude with re-
49
gard to individual requests for promotion.
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In 1859 the chief clerk at the Colonial Office, Peter Smith, retired. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies turned first to candidates within 
the Office before making the appointment. As permanent undersecretary 
Merivale was responsible for recommending members of the Office for pro­
motion and his advice guided the decision of the Duke of Newcastle. 
Merivale explained that the choice was an important one because the 
chief clerkship was retained "...mainly as a mode of rewarding senior 
clerks of high merit, who each have no other promotion to look to ."
The chief clerkship had developed from 1848 into a post of " very
great importance, though in minor details: & the efficiency of the 
department greatly depends on it. He must be constantly at his post, 
conferring with other departments, household, &c. &c. though of course 
he has time enough for doing a great deal of departmental business 
besides." For these reasons Merivale resisted any attempts to have 
Henry Taylor, senior clerk in charge of the West Indian Department and 
the most senior of the clerks, appointed. For many years Taylor, suffering 
from asthma, had capably handled his responsibilities but had done so from 
home, as Merivale put it succinctly, "on paper". Taylor wanted the pro­
motion to increase his salary and had promised to come to the Office on a 
regular basis. Merivale doubted that Taylor would be able to keep it 
up for very long: "... I am perfectly certain that in such work Mr.
Taylor would break down. Neither his health, nor his habits of many 
years would suit it. He would try: would fail: and then we should have 
all the ordinary difficulties of devising substitutes and accommodations." 
Merivale recommended the senior clerk of the Australian department, Gordon
Gairdner, and the latter was appointed chief clerk. Taylor was given a
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substantial raise in salary.
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Merivale had great success in handling the internal affairs of the 
Colonial Office but he had more difficulty in his relations with other 
branches of government particularly the Treasury which was the bete noir 
of the Colonial Office in the nineteenth century. This department forced 
Merivale to reconsider very carefully every request for funds for the 
Office or for colonial projects overseas. As a consequence the "watch­
word" of the Office was "economy" and many worthwhile endeavours designed 
to aid the social and economic development of the British colonies were 
not undertaken. Throughout his years at the Colonial Office Merivale
fought a continual battle with the Treasury over trivial as well as
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important items of expenditure.
Merivale*s chief complaint was that the Treasury continually delayed
making its decisions. Important projects, such as the proposed railroad
between Halifax and Quebec City through New Brunswick in 1848, had to be
examined closely and approved by the Colonial Office, the Treasury and,
of course Parliament. In cases like these it was important that time
52and care be taken. In others, such as compensation to individuals 
for loss of property, usually involving small amounts of money, the
Treasury often held up the process for months by refusing to accept the
. ... 53report of the Colonial Office.
By the late 1850's Merivale had had enough of the Treasury. It 
seemed to him that Treasury "interference" was growing and was com­
pletely unwarranted. In 1856 he stated the problem clearly:
For four and five months respectively the Treasury have had these 
matters under consideration requiring only an hour or two s thought 
to settle. I am very sorry to enter into disputes with other 
departments, but I must record my own belief that these constant & 
most unreasonable delays are a very serious evil in the present
5?
state of our relations with governments under representative 
institutions: besides the private suffering they occasion. I 
have never found that private remonstrances are of any use in 
this matter, & should propose to write to the Treasury, officially, 
to the effect of the draft subjoined. But X would request you to 
weigh it attentively before concurring, as it may very possibly 
provoke a quarrel.
Henry Labouchere agreed that the Colonial Office should send a strongly- 
worded protest to the Treasury but private meetings and official letters 
of protest were all to no avail. By 1860 it seemed to Merivale as 
though the Treasury was the department of the British government which 
was "ruling" the colonies and helping to create friction especially 
between the colonies which had representative and responsible govern­
ment and the Colonial Office.
Merivale and the Colonial Office had less business with the other 
branches of government and with a few exceptions, relations were much 
more cordial. The best example was the co-operation between the 
Colonial and the Foreign Office with respect to the Palliser Expedition 
from 1857 to 1860. This undertaking, which became extremely important 
for the future economic development of Canada was first suggested by 
Sir Roderick Murchison, president of the Royal Geographical Society.
Both Merivale and John Ball, the parliamentary undersecretary, had 
personal interests in geology and geography and persuaded the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies to support the Expedition. It received the 
approval of the Treasury and the Foreign Office. In the next few years
the Office continued to support Palliser despite the disappointing
57 ^  t .
results and increasing expense of the Expedition. The best relation­
ships between departments were almost always a consequence of personal 
friendships between the permanent undersecretaries or the politicians
or both.
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Until the Crimean War in 1854 the Colonial and the War Offices
were one and the same department. When they were separated there were
many close friends in both departments. For example, Merivale had
worked for a number of years with Benjamin Hawes who had been the
parliamentary undersecretary under Lord Grey from 1848 to 1852 and
who was later transferred to the War Office. There was in the late
1850’s considerable co-operation between the two departments over
the issue of colonial self-defence. A complex system was devised
for making the colonies, which possessed responsible government,
pay for their own defence as much as possible. Imperial garrisons
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however, would be reduced only gradually* Hawes and Merivale
also arranged for the first interdepartmental council on colonial
defence and participated in a special commission on reductions in
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colonial military expenditure in 1859. On only one occasion, with
regard to the proposed transfer of the Straits Settlements to the .
Colonial Office early in 1860, Merivafe worked with the India Office.
At the India Office from i860 to 187^, he seldom acted as a liaison
60 ;
between the two Offices.
Merivale's greatest contribution to the efficiency of the Colonial 
Office concerned the massive amounts of paper containing the despatches 
sent to London by the colonial governors. Although it is true that the 
Colonial Office was separated physically from the colonies and the
members of the Colonial Office rarely, if ever, visited the colonies,
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there were concrete links between the two. Increasingly white
6 2
settlers and even some Amerindians were visiting the Colonial Office.
The most important connection between London and the colonies was com­
munication, both official and private, between the Colonial Office and
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their officials in each colony. Merivale, realizing the importance of 
these links, contributed to their development in his role as permanent 
undersecretary.
Only a few months after his appointment Merivale initiated a very 
simple but extremely important means of improving the efficiency of 
the Colonial Office. After receiving a long despatch from Sir Harry 
Smith in southern Africa, Merivale suggested to Lord Grey that all 
despatches and reports should be paginated and paragraphed by their 
originators. Merivale's model, although he had no experience with it 
prior to his coming to the Colonial Office, was India: "The latter
is the practice in Indian correspondence as far as I have seen, and 
I am told uniformly so. The ease which it affords of referring, is 
very great: especially in the case of a colony like the Cape, where
the reports are often necessarily long; ...." Lord Grey agreed and 
ordered Merivale to send out a colonial circular to implement this 
change. As a result imperial administration became more efficient.
The permanent undersecretary could immediately direct his attention to 
the most important parts of a governor’s despatch and its enclosures 
and then send out his response more quickly, first to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies for his approval and then to the colonial gover­
nor. This change did not, of course, mean that errors were no longer
, • •, 63made by the permanent staff or by the colonial governors.
Another change from Stephen’s time was Merivale’s ability to dele­
gate authority within the Colonial Office. Whereas Stephen had conducted 
most of the business of reading all the despatches and minuting each one 
laboriously Merivale gave greater responsibility to his assistant under-
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secretary, Thomas F. Elliot, and to his senior clerks. ^ Nevertheless,
letters were sometimes delayed, misplaced or even lost in the large
amount of paper which circulated through the halls of 13 and 14 Dawning
Street. In June 1852 one such delay occurred and it clearly revealed
the manner in which the internal affairs of the Office were conducted:
I CHerivale^j am afraid I cannot altogther coincide in Mr. Blackwood's 
minute. To myself personally it is of very great importance that the 
box^s should be seen by my private secretary on their way from the 
Sec y of State to the department. He selects for me, by the minutes, 
papers which he thinks it essential I should see at once, either 
with a view to prepare the drafts on them, or in order that I may 
know Sir J. Pakington's decision on important questions which have 
been before me. If he did not do so, they would all come down 
together from the department with the drafts on them: or else I 
must put each department to the trouble of looking out & sending 
down what they think is important. I should see at once: which 
is far better done by one private secretary who has general judge­
ment as to what I may require. I concur in the last remark; but 
think, that when a private secretary has occasion to absent himself 
for more than an hour he should either ask another private secretary 
to do this for him, or, in his absence, let the box go up at once to 
the department. I am quite aware some delay is occasioned by the 
present method, but believe much greater inconvenience would result 
from changing it.^ -*
Considering the number of despatches, reports and letters from private 
individuals in Britain and the colonies the number of errors which were 
made was surprisingly few and the business of the Colonial Office was 
conducted with more than a reasonable amount of efficiency. In one 
important case Merivale discovered a significant error -made by another 
branch of the civil service, the Admiralty. A spelling error in a despatch 
from the Admiralty to Captain Fremantle of H.M.S. Juno led directly to the 
annexation by the East India Company of the Cocos or Keeling Islands 
instead of the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. The error was not
rectified and both groups of Islands became part of the BritishEmpire
_Q _ 67 
m  1857.
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Confronted with a dearth of information concerning the colonies, 
the permanent staff did their best to obtain more. 68 Nor did they 
hoard that which they possessed. They loaned or gave material to 
other branches of government, to private persons and to institutions 
such as the British Museum and the Royal Geographical Society. Hist­
orical documents, which for reasons of security might have a detrimental
effect on relations between Britain and other countries, were the only 
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exceptions. Merivale had to be careful about what literary assign­
ments he undertook because he was not allowed to write on subjects with 
which he was dealing at the Colonial Office. In private correspondence 
however, he did discuss these matters with his friends in Britain or in 
the colonies.^
The most important problem the Colonial Office faced, however, was 
distance. No matter how much information was accumulated concerning 
the colonies or how accurate it proved to be, the greatest difficulty 
was, as Merivale was constantly aware, that most of it was obsolete 
by the time it reached Downing Street. With the exception of the 
eastern colonies of British North America and those in the Mediterr­
anean most despatches took more than a month to reach London.
The Colonial Office was thereby less influential in determining the 
course of imperial events. As Merivale put it to Carnarvon in 1858 j
during the conflict .(with Sir George Grey over federation in southern \
Africa: "...'it constantly & most inconveniently happens in Cape
correspondence, that when despatches have been determined on, 
new intelligence comes at the last moment to influence the de­
cision —  but there is no help for it & I can only ask for you
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to let Sir E. Cbulwer Lytton] have them as soon as possible." 71
The only means which the Office could use to counteract the disobedience 
of colonial governors was the use of censure, immediate recall or transfer
The Colonial Office relied only once upon the telegraph in the 1850's 
and that occurred in 1858 in the Ionian Islands. In this case the 
Colonial Office used the telegraph to maintain contact with their special 
commissioner and the former Secretary of State for the Colonies, William
believed that it did not provide the Colonial Office with sufficient 
information in comparison with despatches. Colonial Office policy in 
the 1850's was directly connected with the ability of their official 
representatives in each colony to interpret events and then to act with 
or without the advice of the Colonial Office.
Considering the great distance between Britain and the colonies, one 
of the most important aspects of imperial administration , as Merivale 
realized, was the appointment of a competent colonial governor. The 
Colonial Office was biased because it preferred to appoint someone from 
the metropolis rather than from the colonies. Although the colonial 
governors came from a wide variety of social and economic backgrounds, 
the majority were drawn from the military, such as Sir George Grey, or 
from the professions —~ lawyers, doctors or administrators xn other 
branches of government. Merivale and the Secretaries of State for the 
Colonies were often personally acquainted with them before their appoint­
ment. For example, Merivale was a friend of Sir Edmund Head, a governor 
in New Brunswick and later in Canada, of Sir George Bowen in the Ionian




No greater use was made of the telegraph because Merivale
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Islands and Queensland and of Sir William Raid in Malta. After visit­
ing Reid in Malta in 1857 Merivale, not without bias, described him as 
a model:
... of the British veteran soldier of the better stamp. In saying 
this, I of course imply that he possessed, in addition to a high 
sense of honour, a courtesy of manner, gentleness, and a consider­
ation of others, which are essential to my conception of that 
character. But these, in him, were combined with somewhat rarer 
qualities. Possessed of varied accomplishments, and distinguished 
for general scientific knowledge, besides that of a very learned 
branch of his profession to which he belonged, he was withal a man 
of singular modesty; almost too deferent to the opinions of others 
in trifles, and too diffident of his own; though he had a fund of 
quiet obstinacy, too, on points which appeared to him to involve a 
principle. He had the warmest love of justice in the abstract: and 
(as happens not infrequently with men of his stamp) when he judged 
wrongly, it was generally from the strong sense of some ulterior 
right, interfering with his perception of the immediate right. His 
sense of duty towards those whose government he administered, amount­
ed almost to a passion: and so did his hatred of oppression exercised, 
or arrogance exhibited, towards them; the first happily rare in English 
dependencies, the latter only too common.
Reid was therefore, despite his inability (like other colonial governors)
to speak the language of the people who he was supposed to govern, a
" ... fitting representative of England’s rule in its aspects of benefice
„ ,.74and equity, and consideration for the governed.
Merivale had a conscious bias in favour of the colonial governors
and he allowed them a great amount of flexibility. 75 Distrusting the ability 
of colonial politicians and civil servants to govern themselves efficiently, 
he had no choice but to rely upon the colonial governor. Generally, this 
was even more true of colonies which did not possess representative 
institutions because the power of the governor was more direct and pater- 
listic. As a consequence, as one historian has noted, many of the 
decisions which were made by the Colonial Office were ... largely con­
cerned with the extent of the Governor's discretion, and with the extent
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of his responsibility to the Imperial Government for the general
7 fi
administration of his office."
Merivale attempted to increase the power and the influence of the
colonial governor because he realized the Colonial Office was severely
limited in its capacity to govern the Empire. The ideas of colonial
governors usually contained more substance than the theoretical ones of
the civil servants in London. Merivale's private correspondence with
colonial governors, designed to prevent conflict between the governor
and his colonial assembly, which possessed responsible government,
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was extremely important. The best example was Merivale's correspondence
with Sir Edmund Head in New Brunswick and in Canada. As Merivale explained
to Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton in 1858 Head had written privately because
" ... of the rapid changes of this office (seven Secretaries in one year,
1855...6) he scarcely could correspond privately with the chiefs: though
he did so with Mr. Labouchere latterly. The consequence is that he has
gone into a way of writing his narration of events in the form of long
private letters to me ...." Merivale concluded that it was "always" best
to have a "full private communication" between the colonial governor and
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the Colonial Office.
If private correspondence or confidential despatches were not possible, 
then, Merivale declared in another memorandum to Lytton, public des­
patches would have to be used and a "... public despatch to the Governor, \ 
is a despatch to his Council, and his Parliament, and the people of 
Canada. You cannot separate the Governor from the Government and
nation. And his Council will, certainly, dictate the answer: ;
1
probably in the form of a minute which he will have to send. j
If the Colonial Office answered the Canadian politicians by
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a public despatch the specific issue would almost inevitably be lost 
and an imperial quarrel would ensue: "They will probably answer sharply
—  perhaps offensively —  to the effect that we ought to mind our own 
business. Then we shall have a choice between an undignified retreat, 
and a continued controversy with Separation as the probable end of it . " 79 
A satisfactory mode of communication between the colonial governor and 
the Colonial Office was therefore essential in maintaining a stable 
and working relationship between Britain and the colonies.
Recognizing the importance of the colonial governor for the British 
Empire, Merivale fought throughout the 1850's to better their lot. For 
example, when Sir Donald Campbell died in October 1850, Merivale received 
a request from his widow asking that her return passage to Britain be paid 
Normally the governor was remunerated for his own passage to and from the 
colony which he governed but his family was not. In this case as in many 
others, Merivale succeeded in getting these restrictions changed. He 
also asked for increases in salaries for the governors, campaigned to have
them receive pensions and usually supported them in quarrels with other
80  ^officials in the colony. Either the British government paid good j
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salaries or it would not obtain efficient administrators. If the
1 colonial governor was not competent, he could be, and often was, cen—
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sured or recalled from his position. Dismissal was however, usually 
only adopted as a last resort. The most common error which a colonial 
governor could commit was to become politically partisan. For this he 
was rebuked by the Colonial Office but if he persisted, he was transferred 
to another colony. The ultimate "sin" as Sir George Grey discovered in 
1858 in southern Africa, was to continue to disregard orders from
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London. Merivale and the other members of the Colonial Office were, 
however, enormously impressed by a governor who could act competently 
on his own with only general guidance from the Colonial Office, such 
as James Douglas did in 1858 during the gold rush on the Fraser River.^
Merivale was not as influential an administrator at the Colonial Office 
as was his predecessor James Stephen. Merivale had introduced only a 
few innovations into the Office, most notably in the processing of des­
patches because he believed that the Colonial Office was already 
reasonably efficient.^ He was aware of the great limitations placed 
upon the Office’s ability to govern the Empire, primarily the important 
factors of distance and communications. He concluded that the only 
means which he had to deal with these problems was to re-organize the 
Office and its relations with the colonial governors. He was, however, 
unable to accomplish that goal. Merivale tried to introduce specializ­
ation into the formation of policy. As a consequence, the Office was 
better equipped to handle the increase in the number of despatches and 
more cordial relations were usually, but not always, developed with the 
colonial governors. British colonial policy, such as it existed in the 
1850’s, became increasingly fragmented and beset with vacillation.
Despite Merivale’s attempts to bring the Empire closer to London, it
• J 85 remained as far away as ever.
Merivale's guidelines for the Colonial Office's relationship with 
the colonies consisted of the limitations of knowledge, economy and 
distance. The watchword in the Colonial Office after the departure of 
Stephen and Grey was not innovation but co-operation between the various 
members of the Office and their official representatives overseas.
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However, the Office's inability to control events overseas led it into 
conflicts with white settlers concerning colonial self-government and 
even more so into costly wars between native peoples and white settlers 
particularly in southern Africa.
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Chapter 3: Free Trade and the British Empire, 1847-1860
Merivale fs advocacy of the doctrine of free trade accounted for
i
his initial interest in and his long contact with the British Empire.
Free trade led him into academic discussions on aspects of political 
economy in the 1830's and 1840's and once his reputation was established 
he was appointed to the civil service where he remained until 1874. Free 
trade had two effects on Merivale's thought and actions with respect 
to the British Empire. It provided the initial theoretical justifies- 
tion for the maintenance of the British Empire. As an administrator 
he supported the creation of an empire for Britain which was based 
on practical principles derived primarily from classical political 
economy. Merivale wanted to develop an overseas empire which could 
be controlled from Downing Street and yet could be expanded economically 
by commercial companies or white settlers. While Merivale's imperial 
ideal failed, largely because the Empire could not be ruled from London, 
he contributed to the development of an informal economic empire 
alongside that of a formal one. By dominating the world ”by means of a 
natural superiority in industry and commerce" Britain had created by 
the 1870's "almost an empire, in all but name." In Merivale's view 
"...by actual possession here and there; by quasi-territorial dominion, 
under treaties, in other places; by great superiority of general com­
merce and the carrying trade everywhere, we have acquired an immense 
political influence in all that division of the world which lies
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between India and Japan®11 This expansion caused complex problems 
for Merivale at the Colonial Office particularly with respect to 
colonial self-government and the "native question". All these 
questions were, of course, unforeseen by Merivale in the late 1830's 
when he became interested in political economy, Adam Smith and free 
trade.
The Political Economy Club was founded in 1821 and meetings 
were held regularly throughout the year. It was exclusive and the mem­
bers were supposed to develop their own interests in political economy. 
However, their "real and important obligation" was to keep a watch 
over public affairs, particularly "the Press" and to publish articles 
which would maintain the objectives of political economy in relation­
ship to Britain and the Empire. As Drummond Professor of Political 
Economy at the University of Oxford from 1837 to 1842 Merivale auto­
matically became an honorary member of the Club. He did not become a 
full-fledged member until February 1847. As an honorary member he 
led the discussion of only one question and that occurred on June 6, 
1839 after he had published a number of articles on political 
economy for the Edinburgh Review. That first question, however, was 
most revealing because it involved an important problem: "What
meaning is to be attributed to the proposition of Adam Smith, that 
Capital employed in the Foreign Trade 'gives but one half the encour­
agement to the industry, on productive labour of the Country1, which 
is given by Capital employed in the Home Trade?" By comparison, 
his last question on May 6, 1870, was equally.as complex but much more
direct: "What are the economical advantages or disadvantages arising
p
to this country from the possession of India?" MerivaleTs interest 
in the British Empire was a direct consequence of his study of Adam 
Smith and the classical political economists of the early nineteenth 
century.
The first written evidence of Merivale*s interest in political 
economy was his "Introductory Lecture on Political Economy". In this 
masterly discussion of the objectives of political economy Merivale 
laid the groundwork for his Lectures. In all these writings he was 
not an original thinker but rather an "intelligent eclectic". As a 
result Merivale was not necessarily less influential in propagating 
free trade within his own society although he undoubtedly had little 
impact on the theoretical development of political economy in nine­
teenth century Britain. He was regarded as representative of capitalist
3ideology by no less a person than Karl Marx in Das Kapital.
In his "Introductory Lecture" Merivale defined political economy 
as "the science of those laws which regulate the production and distri­
bution of national wealth." But he went on to make an important 
distinction about this "science" which he continued to make for the rest 
of his life. Political economy was "...strictly a science, not in 
name only, but in method. Its object is to discover and lay down 
theoretical truths: not to produce certain results: not to create
but to prove." This perspective of the function of political economy 
also defined his view of the political economist:
...who proceeds, in part, on assumptions, not on facts: 
and its conclusions are mere approximations to actual 
phenomena, although logically derived from the assumed
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premises. He deals in the first instance, with 
certain general tendencies of human nature only: it is
for the experimental politician to connect their results 
with those of the other conflicting tendencies which 
seem to cross and disturb and counteract each other in the 
complicated movements of the social machine.
Nineteenth century assumptions of political economy were extremely im­
portant because they revealed the direct connection between the economy of the 
nation and the politics of its leaders. The ultimate objective was the 
maximization of wealth within the country. The model used by Merivale was a 
very primitive one. Although he acknowledged that the "production and 
distribution of wealth" depended on a "variety of extrinsic causes" he 
concluded that "nations seem to vary like individuals: some are sunk in
habitual indolence: some are devoted to the pursuit and accumulation of
wealth" some, too active to fall under the former description, but too vain 
or too impatient for the latter, seem to labour with energy, but to spend 
instead of accumulating." It was only a short step from this idea to its 
application . The link between these ideas and actions was provided by 
Merivale and his fellow political economistsr interpretation of history. The 
European past had revealed that material progress was inevitable. As 
Merivale put it succinctly: "Do not suffer yourselves to be misled by the 
declamations of those whose discontent with its moral tendencies induces them 
to undervalue the real conquests which it [ progress] has made in the 
mechanical part of civilization." Using a circular argument he concluded 
that the cause of material progress was to be "found in the gradual pre­
valence of sounder opinions on the subject of national wealth, and the ex­
changes on which it is based. It arises from the gradual conversion of those 
conclusions which economical science has discovered and proved into maxims
85
for the guidance of statesmen. Wxthin ten years Merivale found himself 
at the Colonial Office, applying these ideas to the British Empire.
In January 1837 Merivale had written a letter to Macvey Napier, the 
editor of the Edinburgh Review, concerning a review of Nassau Senior’s 
work published in 1836 entitled An Outline of the Science of Political 
Economy. This work had originally been delivered as a series of lectures 
at Oxford during the late 1820’s while Merivale was a student. He had read 
the work and eventually published a review of it in October 1837. In 
the letter Merivale remarked that he had been "stimulated" by Senior’s 
assertion that political economy was the "science of national wealth". This 
was the first extant evidence of Merivale’s interest in political economy. 
Senior’s work probably led to his application for the professorship at Oxford 
and his "Introductory Lecture" and the publication of his Lectures. It was 
fitting that one of Merivale’s first works on political economy should have 
been a critique of the work of the first Drummond Professor of Political 
Economy.
After defining the various schools of political economy in Britain and 
in Europe and putting Senior into this context Merivale turned his attention 
to the nature and function of political economy. He conceded that political 
economy until the 1830’s had been an "art" rather than a "science”, in effect, 
a study of the "art of managing the resources of a nation." But he emphasized 
that political economy was an "art founded on the maxims of the several sciences, 
— of moral philosophy, of political philosophy, and, finally, of the abstract 
science of national wealth •’* Merivale reiterated his contention that the 
political economist must deal with both the theoretical and practical
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aspects of his subject and must always distinguish between them. "History" 
and "observations" were the only sure guides for the evaluation of the 
theories of political economy. Merivale1 s views on the subject of political 
economy clearly revealed that he believed the ultimate test of ideas was 
their applicability to society. At the Colonial and India Offices he 
recognized the severe limitations of applying imperial schemes formulated 
in London to the colonies.
In the next five years Merivale attempted to apply the theories of 
nineteenth century political economy, primarily free trade, to the 
British Empire. In 1838 he wrote "Five Lectures on the Provisions for the 
Poor in Ireland" which dealt with the economic problems of Ireland and
g
their possible solutions. Of far greater importance, however, was
the publication of his Lectures on Colonization and Colonies. His initial
interest in this subject was mentioned in a letter to Macvey, Napier. He
wrote that "English colonial policy" was a subject which he would like
"to attack some day or other. , . not with immediate reference to the
questions now quarrelled about, but rather looked at in an historical point
of view." Despite this declaration it was obvious that he was (as the
remainder of the letter revealed) more concerned with the present:
My impression is, that the laissez-faire system which is 
now called democratic is in fact, the old policy of England 
towards her settlements: and that the notion is imbuing
colonists with the politics of the mother-country, instead 
of allowing them to frame their own, is comparatively 
modern: dating principally from the American war. Our
ancestors, in short, placed their colonies under severe 
commercial restrictions for the benefit of England (or 
they imagined) and left them in other matters to shift for
themselves. We give our colonies enormous commercial 
advantages, to our own great loss, that we may have the 
pleasure of governing them as we please, giving them 
church_establishments &c. &c. and disposing of their 
lands.
Merivale*s chief concern as an imperial commentator, however, was with 
the important economic questions raised by Adam Smith in the Wealth 
of Nations in the late eighteenth century and their effect on the 
economic objectives of the British Empire in the nineteenth century.
From 1838 to 1841 Merivale wrote a great deal on this aspect of 
political economy.In his "Introduction to a Course of Lectures on 
Colonization and Colonies" (1839) and in the Lectures he came to the 
conclusion that the Empire should be founded primarily on free trade 
rather than settlement. Far from being a "separatist" it is obvious 
from reading his early work that he wanted the British to develop an 
empire in which each colony would be self-sufficient and would there­
fore cost the mother-country as little as possible to administer. 
Economic rather than political, military or cultural reasons should 
provide the rationale for the British Empire.
Merivale divided the economic history of the British Empire into 
three phases— the beginnings of empire to the middle of the seventeenth 
century and the passing of the Navigation Acts; the mid—seventeenth 
century to the American Revolution; the "modern" period from 1783 to 
the mid—nineteenth century. The first phase contained adventure, 
romance, avarice and international rivalry caused by nations coming 
"under the influence of the most sanguine dreams of extending their 
wealth and power." In contrast, for Merivale, the greatest impediment 
to British expansion in the second phase was the loss of Britain s anc
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ardour for colonization in the mere eagerness of commercial monopoly.”
Easily accessible regions such as the eastern coast of North America
had been explored and monopolies granted with the result that European
nations were fighting "ruinous wars to extend or protect their foreign
dominions." There was therefore a great difference between the initial
reasons for the foundation of the British Empire and the way in which
10
it had developed to 1783. Although Merivale believed that there was 
continuity within the British Empire he realized that each age had its 
own different objectives and motives for imperial expansion. India 
was always an exception, because it was an empire in its own right and 
not strictly a colony like the rest. One major weakness of his his­
torical argument and his advocacy of free trade as an administrator 
was his support for the trading monopoly of the Hudson's Bay Company 
in Rupert's Land. The Company had been flourishing since its foundation 
in 1670.
In the third period of Merivale's historical synopsis of the 
Empire he pinpointed the reasons for imperial expansion in the early 
nineteenth century. There had been a "revival in the spirit of coloniz­
ation" reminiscent of the seventeenth century and with it "the general 
extension of commercial activity" which created conditions necessary 
for the creation of a new empire. This situation had occurred through 
a concatenation of causes, as Merivale expressed it, because of 
"accidental circumstances"* These included? an excess of unemployed 
labour and capital" in Britain after 1783 which led to the migration 
of both to British North America; stimulation of the economy of
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the West Indian islands by the American Revolution; the emanci­
pation of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies which led to British interest
in these regions; the foundation of penal settlements in Australia. Des­
pite this evidence of expansion Merivale believed that Britain was not 
as prosperous as it had been in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. British North America was "a region well fitted for the multi­
plication of a hardy and prosperous people ... but not for the creation of 
much surplus wealth" while Britain’s "western tropical possessions" such 
as Cape Colony were valuable for the "production of wealth" but not for 
colonization by white settlers. Australia and New Zealand, which contained 
both qualities were too far away from Britain. At this point in time, 
however, Merivale was not pessimistic about these problems.
Merivale believed that the greatest change :was the nineteenth 
century revolution in transportation and communications. Particularly the, 
development of "steam navigation" would open up a new area of the world for 
Britain, the Pacific Ocean. Fully cognizant that the Empire had always had 
a maritime base, Merivale argued convincingly that steam would replace "this 
laborious and unequal communication", sail. In addition "...steam navigation 
has, as it were, forced the masters of the isthmus of Suez to open that 
great highway of the Old World; for the exigencies of trade will in the end 
triumph over all political obstacles." Merivale believed that this process 
was inevitable. He was both fascinated and repelled by the prospects of the 
next fifty years which would, he declared! ...m all probability, see a 
change analogous in character, and more than equal in extent, to that which
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was effected in the first half century after the landing of the Spaniards
in America. Whatever revolutions may await Europe at home, her destinies
of foreign conquest and domination seem fixed and unalterable as fat as any
thing future can be so. In this manner Merivale linked the two most
important factors in British expansion in the nineteenth century— the
ideology of free trade with the inevitability of technological progress.
The basis of the British Empire was material progress, specifically \
the amount of wealth to be derived from another region by opening new markets
for trade and "new outlets" for the population of the mother-country. This
process should not, however, be undertaken by a "policy of securing those !
markets by prohibition, and keeping our customers in subjection by force"
but by free trade. Free trade would enable the British at home and overseas
to engage in such economic activities which would give scope to individual
liberty and individualism and thereby contribute to British status and
11
power throughout the world. This preoccupation forced Merivale to examine
the theoretical basis of free trade in the Wealth of Nations which had just
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been published in 1838 in a new edition.
In the Edinburgh Review Merivale pointed out the value of the Wealth of 
Nations since its publication in 1776. He admitted that its practical use­
fulness was largely gone because the "principles which he [Smith] advocated 
with such force of reasoning and illustration, have, to a great extent, passed 
into axioms in political science; and form the general basis of commercial 
legislation in Europe." Smith's greatest, contribution was, however, "one 
of the most active and efficient instruments in doing the great work of that 
age; the work, namely, of destruction; -- of clearing away the encumbrances 
of ancient systems of which the vitality was gone, and the ponderous and
inanimate remains encumbered the earth." Merivale saw his own age and 
career being devoted to carrying on the great work of Adam Smith with 
regard to the British Empire first as a commentator in his -Lectures and 
then as an administrator at the Colonial and India Offices.13
From his initial dedication of the Lectures in 1841 to the Earl of 
Devon, whom he described as the "zealous and active promoter of colonial 
enterprise", to his conclusions concerning the value of colonies to Britain, 
Merivale was intent on unravelling the complex relationship between free 
trade, imperial expansion and its consequences for Britain, Europe and 
the Empire. He was aware of the difficulties of dealing with such a "vast 
subject". His specific objectives were "to convey information 
on a very popular and interesting topic, on which information in a condensed 
shape is not easily attainable"; to develop the elementary principles of 
political economy as far as they have affected colonization; to question 
the "speculations of late years respecting the most profitable mode of 
applying capital and labour in the foundation and improvement of settlement." 
The analysis of these objectives which followed in the pages of his Lectures 
was one of the most penetrating ever made in the English language to 1841.
Its influence upon British imperial historians since its publication has 
been significant.13
Merivalefs Lectures have also offered an insight into British imperial 
attitudes in the mid-nineteenth century. Written before the work of Marx 
and his disciples and the great expansion of the British Empire in the 
late nineteenth century the Lectures have given twentieth century historians 
an understanding of the economics of empire relatively uncluttered by
political dogma and complex theoretical economic analyses which arose 
after the new imperialism occurred. In addition the Lectures were 
significant because Merivale was an "informed contemporary observer" 
and an "intelligent eclectic" in classical political economy.1^
Merivale defined "colony" in very simple and clear terminology as
a ".. .territory of which the soil is entirely or principally owned by
settlers from the mother country." A colony was not a "military station"
like Gibraltar, Malta, a "conquered district" like Ceylon or part of Britain
informal empire. The most important exception was India, which in
Merivale*s view, was not a colony because colonization by Europeans
was not only "unknown but prohibited". As a consequence he made only
passing reference to India in his Lectures. This distinction concerning
colonies of white settlement, strategic outposts of empire and areas of
economic dominance, revealed his awareness of the variety of complex
17
forces at work in the nineteenth century.
Merivale*s definition of a colony was followed by an investigation of 
the motives for British expansion from the sixteenth to the nineteenth cen­
tury. The "fundamental principles of colonization", he believed, "have 
always been those of exclusive dominion, generally of exclusive trade."
In general terms these two elements had interacted such that the former 
has often been jealously preserved for the sake of the latter; often, 
too, from the feeling of national pride in extensive possessions.
British attitudes and actions towards the Thirteen Colonies before 1776 
were the best examples. Colonies, he believed, went through three stages 
of development. All three stages he expressed in terms of material progress
The first or infant11 stage was the one in which the major problems 
were largely economic, the introduction of capital and labour to the 
new land* The second or "adult" stage occurred when there was economic 
stability, a harmony between land, capital and labour, during which 
British political institutions could be introduced* The third stage 
was that of "virtual or actual independence" at which time the colonists 
would be allowed to control both their domestic affairs and external 
relations* Merivale therefore made a very clear distinction between 
Britain's political and territorial control over an area, a formal 
empire and economic dominance by means of trade, an informal empire*.
This theory of empire was confirmed by his detailed historical analysis 
of the Spanish, French, Dutch and British empires.
Merivale added the details of the economic development of European 
empires to Adam Smith's model in the Wealth of Nations. Unable to 
accept completely the "black legend" of Spanish rule in the Americas and 
the Caribbean he wrote that improvement had come to the Spanish possessions 
because of the "commerce and the spirit of America*" The English smuggler 
and the example of the commercial success of the Thirteen Colonies had 
forced Spain to lift its economic and political restrictions. When 
revolution finally broke out in the Spanish colonies it was caused by 
the "feeling which recruited the armies of the patriots, and made their 
cause popular with the community in general, even when stained by the 
greatest excesses and devastations— a most pregnant warning to governments. 
Tyranny, in the ordinary sense of the word, falls heavily only on the few, 
and is often endured for a long time through the acquiescence of the many." 
After this great change Merivale believed that the new republics were 
making substantial progress with the abolition of slavery, improvements
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in education and race relations. Brazil, Cuba and Mexico, in particular, 
bad made great strides despite opposition from the planter class.
By the mid-nineteenth century the former Spanish colonies in the 
Caribbean were, according to Merivale, once again in a perilous state.
They were "rapidly acquiring the degraded characteristics of factories" 
and were not models of material, social and political progress. In con­
trast, the development of Brazil since British intervention in 1807 was 
very marked and had proved that "freedom of trade to be established in 
Brazil [was] a singular instance of great internal benefit resulting 
to a nation through the temporary interference of a foreign country in 
her affairs." By ideology and action in the nineteenth century Britain 
was, with respect to its commercial policy, having a great impact on the 
rest of the world. In Brazil the ports were "thrown open to foreign goods 
in foreign vessels, in payment of an ad valorem duty; for purposes of 
revenue only; and then England became, in a commercial sense, the metro­
polis of Brazil. Perfect freedom was given to internal industry; and a 
country in which, up to that time not a single book had ever been printed,
became the seat of a court, a representative government, and what are
20called national institutions." Merivale realized he was describing the 
state of Brazil as moving from the control of one metropolitan European 
power to that of another, from formal to informal imperialism.
Merivale completely failed to reconcile the internal contradictions 
in the relationship between monopoly, free trade and imperialism. He did, 
however, make a distinction between a state monopoly and a private commercial 
undertaking. While all state control inevitably inhibited economic and 
political progress Merivale believed that private monopolies were acceptable
because they did not directly interfere with political development. Some­
times they even helped the economic foundation of a colony in its "infant" 
stage. Private monopolies given to commercial companies by the state had 
to be run efficiently and humanely. In his Lectures his primary historical 
example was the Dutch East India Company which "...declined partly through 
the natural unsoundness of monopoly, partly through the consequences of 
its own wealth and prosperity. That prosperity led it to form expensive 
establishments, which involved it in debt; and, thus burdened, it was ill 
able to withstand the competition of the English, either in war or commerce, 
while these were as yet free from similar impediments." The failure of 
the combined effort by private companies and the state in New France in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were also used by Merivale to 
highlight the' triumph of free trade within the British Empire. For the 
most part he neglected the environmental factors which had an effect on the 
imperial endeavours of other European countries. The climate and soils
of the majority of the Thirteen Colonies were for example, much more
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suitable for settlement than the St. Lawrence Valley.
In his Lectures Merivale oversimplified the relationship between free 
trade and imperialism in his description of the failures of other European 
empires. Historical evidence was subordinated to the doctrines pro­
pounded by Adam Smith although he recognized that British imperial history 
"...presents a prospect so wide and so diversified; it is so rich in 
great enterprises and strange events; so abundant in economical lessons, 
and carries our attention from point to point over so vast a portion of the 
surface of the earth, that selection and compression appear almost equally
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difficult/ Merivale was primarily concerned with the general characters
j
istics of the Empire and its usefulness as a guide for the present and
the future and his analysis was distinctly "Whiggish."
Merivale*s entire interpretation was primarily a history of the
development of economic and political liberty. The only exceptions were
those colonies "acquired by conquest" and the "chartered colonies of
North America." For the most part he asserted that the first colonists
had grown" .„.in a spirit of independence and self-reliance; and instead
of parting with a portion of his rights when he settled in a distant
dependency, the emigrant felt that he breathed a freer air than that of
the land he had relinquished." British policies which promoted political
and economic liberty had given British settlers much more freedom than
other European settlers. The eighteenth century was an exception because
the British had begun to enforce the Navigation Acts.
Merivalete interpretation of the American Revolution was crucial to
his view of the British Empire in the nineteenth century. The Revolution
had been caused by the adoption of mercantilism:
...the colonies were brought, both as to their commerce and 
their internal affairs, under regular government and sub­
ordination, in which they continued until the attempt to 
reduce those of North America to more complete subjection, by 
taxing them without their own consent, occasioned their 
separation from the mother country. This event, and the 
results of the great French war, which placed under our 
government a great number of the dependencies of other 
countries, materially changed the character of our colonial 
relations.
The American Revolution, the rise of free trade, the Napoleonic wars and 
the industrial revolution in Britain signalled the end of mercantilism 
and the "first" British Empire. The new Empire, which was beginning to be
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developed after 1814, was based on trade rather than settlement.
By 1841 free trade had still not become the dominant policy of 
Britain toward the colonies. Merivale had, as a consequence, a very critical 
attitude towards British imperial policy in the 1830’s and the 1840’s which 
led later commentators to assume that he was an advocate of "separatism".
In fact he wanted an empire of free trade and one that benefited Britain 
economically. As he declared emphatically in 1841: "We give them [the
colonies] commercial advantages, and tax ourselves for their benefit, in 
order to give them an interest in remaining under our supremacy, that we 
may have the pleasure of governing them." Merivale.wanted to cut admin­
istrative costs in colonies which had not proven to be economically valuable. 
Any colony which had any economic value or which was of strategic signi­
ficance would be retained. It is clear that he was not opposed to British
imperial expansion if it was done in a controlled manner. For Merivale
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the economic motive for empire was clearly dominant.
MerivaleTs attitude to free trade made him conclude that the British 
West Indian colonies were anachronisms. The English "distaste" for slavery 
and the attempts to eradicate it were, in his view, a consequence of 
economic changes rather than its cause. The end of the sugar monopoly in 
the British West Indies was due to "the extraordinary progress of the 
French sugar colonies" and "the American revolution, which deprived them 
[the British sugar colonies] of their American customers, who, having 
achieved their independence, resorted to the cheapest market." Alterna­
tive sources of trade with the remaining British North American colonies 
had failed to develop because Canada, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were 
not able to supply the British West Indian colonies with the goods needed
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in exchange for sugar. As a consequence the latter colonies went into 
severe economic decline from which they did not recover in the nine­
teenth century. Merivale did not lament the "loss" of this part of the 
British Empire because of their racial and economic problems.23
Merivale was convinced that the nineteenth century Empire should be 
based on free trade, material progress and liberty for white settlers.
One of the constant themes running through his imperial commentaries, his 
minutes and memoranda at the Colonial and India Offices was the essential 
need for "plain and practical institutions" for all new settlement colonies. 
The "foundation of a colony is like a house: you may throw in at first loose
stones, and any kind of rubbish; the finished elevation must follow after- 
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wards." This attitude was reflected in his policy with regard to the
penal settlements in Australia, as well as colonies in New Zealand, southern
Africa and British North America. In 1841 he was extremely optimistic
with regard to British policy towards these new regions and their natural
resources. The British "North American empire" possessed enormous potential
with an excellent climate and soils for agriculture in the colony of Canada
and elsewhere, valuable "staple articles for export" such as fish in the
North Atlantic colonies, timber in New Brunswick and fur in the Hudson’s
Bay Company’s territories. "South Africa" also had "some great natural
advantages, which seem to ensure its eventual prosperity", a good climate
and geographical location because it was "lying in the middle of one of
the great highways of maritime communication." But as yet these advantages
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had not been developed by British settlers. The same was true of
Australia and New Zealand although they were separated from Britain by
^  26 
great distances.
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In 1841, considering this inventory, Merivale became exhilarated with
the present and future prospects of the British Empire. He wrote that these
colonies would, in time, surpass the wealth and power of Britain:
The fortunes of the new shoot, when separated from its parent 
stem, afford a more pleasing object of contemplation than 
the slight changes which may be produced in the condition of the 
old familiar tree. The mere effort of directing the mind to 
travel abroad to those new regions of romance and expectation, 
where all is life, and hope, and active energy, affords a relief 
to the spirits, which again feel wearied and fettered when it 
is called back to fix its attention at home.
The imperial motive was, according to Merivale, to be found in the peculiar 
nature of the British character, the "yearning after the distant and unseen", 
which had led the British to become "masters of every sea, and colonists of 
every shore". Merivale*s analysis of the British Empire was grounded in 
political economy.
The British Empire was a product of a material process and imperial 
ideas. Free trade was, for Merivale and many of his contemporaries, the 
link between the two and the rationalization for both. "Empire" was there­
fore "a sort of instinctive feeling to us all, that the destiny of our 
name and nation is not here, in this narrow island which we occupy; that 
the spirit of England is volatile, not fixed; that it lives in our lan­
guage, our commerce, our industry, in all those channels of inter­
communication by which we embrace and connect the vast multitude of 
states, both civilized and uncivilized, throughout the world." This 
conclusion raised an imperial dilemma. Britain would inevitably expand 
and spread liberty and equality throughout the world while, for the native 
peoples, the impact of the imperialism of free trade would not be liberty
or equality. Merivale recognized this problem but, as will be shown
27
below, he had no practical solution for it.
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Merivale knew that the process of the imperialism of free trade was 
not entirely a natural development but entailed the intervention of the 
state in the economy of the Empire. Besides "political considerations", 
Merivale believed that there were only two economic factors in coloniza­
tion and they both needed planning in order to be established: "First. To
furnish a means of bettering their condition to the unemployed, or ill- 
employed, portion of the people of the mother-country. Secondly. To
i
create a new market for/the trade of the mother-country." Both these
economic purposes were connected because they provided the two necessary
elements for the foundation of any colony, capital and labour. The
British government would have to encourage emigration from Britain to the
colonies by a system of bounties. Once the settlers had arrived it was
imperative that capital be supplied to enable the new settlers to open
up "new sources of production and new outlets for our trade". Merivale
admitted that the creation of an empire of free trade meant that Britain
would have to rely on a system similar to that propounded by Edward
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Gibbon Wakefield, one which would be "well-regulated". Free trade for 
Merivale and many of his contemporaries meant, in political terms, 
the spread of British traditions of liberty and equality throughout 
the world. In economic terms it meant something very different, the 
exploitation of the human and material resources in colonies for the 
benefit of the mother-country.
The objective of empire was to maximize the wealth and ultimately 
the power of the mother—country. In 1841 Merivale believed the remnants 
of the "old colonial system" were inhibiting the growth of wealth of 
Britain. It was therefore only in exceptional circumstances that an 
"artificially monopolized market" might be valuable to the mother- 
country. He concluded that practically:
.•.such gain is found to be wholly illusory; that the disad­
vantages of a forced trade in manufactured commodities are 
almost always greater than its advantages, but that to a country 
possessing the means of manufacturing cheaper than the rest 
of the world the benefit must be visionary altogether; while, 
in order to secure this delusive profit, we are forced to con­
cede to our colonists a monopoly for their raw produce, which 
is a real and substantial loss to ourselves. It is plain, 
therefore, that the whole fabric is, in truth, maintained by
sacrifices on our part, amounting to an enormous national
expenditure.
Quite accurately he argued that the old colonial system had been "constructed 
with a view to the present gain of particular classes" but once it had been
established in the seventeenth century it was self-perpetuating, and had
"found ingenious advocates to defend it, on the ground of prospective utility. 
The economic basis of the first Empire had been destroyed when it was dis­
covered that trade had increased between the new American republic and 
Britain after 1783.
Free trade was therefore in the interests of the Empire but not all
the colonies. Colonies should only be retained if they were profitable.
This philosophy, as Merivale was to discover in the late 1840Ts and 1850’s,
was vigorously opposed by the white settlement colonies because Britain was
increasingly diverting its attention to an empire based on trade, consisting
of both formal and informal areas of economic influence throughout the world.
Merivale was aware that schemes which advocated the development of a kind of
"colonial zollverein" would not work to Britain’s economic advantage. There
would be little practical difficulty in forming a colonial zollverein
...on the grandest imaginable scale. Many an independent 
state would gain, commercially speaking, by surrendering its 
sovereignty, and becoming enlisted in the catalogue of British 
dependencies. But every extension of such a commercial league 
could take place only at the expense of additional burdens 
on British industry, and additional loss to British consumers, 
if the products of the regions comprised in it required pro­
tection in order to enable them to compete with foreign 
products in the British market.^9
If Britain was to continue to develop its own economy it would have to 
expand its Empire but such expansion, he believed, would have as its 
primary purpose the self-interest of the mother-country.
All these themes Merivale developed from. 1841 until 1874. In
the Edinburgh Review he reiterated that Britain did not have enough
colonies. In July 1843 when reviewing Sir Charles Lyell’s Travels in
North America Merivale wrote that the "perilous greatness" of Britain
depended almost entirely upon "colonization"— "the opening of new
markets, the creation of new customers". This process meant that the
new colonies had to receive British emigrants but Merivale did not
regard the loss of labour as detrimental to the interests of the mother
country in the long term because they were only "driblets from our
teeming multitudes." "Every new colony" would "far from diverting
strength from the older ones, infuse into them additional vigour. To
them as well as the mother-country it opens a new market." One such
new area for imperial expansion was the northwest coast of North 
30America. British involvement in this area would, he realized, bring 
the British into conflict with the American republic.
As a consequence of Merivale?s concern for colonization in the 
western regions of North America he found another exception to the 
imperialism of free trade. In October 1847 in the Edinburgh Review he 
discussed the adoption by the United States of a protective tariff and 
attempted to understand the American rejection of free trade principles 
While regretting the American system of tariff protection he could only
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conclude that it ...began in a desire of just, but impolitic retaliation on 
England. Once implanted in the state— according to the uniform history 
of such evil growths it struck its roots too deeply in popular feeling 
to be eradicated, so long as the close balance of parties, and the difficulty 
of conducting the government, might render it an object with statesmen to 
bid for the votes of a protected class, strong in united self-interest 
rather than numbers." The economic consequences for the West Indies had been 
calamitous but the United States had prospered. He believed that the United 
States had so many natural advantages that it did not really need tariff 
protection } but there was little that Britain could do to change American 
policy. Merivale continued to view this situation with a certain amount
r; +. 3lof regret.
Merivale was greatly impressed by the development of the informal
empire of the United States. With the American conquest of California he
wrote that their next sphere of economic influence would be the Pacific
Northwest and Latin and South America. Contradictorily Merivale condemned
the American conquest of the former Spanish American colonies. He was
motivated, at least partially, by a sense of rivalry between the British and
the American empires in the mid-nineteenth century. As he put it prophetically:
To bring internal peace and the benefits of commercial 
enterprise to these wretched little states, impotent alike to 
defend their rights and ameliorate their internal condition, 
seems a mission worthy of a great and flourishing people: and
thus the spirit of rapacity is varnished over by one of those 
plausible hypocrisies so dear to human self-righteousness.
That Central America is to become substantially a dependency of 
the Union— whether by conquest, or the milder process of im­
proving the natives off the face of the earth is an article of 
faith which meets, we conceive, with no dissenters, from Maine 
to California; and such determined faith is apt enough to 
realize its own accomplishment.
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Merivale realized that these words could readily apply to any nation 
with imperial designs on other regions of the world including the British.^2 
Nevertheless his critical awareness of the effects of imperialism on 
aboriginal populations did not prevent him from advocating the expansion 
of the British Empire either at the Colonial or the India Offices.
With the advent of free trade in 1849 the way was open for Merivale and 
the Colonial Office to persuade the white settlement colonies to adopt free 
trade. In every case except one, the Reciprocity Treaty among some British 
North American colonies and the United States in 1854, the colonial response 
to free trade was a negative one. Acting out of economic self-interest the 
colonies attempted to put up tariff barriers against Britain in order to 
protect their developing industries and to raise revenue for internal im­
provements. British opposition to colonial tariffs created almost as much 
conflict in the 1850’s as the British proposal to withdraw its imperial 
garrisons in the 1860's. In one particular case which has hitherto received 
very little attention from either Canadian or British imperial historians, 
the Merivale-Peigard Treaty of 1856, Merivale was caught squarely in the 
middle of one of these conflicts and only then did he realize the 
limitations of developing an imperial policy based on free 
trade.
The first case of opposition by a colonial assembly to free trade, with 
which Merivale was concerned, came from New Brunswick in the spring of 1848. 
Receiving news from the colonial governor,Edmund Head, of the passage of an act 
imposing differential duties on the United States, Merivale deplored the 
action but suggested that its cause was trade rivalry between New Brunswick 
and the United States. His greatest fear was that such an action would re-
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suit in a tariff war which might possibly include Britain but the Colonial
Office was very reluctant to disallow colonial acts and did not do so with
this one. Under the leadership of Lord Grey, who was also a free trader,
the Office knew it had to find some way to prevent the proliferation of tariffs
33in British North America.
The most obvious solution was the negotiation of a reciprocity treaty 
with the United States. Grey instructed both Head and Lord Elgin,rGovernor—General 
of Canada, to sound out colonial politicians and American representatives on 
the prospects. Both Head and Lord Elgin responded that such a proposal would 
encounter no opposition from Canada or most of the Atlantic colonies. The 
most serious question was whether the United States could be convinced of its 
economic efficacy. Lord Elgin and his lobbyist in Washington, Israel D.
Andrews, negotiated a reciprocity treaty in 1854. The treaty also settled
34the long-standing fisheries dispute in the Grand Banks for the next ten years.
Merivale approved of these negotiations largely undertaken by the 
Foreign Office and by Lord Elgin in Washington. As the Office's legal expert 
he pointed out a problem which would continually frustrate British politicians 
and administrators throughout the 1850's and later. It was fairly easy to 
obtain the support of the colonial governor and those interested in free trade 
in each colony. The real problem came with ratification when each colonial 
assembly had to pass the clauses of the Treaty. Theoretically Parliament could, 
Merivale minuted, overrule existing colonial laws but in practice such inter­
ference was seldom undertaken. Each colonial assembly could pass the necessary
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laws itself but they could not be forced to do so. This legal problem, 
associated with the introduction of free trade into British North America, was
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extremely important and would come back to "haunt" Merivale and his
colleagues in 1856 with regard to a fisheries treaty in Newfoundland.
While the Colonial Office was pondering these problems Lord Elgin
was in Washington negotiating the reciprocity treaty. A few weeks
before it was signed the Colonial Office received a despatch from
James Douglas, governor of Vancouver Island, asking if the proposed
agreement would also include that colony. This query was important
because much of that colony's trade was with California and Oregon rather
than with Britain or the rest of British North America. The Colonial
Office was surprised and Merivale admitted that no one had thought of
including Vancouver Island. It was not until December, three months afte]
the signing of the Treaty, that Merivale learned from the Foreign Office
that it had not been found "practical" to include Vancouver Island.
This colony was, in the view of the Foreign Office, too far away from
Britain and the rest of British North America to be considered, although
the Colonial Office was also aware that the colony was economically
backward and could have been materially assisted by the Treaty. There
was, therefore, a certain amount of inconsistency in the application
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of free trade to the British North American colonies.
Newfoundland, the oldest British colony in British North America,
(but one which always had great economic difficulties) gave Merivale and 
his colleagues the most trouble in the 185 0's. This case also revealed 
the deficiencies of a policy of free trade after the granting of 
responsible g o v e r n m e n t E v e r  since the Peace of Paris in 1763 French 
fishermen had a legal right to land on the west coast of Newfoundland, to 
dry their fish. This problem was further complicated by the fact that 
many Newfoundlanders made their living by selling bait to both Newfound-
i
land and French fishermen. If there was a shortage of bait, Newfoundland j
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fish©t men were sometimes pieced at a disadvantage. Merivale*s 
first contact with this problem came in 1849 when a petition arrived at 
Downing Street. The major complaint was that Newfoundland interests were 
being sacrificed to imperial ones because the.British government had 
refused to enforce the laws against selling bait. It alleged that 
Britain’s primary interest was to maintain good diplomatic relations with 
France. Merivale recommended that the complainants1 request for en­
forcement in the form of a "small armed naval force" be considered by • 
sending the request to the Board of Trade and the Admiralty. Lord Grey,
not wanting to involve Britain in a confrontation with France, vetoed
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Merivale*s suggestion. Nothing was done until Grey left the Colonial 
Office in 1852 and until the complaints were linked with Newfoundlanders' 
demands for responsible government.
In 1854 and 1855, William Strachey, the precis writer at the Office, 
compiled information on this problem while Merivale and the Secretaries 
of State were busy with the implementation of responsible government.
In 1855, in consultation with the Foreign Office the Colonial Office decided, 
without consulting the inhabitants of Newfoundland, to solve the problem by 
negotiating a treaty with France. In the summer of 1856 Captain Peigard, 
the French representative, arrived in London to negotiate the treaty. 
Merivale was appointed as the British negotiator. The treaty was accepted 
in September 1856 by the French government and was formally signed in 
January 1857.^ The entire proceedings had been conducted without consulting 
Newfoundlanders who had been granted responsible government.
Newfoundlanders were informed of the Merivale—Peigard Treaty in January
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1857. Within one month Merivale and Henry Labouchere, the Secretary 
of State, were presented with a petition from the colonial legislature 
protesting the fact that Newfoundlanders had not been consulted. They 
believed that their interests had been sacrificed by the British govern­
ment. The colonial governor, Sir Charles Darling, sent a report on public 
reaction. Opposition was wide-spread. A large public meeting in St.
John’s had proposed a motion in favour of annexation to the United States, 
there was general condemnation of the British government for granting too 
many concessions to France and for not consulting the Newfoundland assembly 
before signing the agreement. Merivale and the Colonial Office were 
confronted with the ultimate colonial sanction when the assembly refused 
to ratify the Merivale-Peigard Treaty. The Treaty, they argued, would 
give the French commercial and strategic advantages over Newfoundland and 
eventually lead to French annexation.
The whole question was then, quite rightly, dropped into the permanent 
undersecretary’s lap in Downing Street. Merivale had to placate the 
colonists, try to get them to change their minds and ratify the Treaty. He 
drafted a despatch to Darling on March 26, 1857 in which he explained that 
the Treaty had been signed "...in the hope of bringing to a satisfactory 
arrangement the many complicated & difficult questions which have arisen 
betx^een the two countries on the subject of the Newfoundland Fisheries. 
Attempting to assuage the feelings of Newfoundlanders he reiterated that 
the British government was not trying to force them into the Treaty and 
he adhered to "...two principles which have guided them, and will continue 
to guide them; namely that the rights at present enjoyed by the community 
of Newfoundland are not to be ceded or exchanged without their assent,
and that the constitutional mode of Submitting measures for that assent 
is by laying them before the Colonial Legislature.11 The next stage of 
Merivale's argument was less convincing. He wrote that the British govern­
ment had simply followed the same pattern of negotiation as the 
reciprocity treaty with the United States in 1854. This statement was in­
correct because the British had consulted most British North American 
colonies before the 1854 agreement had been signed. Nevertheless he 
realized that the Colonial Office had no choice but to accept the wishes
■J
of the colonists: "The proposals contained in the Convention having been 
now unequivocally refused by the Colony, they will of course fall to 
the ground. And you are authorized to give such assurance as you may think 
proper that the consent of the Community of Newfoundland is regarded by
H.M.'s Gov't as the essential preliminary to any modification of their 
territorial or maritime r i g h t s . I n  effect Merivalefs draft despatch 
conceded to Newfoundlanders the right to determine their external economic 
relations when they came into conflict with those of Britain and the Empire.
This conflict with Newfoundland occurred two years before a similar 
case, Canada's protective tariff of 1859, was allowed by the Colonial Office 
In granting responsible government the Colonial Office discovered that 
free trade had not been a panacea for imperial problems. Merivale spent 
three more years attempting to re-negotiate the Treaty with full con­
sultation by Newfoundlanders. It was imperative for the Colonial Office 
to continue because there was a danger of the possibility of armed conflict 
between the French and the Royal Navy off the French shore of Newfoundland. 
The Office sent a representative to visit Newfoundland to conduct an 
informal inquiry with the help of the new governor, Sir Alexander Bannerman.
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At the same time the Colonial Office received notification from the
French government that Captain Peigard had arrived in London to commence
the re-negotiations. By this time however the Colonial Office had learned
its lesson, as Merivale minuted: "This note expresses the expectation of
the French government that new proposals shall come from our side. If so,
they must I conclude come from or he made with the priority of the government
of Newfoundland." Acting on Merivalefs advice Henry Labouchere thought it
was wise not to renew the negotiations until there was consultation between
42the representatives of the colonies of Newfoundland and St. Pierre. Merivale 
and the Colonial Office had adjusted their colonial policy to allow for 
colonial representation.
In 1858 the Colonial Office learned from Bannerman that, because of 
public feeling against the French in Newfoundland, Newfoundland politicians 
had refused to consider the re-negotiation of the Treaty. They requested 
that the Royal Navy be sent to protect them from the French. The colonists 
were demanding the right of self-determination in their external relations 
but, like responsible government, they would not take on the responsibility 
of taking steps to see to their own defence.43 Despite pressure from the 
French government the Colonial Office did not take any action in the matter
44until Newfoundlanders changed their position. . Meanwhile the colonial 
governor was in a very delicate predicament. Fearing violence between French 
and Newfoundland fishermen on the French shore and the intervention of the 
French navy Bannerman ordered, without consulting the Colonial Office, 
Newfoundland fishermen not to go into the disputed area. He also suggested 
that 'the whole affair could easily be solved if the Colonial Office told 
Newfoundlanders that the matter was an imperial rather than a colonial
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question and therefore an act of some sort should be passed to overrule the 
assembly. The Office did not agree with this proposal. Both Lord Stanley, 
the new Secretary of State, and his parliamentary undersecretary, Carnarvon, 
agreed with MerivaleTs assessment: "Like most Governors, he sees the
difficulty of his own position, and does not fully understand the much 
greater difficulty in which the Home Government is placed. I am afraid he 
is doing little good where he is. But much abler men would be equally non­
plussed by the exceeding awkwardness of the situation."43 Like many other 
important questions, particularly "native" affairs, the Colonial Office found 
itself caught between a policy which it believed was the right one to follow 
but it could not act because of the attitudes and the actions of the 
colonists.
In 1859, after rejecting a proposal from the French government and
the Foreign Office to appoint a third and impartial power to act as a
mediator in the dispute, the Colonial Office agreed that a commission should
be appointed. If the Newfoundland assembly did not agree with this proposal
the French government warned that it would send in a naval force to protect
its claims during the 1859 fishing season. Violence was a distinct
possibility. However, all parties agreed to this compromise and a commission
was appointed which included two French, one English and one Newfoundland 
46representative.
During the spring and summer of 1859 the commissioners investigated the 
problem in Newfoundland and then made their recommendations on September 22, 
1859. Their report was an unanimous one. The commissioners suggested that 
a "common and local administration" should be set up in the disputed areas.
In order to enforce the regulations of this local body a joint local Police 
(a naval rather than a military force) should be appointed to safeguard
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the rights of both French and English fishermen. The report was
adopted and a new convention was signed in Paris on June 26, 1860.^
Coming simultaneously with the Colonial Office’s troubles with Sir George
Grey over the "native" question in southern Africa and with the Hudson’s
Bay Company’s charter and licence in Rupert’s Land, the four years of
negotiations with Newfoundland made Merivale realize how ineffectual the
policy of the Colonial Office could be when confronted with specific
social and economic problems in the colonies. Events such as these
tempered Merivale’s ideal of free trade and his hope that it could be
48implemented throughout the British Empire. It was highly ironic that
the concomitants of free trade, material progress and political liberty,
had forced Merivale to respond positively to the demands of the British North
American colonies for responsible government and in doing so the colonies
49had used their freedom to subvert the policy of free trade.
Although the most serious example of colonial opposition to free 
trade occurred in Newfoundland, there were a number of other cases in 
British North America in the late 1850’s. In 1859 Nova Scotia fishermen 
complained that French fishermen from St. Pierre and Miquelon were re­
ceiving bounties from the French government and therefore had a distinct 
commercial advantage. The Colonial Office response was, in keeping with 
their policy of free trade, a negative one.50 In the same year Canadian 
politicians placed duties on foreign shipping into the colony. This 
action was ags-inst the "most-favoured nation clause m  British treaties with 
Russia, Austria and "South American states . As in the case of Newfound­
land Merivale could not see any way out of the colonial-imperial conflict 
except to accede to the request:
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To tell the Canadians that they must not exclude 
U.S. ships (against which this is directed) on account of 
a possible construction of treaties with Ecuador— Paraguay 
(far inland states) and half a dozen more, which never 
"produced” a ship since Canning called them into existence, 
seems more lawyer than statesman-like... .
The real objection to the Act is that it violates free 
trade principles. Are we determined enough in their 
maintenance, to make them the ground of disallowing a 
Canadian Act?
If we are, then the objection arising from treaty 
stipulations might very well come in by general words & 
as a makeweight. But it seems a narrow ground to rest 
a disallowance on, taken by itself.
Merivale was forced to concede the colonial right to adopt tariffs against 
other states or even Britain if it was in the colonial interest. The 
Colonial Office had no choie because the granting of responsible govern­
ment had given the colonies liberty to conduct their own domestic affairs
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and trade was obviously inseparable from the colonial economy.
In the west and northwest regions of British North America, where
responsible j government had not been granted, the Colonial Office and
Merivale found it almost impossible to implement free trade for other
reasons. In the territories under the control of the Hudson's Bay Company
the Colonial Office agreed with the Company that the introduction of free
trade with the United States would not be in the best interests of Metis and
Amerindians. If American traders were allowed into Rupert's Land the
Colonial Office was convinced that increased competition in the fur trade
would ensure a greater use of alcohol and eventually cause a further
decline of the Amerindian and Metis population. The Colonial Office did
its utmost to prevent the introduction of free trade in the 1850 s and
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they were successful in their immediate objective. However they were not 
able to protect Amerindians or Metis.
From 1841 to 1861 Merivale regarded the northwest coast of British
North America as the last favourable region for European colonization.
His dreams of imperial expansion were confirmed by the gold rushes in
California in 1848 and on the Fraser and Thompson Rivers in 1858. However,
British hopes for Oregon, Vancouver Island and British Columbia were
dimmed by the presence of the United States and the repeated failures of
54the Hudson’s Bay Company to colonize Vancouver Island. The issue of
free trade did not arise until 1858 when James Douglas, the colonial
governor, decided to impose a ten per cent ad valorem duty on gold exported
out of the colonies (British Columbia and Vancouver Island) and a similar
amount on foreign goods imported into the colonies. Designed by Douglas
to keep the wealth inside the colonies the duties were well-received by
Merivale and his colleagues at the Colonial Office. They hoped that such
duties, although against their idea of free trade, would help British Columbia
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become economically self-sufficient.
By 1859 Merivale had become more pessimistic about the duties after 
hearing of their impact on the colony. Merivale believed that free trade 
would not be in the best interests of the colony but he found that the
duties could not be effectively enforced. As he put it to Lord Carnarvon
succinctly: "You cannot make miners pay an export duty on gold they may
carry off with them. The only way is to make it worth their while, 1» by 
facilities of conveyance, 2. by a mint, 3. by facilities of assaying. In 
this case Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton took Merivale*s advice and the Colonial 
Office ordered Douglas to establish a "government assay office and refinery 
in British C o l u m b i a . I n  every case in British North America Merivale s
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ideal of free trade was subordinated to the economic characteristics 
of each colony and the response of the colonists. In practice free 
trade, when it clashed with colonial, commercial or imperial interests, 
was sacrificed when it was not in the British interest to do so.
In southern Africa the question of free trade was less complicated. 
Both Cape Colony and Natal did not have control over their domestic 
affairs, much less their external relations with other countries. There
was very little demand by the colonists for customs duties and any
- . . 57petitions were immediately vetoed by the Colonial Office. Important
mainly for its strategic value and plagued by costly "native” wars,
southern Africa remained throughout the l850*s the bete noir of the
Empire. Free trade was not combined with territorial expansion in these
colonies because of their lack of economic potential. This situation
was revealed very clearly by Merivale in the spring of 1854 when he
received a despatch from the colonial governor reporting the discovery of
minerals in Cape Colony. Merivale remarked that the Colonial Office had
no funds to send a competent geologist from Britain to determine whether
the reports were true or not. With Britain having just withdrawn from
the Orange River Territory, Merivale wrote that the "discovery of gold in
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the O.R. Territory if true...will be embarrassing." The mineral 
revolution in southern Africa did not take place until the l870's and 
Merivale was spared the embarrassment of giving away a valuable portion 
of the British Empire. Nevertheless his comment was significant. The 
British would not hesitate to move into an area on a formal or an infor-
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mal basis if that region had immediate economic potential.
jjjgrivale was, by the time of the publication of the second 
edition of his Lectures, aware of the impact which free 
trade had on the British Empire. He made his contemporaries
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cognizant of the transformation which had occurred in the British Empire
within twenty years. In a perceptive article in the Edinburgh Review in
January 1862, George Cornewall Lewis noted the "inconsistency" in British
imperial policy since 1841. The British had abandoned territory in
southern Africa and yet had annexed Kong Kong, Labuan and British Columbia
while making Lagos a new station in the battle against slavery and adding
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Oudh to the "Indian dominions." The causes of this change in imperial 
policy, Merivale believed, were: "...partly such as arose out of the 
general progress of the community in the long peace; but in part also 
the result of fortuitous and unconnected events." These events included: 
the Irish famine and emigration to North America; the Canadian "outbreak" 
of 1837 and Durham's mission which he believed had paved the way to a 
return to the eighteenth century view of empire, an "older and freer 
polity"; the emancipation of slaves in the West Indian colonies and 
its effect on the West Indian economy; the "progress of free trade doc­
trines"; the ending of transportation; the rise of a debate between the 
"Little Englanders"--a "new generation of sceptics" and, at the same
time, a group of "young and sanguine sect of colonial reformers" who
• • , • 61 had helped to renew interest in the British Empire,
Although Merivale believed there had been no substantial change in
the "leading principles of administrative and commercial policy" since
1841 he was aware of "signs of reaction" in the early 1860's especially
an increase in the amount of imperial expenditure as a consequence of
territorial expansion and a decrease in importance of the white settlement
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colonies after responsible government had been granted. In a paper 
presented to the British Association for the Advancement of Science on 
October 8, 1862 Merivale directed his attention to the "Utility of Coloniza­
tion" with the advent of free trade. In theoretical terms the question
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was an easy one because "...under a system of free trade, a country would 
g a m  as much by directing her capital and her. emigrants to a new soil 
under foreign dominion as under her own." In the 1860fs these conditions 
did not exist because Britain was the "only colonizing country of Europe." 
The economic advantages of colonies were for the consideration of the 
"politician, not the economist." He might have added that they were for 
the concern of the imperial administrator as well.
Viewing the question of the relationship between imperialism and . 
free trade from a practical point of viex^  Merivale came to the conclusion 
that there was no antipathy between the two ideas. Writing during the 
time of the Civil War in the United States, he was more than ever aware 
of the economic value of colonies. The loss of the American market for 
cotton and as an outlet for British emigration made him conscious of how 
quickly the future of the Empire could change. It was obvious that 
"...under a system of free trade it would be immaterial how soon a colony 
shook off the dominion of the mother-country (or, rather, the mother- 
country would gain through a reduction of expenditure), if the emancipated 
colony remained equally prosperous and equally friendly." Referring to 
the predicament of the British North American colonies during the Civil 
War Merivale continued: "But if it did not; {^remain prosperous] if its
advance was checked by internal security; if it became actuated by feelings 
of hostility; if it fell under the dominion of, or into connexion with 
foreign States; if it adopted hostile tariffs, or opposed the admission 
of our emigrants; then we should find that the loss of the colony was 
the loss of an economical advantage." In this situation Britain would 
discover that "...'ships, colonies, and commerce1 are a little more 
nearly connected than it is now the fashion in some quarters to suppose
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them. Despite the implications of free trade Merivale had become convinced, 
largely because of his experience as an administrator at the Colonial Office, 
of the economic necessity and the potential value of an empire.63
While Merivale was dealing with these conflicts over free trade, he 
and his colleagues at the Colonial Office were also confronted with an 
issue which proved to be even more serious. During the 1840's and 1850's 
colonial self-government was the dominant policy of the Colonial Office 
towards the colonies. With the white settlement colonies it took the 
form either of representative or responsible government. The Colonial 
Office hoped to reduce imperial expenditure by granting these colonies 
control over their own domestic affairs which would make them self- 
sufficient in such matters as defence, civil administration and "native" 
affairs. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, the consequences 
of this policy of self-government proved in most cases to be exactly 
the reverse of what Merivale and the Colonial Office had hoped it would 
be. By 1860 Merivale realized colonial self-government had been a mere 
political panacea for the social and economic problems of the white 
settlement colonies.
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Chapter 4: Colonial Self-Government in British North America
and Southern Africa, l84?-l860 !
The most important aspect of mid-nineteenth century British imperial 
policy was colonial self-government. Imperial administrators believed that 
the Empire would be kept intact if white settlement colonies, and in time 
all colonies, were granted control over their domestic affairs. A distinc­
tion therefore had to be made between colonial and imperial interests but 
British administrators soon discovered that such interests could never be 
distinguished in practice and the granting of forms of self-government 
was a political panacea for deeper social, economic and political problems 
which confronted the British Empire. Colonial politicians, however, mis­
understood British intentions and believed that self-government was one of 
the first steps to political independence. Merivale, as permanent under­
secretary, was caught squarely in the middle of this imperial dilemma. By 
1860 he had experienced all the practical implications and the conflicts 
arising from this policy and was not at all convinced of its efficacy, 
much less its success.
Most colonial and imperial commentators possessed a theoretical idea 
of colonial self-government, its implementation and its consequences.1 In 
practice there was no consistency at all involved in the granting of self- 
government or in its implementation in each colony. The cause of this 
inconsistency was the conflict in priorities between the colony and the 
mother—country. The colonies wanted self-government in order to manage 
their own affairs. Lacking natural and human resources this process was 
very haphazard. On the other hand the object of British imperial policy
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was the reduction of imperial expenditure. This motive was rarely under—
2
stood in the colonies. The consequence, as Merivale found out in the 
1850Ts, was conflict between colonial politicians and imperial admin­
istrators. From the point of view of the latter, colonial self-government 
had been only marginally successful. The colonists had taken the freedom 
which had been given by Britain but had failed to take on the responsi­
bilities of self-defence and political and civil administration.
This process can be seen most clearly in the British North American 
colonies in the 1840's and 1850's. The consequences were important in 
affecting the Colonial Office's decision not to grant responsible govern­
ment to the Cape Colony at the end of the 1850's and also made it reluctant
to introduce colonial federations into British North America and southern 
3Africa. Responsible government did not, as one historian has contended,
„4
solve "the practical problems without raising the theoretical ones. It 
was designed to ameliorate practical colonial problems, which it did up to 
a certain point, but it also raised more practical and theoretical problems 
than it solved. By 1854 Merivale was aware that responsible government 
"... rests on no law, but simply on recognized usage ... it is not 
established by any law, generally speaking, in the Nth. Am. [ericanj 
colonies, where it is best understood ... the danger of legislation on such 
subjects is that the necessary arrangements & modifications on a subject 
which must often require them are thus rendered more difficult. In 
1841, writing in his Lectures, he was not aware of these problems because 
at that time responsible government had not been granted to any British 
colony.
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Merivales discussion of colonial self-government in his Lectures was 
largely 3n abstract one and he confined his argument chiefly to the white 
settlement colonies. He believed there were three important elements in 
the development of any colony: the political character of the mother-
country, especially the social and political background of the emigrants 
from the mother-country; the environment in which the settlers found them­
selves in the colony when they arrived; the model to be adopted by the
g
mother-country for each colony. The environment in which the new settlers
found themselves was by far the most significant factor. He believed that
7
the tendency of all new communities was essentially "republican".
An abundance of good land and cheap labour were of the greatest import­
ance in creating social equality in new colonies. Merivale believed that 
these conditions would help to modify the development of a class system in 
each colony because there was "... none of that depressing poverty which 
elsewhere weighs down the energies of large masses of mankind..,." All 
settlers, at least initially, were equal in the race for material wealth, and 
y.'et he was aware of the dangers of "social equality". Subsequent generat­
ions would later live on their accumulated wealth, the distinctions between 
wealth and social status would become extremely blurred and a class system 
would develop. Depending on the abundance of land and the relative pop­
ulation of a colony, only two forms of society were possible: "servitude" 
or equality.'
According to Merivale, the history of colonies differed considerably 
from that of European countries. Europe had passed gradually but directly 
from feudalism to capitalism without any intervening stage of social
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equality while new colonies, because of the greater amount of economic, 
opportunity, had passed through the stage of equality before the develop-
g
ment of capitalism. The reason for this difference was clear. New
colonies could be planned. They had the experience of European and other
colonial models upon which to draw to build their new social order.
Merivale!s ideas were influenced by utilitarianism and Edward Gibbon Wakefield's
ideas of "systematic colonization" but they were not dogmatic.^
In his Lectures, Merivale's model colony was Pennsylvania before the
American Revolution. Specifically, he laid down the conditions necessary
for the development of such a settlement. The emigrants should come from
a country like England with
... a poor but industrious class; proceeding from a community in 
which freedom prevails, but in which as yet, the usages of old times, 
and an affectionate reverence for antiquity, have hardly died away; 
from a community possessed of commercial activity, but not engrossed 
by it; religious in popular sentiments and observance; and governed 
by wise and equal laws, cherishing the self-respect of the citizen.
Putting these people, hopefully, into a community with "happier physical
circumstances" would help to create the greatest political "virtue",
"moderation".10 Nevertheless, Merivale did not accept the notion that a
11
model community such as the one he described could ever exist because 
the history of colonization had taught him that there was an enormous 
difference between the abstract thinking of "arm-chair" philosophers and 
the circumstances which confronted those people actively engaged in 
colonization. In the late 1840's and 1850's, Merivale was to discover, 
as an administrator for the British Empire, the truth of this proposition.
In 1841, not being in a position of responsibility, he was free to speculate 
what would happen "if one could turn political reveries into realities".
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Once a model colonial community had been set up, the next problem
was its government. In the early 1850's Merivale concluded that only two
methods of governing a new colony existed: "absolute government" or
"absolute freedom". By the former, the colony would be governed directly
by means of the presence and authority of the colonial governor without n
"representative assembly". They would be governed paternalistically but
efficiently for their own welfare and that of the metropolitan power.
If the mother-country gave the colony "absolute freedom", Merivale
argued, using the reasoning of Sir George C. Lewis, his friend and fellow
politicial econdmist, then the
... executive power in the colony claims no greater rights than it 
has in representative government at home. ... In this case the 
colonists are left to tax themselves to administer themselves 
municipally, to superintend their own domestic institutions. Under 
such a government there should seem much reason to expect that the 
colony would remain an integral part of the empire just as long as 
mutual interest appears to recommend: there need be no prejudice 
or irritation at work to bring about permanent separation; nay, 
perhaps the connexion might be maintained by mutual goodwill, longer 
than mere considerations of advantage would have upheld it; for there 
is, undoubtedly, a natural attachment between a colony and its metro­
polis, wherever the inhabitants of the former do not feel their 
sentiments or their interests interfered with by the conduct of the 
latter. And the natural attachment is kept alive to a great degree 
by the process of immigration.12
In this important passage Merivale was, even in the 1840'sjnot a "separatist".
Merivale recognized the possibility of separation but did not endorse such
a plan because he realized it might lead to the collapse of the British
Empire. Alternatively, he proposed ways in which separation could be
avoided.
Merivale was also fascinated by the United States. All too often,
however, British commentators did not really understand the real issues
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involved or why Americans acted the way they did, primarily because they
interpreted American events in comparison with British goals and achieve- 
14
ments. Merivale was aware that the American example also influenced
colonial attitudes:
The future and the distant form the domain in which the imagination 
of the colonist delights to revel. Exempt from passing want and 
engrossing toil, with little to occupy his thoughts in the monotonous 
scene around him, he wanders willingly forth into visionary regions 
of future opulence and grandeur: his ideas, his expressions, acquire 
a certain colour of habitual exaggeration.
This colonial habit had an impact on the development of colonial national-
16xsm m  the nineteenth century.
Merivale insisted that the development of nationalism in white settle­
ment colonies was derived from the process of British imperialism. The 
example of the Thirteen Colonies during the American Revolution, at least 
in its political and constitutional implications, had been a model for 
British colonies in the nineteenth century. This experience taught the 
British that there were only two alternatives, that of granting self- 
government or maintaining direct control over colonies. Serious limit­
ations were therefore put upon British policy because the United States 
had provided an alternative. The United States had broken away from the 
Empire and had prospered:
... the effect of the example of the United States, ever present and 
fructifying in the imaginations of colonial reformers in every 
corner of the world. There will always be a government party and a 
popular party; a party resting for its existence and influence on the 
detection of abuses, and inflamed representation of grievances; a 
party which must of necessity, be it consciously or unintentionally, 
incline towards principles of national independence.
In 1841 however, he was not certain what sort of institutions these
colonies would have in the future and he was not sure whether any
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temporary or experimental" schemes should be adopted by the mother-
country to prevent the "more dangerous influences of the democratic
spirit" in the white settlement colonies. Whether the colonies, if
given self-government, would become responsible for the administration
and defence of their colony and yet still maintain their loyalty to
17Britain and the Empire, was a serious question. In 1860, after dealing 
directly with the white settlement colonies which possessed responsible 
government, Merivale had become disillusioned by the consequences of the 
experiment. Responsible government was, he concluded from an imperial 
perspective, not very responsible in practice.
Merivale believed the colonists were either incapable or unwilling 
to develop the political, social and economic institutions of their own 
country. Accepting self-government from the British, the colonists 
refused to attend to such mundane tasks as the levying of local taxation 
for roads and other public works which would, in time, make them self- 
sufficient. The natural resources of the colony would not be developed 
because colonial politicians would become more interested in power and 
patronage than in governing responsibly. Withdrawal of competent imperial 
civil servants in the wake of self-government would mean a dearth of 
trained and qualified colonials. The same process would occur as well 
with the development of civil establishments, especially the important 
institutions of religion and education. Merivale concluded that it was 
of the utmost importance that an "infant nation" be taught the principles 
of self-government by the mother country otherwise it would fail to 
develop out of "its own permanent existence -— its own nationality .
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The United States had developed its own culture since the American
Revolution despite the "transplantation11 of British laws and institutions.
Unfortunately the British North American colonies had experienced no
comparable revolution. As a consequence, there was a "tendency in new
colonial communities to allow those institutions which are of domestic
origin to grow up carelessly and at random; to frame laws merely for
actual emergencies; to fill up the foundations with rubbish, and let
future generations care for the finished building." It was Merivale's
utmost concern, both in 1841 and later at the Colonial Office, that col-
18onies should be planned and yet be adaptable to their environment.
The undogmatic utilitarian bent to Merivale's thinking in his 
lectures placed great priority upon the development of colonial self- 
government instead of imperial federation. From 1841 to 1870 Merivale 
continually dismissed any plan in which colonial representatives would 
be admitted to an imperial parliament. Once again, his arguments were 
based not on abstract political theory but upon the practicality of 
such a scheme. There is no doubt at all that he was right in his judg­
ment in this matter. Imperial federation would not solve the problem of
19
separation between British North America and the mother-country. It 
would do precisely the opposite. He believed that the British North 
American colonies would lose their political and economic freedom if 
imperial federation was adopted:
But if colonies were to retain their own legislature for internal 
taxation and the smaller details of government, and at the same time 
send representatives to the central parliament then the question 
would necessarily arise, what functions do these colonial represent­
atives actually perform? Where the power of taxation is, there 
resides in truth the supreme domestic authority. The transoceanic 
members of parliament, destitute of real importance, would become
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mere hangers-on. of parties in the mother-country; the provincial 
assembly would represent public opinion, as it does now, and the 
quarrels between it and the executive would be altogether unaffected 
by the influence of the little knot of gentlemen who might be sent 
to enact the visionary part of legislators in London.
This view of imperial federation influenced his thinking on the desira-
bility of colonial federation in British North America and southern
Africa in 1858.
In 1841 Merivale, as we have seen, had developed a relatively 
coherent abstract theory of colonial development although it was obvious­
ly not original. He was also acutely aware of the practical limitations 
of any theory of colonization. He came to the conclusion that, however 
many restrictions were put on colonies by the mother country, they would 
eventually become separate political entities because of their environment. 
This process would not, however, mean that the colony would lose all its 
"dependence on the imperial sovereignty”. There x^ould be political and 
cultural links because the historical process of imperialism was very 
gradual.
Merivale's analysis of the experience of imperial Rome also made 
him aware of the limitations of abstract theories of colonization. The 
Romans had maintained their empire for so many years by a flexible pol­
itical relationship with their subject states. Loyalty to the parent 
state was the most important factor:
... May we not figure to ourselves, scattered as thick as stars 
over the surface of this earth, communities of citizens owning 
the name of Britons, bound by allegiance to a British sovereign, 
and uniting heart and hand in maintaining the supremacy of Britain 
on every shore which her conquered flag can reach? These may be 
extravagant views; but, if rightly understood, they have this 
advantage, —  that the pursuit of them cannot lead the mind to 
wander in an unprofitable track. They are altogether inconsistent
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with the notions which have at different times led this country so 
fatally astray, in the defence of valueless rights or imaginary 
advantages; they are altogether inconsistent with the idea of a 
subjection bought through the means of a constant and galling 
expenditure, or by the still more injurious method of conceding 
commercial monopolies.^
In the 1850fs, as an administrator, Merivale experienced in southern
Africa, the full force of these dangers. The Kaffir War was an
example of a British adventure using "bayonets". The consequence was
a "constant and galling expenditure". Merivale became more and more
disillusioned with his attempts to formulate an abstract theory of
empire and turned his attention to practical methods of developing the
loyalty of the white settlement colonies to Britain.
In 1852 Merivale emphasized the value of the cultivation of "loyalty".
It was, he argued, "... in the wider sense ...not extinct; no great nation,
capable of high impulses, could exist without it. It must have a cause
and a symbol, strange and even grotesque as these may appear to the
philosopher." In the United States the symbol of loyalty was the American
constitution, in Turkey the "banner of the Prophet", in Russia the"Czar"
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and in France "Buonapartism". White settlement colonies had no in­
digenous symbol upon which to base their nationality but as Merivale 
realized when he became an administrator at the Colonial Office in 1847, 
colonies in British North America, Australia and New Zealand regarded 
their achievement of responsible government as their symbol of loyalty.
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Merivale was one of the few people in London who realized this fact.
He has, therefore, been praised by many historians for his "broad views"
23
on the question of responsible government in the 1850's. While many 
of his colleagues in London viewed responsible government as a method
13^
to solve the political problems of these colonies, Merivale, because of
his reliance on private and confidential correspondence from colonial
governors, knew that the colonists interpreted this system of government
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as an end in itself. Responsible government, therefore, meant some­
thing very different to colonial politicians, compared with British 
politicians and administrators. In the 1850?s Merivale attempted to make 
the Secretaries of State for the Colonies aware of this difference.
British inability to understand the colonial view of responsible 
government was caused by their general ignorance of the geography and the 
history of the colonies. Unable to judge the distance from and the size 
of their North American colonies, British politicians and administrators 
consistently underestimated the difficulties involved in governing them. 
They alternated between optimism and pessimism about the future of the 
Empire. If they were optimistic, they generally believed British North 
Americans were "loyal Britons transplanted to a distant soil". If
pessimistic, the same colonists became "republican in character, feelings
25
and institutions" that is, more like the United States.
Merivale conceded that in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, the British North American colonies had already been granted
at least "representative forms" of political freedom. He also believed
that geographical considerations were important for their political
development because British North America was so vast and had a relatively
small population. Given these facts, they must become "essentially
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republican" whether they kept their British institutions or not. From 
1847 to 1860 while attempting to deal with the practical implications of
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responsible |government, Merivale focused his attention on each individual 
colony in British North America.
Nova Scotia was the first British North American colony to be granted
responsible!, government in 1848. Merivale did not participate directly
because of Lord Grey's great interest in this subject. After Grey left
the Colonial Office in 1852, Nova Scotian'affairs were handled capably by
the chief clerk for the North American Department, Arthur Blackwood, and
the assistant undersecretary, Thomas F. Elliot. Merivale did?however, make
some observations about Nova Scotia. Even before his appointment to the
Colonial Office, while reviewing a book written by the British geologist,
Sir Charles Lyell, concerning his travels in North America in the early
1840's, Merivale remarked that Lyell's "...glimpse of the state of affairs
in the country of the 'Blue Noses', taught him a lesson early learnt by
travellers in most parts of our scattered colonial dominion -- that many
of the peculiarities which, when exhibited by a Yankee, we term democratic,
flourish quite as luxuriantly in certain parts of Her Majesty's dominions
28under the shadow of royalty." Merivale reiterated that it was the 
social and economic conditions in which the colonials lived which fostered 
their desire for self-government.
Throughout the 1850's Merivale supported the premise that the colonial 
governor should defer to the wishes of a majority in the colonial assembly. 
In 1856 when filling the position of Chief Justice of Nova Scotia, Merivale 
minuted, and it was approved by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
that the governor should be informed:
that the system of government which he administers does not admit 
of any broad distinctions between the office of Ch. Justice & any
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other: that he must be guided by the advice of his Council as 
between the several claims of candidates for the office: subject 
only to this, that if he conscientiously regards the man selected 
as unfit by reason of absolute defects not mere relative inferiority, 
he is then bound especially in an office of such influence to the 
whole community to prefer the public interest to every other con­
sideration, & not to appoint him.29
The governor was in a highly anomalous position because he was responsible 
to the imperial government for appointing competent officials and yet was 
forced to defer to the demands of colonial politicians. This situation 
was one of the disadvantages of responsible government.
In 1858 when a union of the Atlantic colonies was being considered, 
Merivale made his views known at the Colonial Office and by this time they 
carried considerable weight. These colonies had not developed satisfact­
ory municipal institutions which would replace their colonial assemblies 
if a larger union was created. Moreover, he agreed with the governor's 
assessment that the presence of strong colonial identities would prevent 
such a union because it would lack the "general support" of the population 
in each colony. If a union of all the eastern British North American
colonies occurred, Canada would gain the most because a union would pro-
30
vide a solution for its political difficulties. If a relatively "mature" 
colony like Nova Scotia was not ready for a larger union then the same 
was even more true for a much smaller, less populous colony like Prince 
Edward Island.
Prince Edward Island had a difficult problem, absentee landlordism.
In 1848 Merivale had minuted that "the land question in P.E. Island should
be settled as soon as possible, than QjicT) that the island is otherwise
31
unfit for responsible government...." This question was not settled
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for many years because landlords ware opposed to the granting of resp­
onsible government. They knew that if the assembly gained control over 
the executive branch of the government then the assembly would be able 
to pass legislation to end their power. The onus was on the Colonial 
Office to come up with a solution. Merivale recommended that responsible 
government should not be granted "... unless the Imperial government is 
prepared to say to the landowners, 'We can do nothing more for you, are 
bound to do nothing for you, and shall leave you to be despoiled by your 
tenants'. Whether this can be said, or ought to be said, and whether any 
measure which shall secure to the landowners something of their claims can 
be made to the foundation of a bargain conceding responsible government 
are questions requiring so much knowledge & wisdom to solve that I can
presume to do no more than suggest them ...." He suggested sending out
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a commissioner to arbitrate the dispute.
After following this complex problem very closely, Merivale decided
on a different course of action. He agreed with the colonial governor's
decision to dissolve the assembly and to hold new elections. The result
was a vote of eighteen to six by the new assembly in favour of responsible 
33
government. Despite having doubts about its implementation, Merivale 
and Grey acquiesced to these demands. Within a few years however, Merivale 
was lamenting the problems which had occurred. By 1853 he believed that 
in Prince Edward Island, there was a lack of "good working Attornies 
General", that is, men who would put the welfare of their colony above 
partisan politics. Moreover, self-government had not solved the land 
question.34 In 1854 Merivale concluded that the full meaning of respon­
sible government was being misunderstood:
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"Responsible government" is as yet only a few years old in Canada, 
and in its infancy every where else, and therefore it is not to be 
wondered at if parties are yet a good deal at sea about its meaning,
& if many of its elements conflict a little with our old colonial 
forms invented for a different state of things. If the analogy of 
British government is to be followed —  and I do not see what else 
can be done —  then I suppose it is clear, / 1. That a governor
ought to dismiss his Council if they cease to be supported by a 
majority in the Assembly, 2. That if they possess a majority in 
the Assembly but are in his opinion taking steps contrary to good 
government, he ought first to dismiss them & call new advisers, 
and then (with the advice of the second set) dissolve the Assembly. 
Here, on the contrary, we find Sir A.B. Bannerman dissolving the 
Assembly in opposition to the advice of his Council —  and the 
Council contending that he has no right to do it (in which I think 
they were wrong) him answering that he not only has a right but is 
following the proper constitutional course -- in which he seems to 
me equally wrong ....^
Far from solving the problems of responsible government, the Colonial 
Office discovered that it had created more conflicts between the governors 
and colonial politicians.
Five years later Merivale confessed that the experiment of responsible 
government in Prince Edward Island had been a failure. The land question 
had not been solved and the politicians continued to squabble among them­
selves over patronage. Merivale rejected "departmental government" as a 
substitute because the " ... colony would be driven back on the American 
system -- viz. - - a  free legislature with an irresponsible executive. But 
the American executive is removable with the President by the popular vote 
every four years. The colonial executive would be permanent & respon­
sible' government would work back to the very system out of which it 
emerged a few years ago." The only hope was that a new governor would 
find a way of "harmonizing antagonists" without causing more constitutional 
conflict. Merivale concluded that he had, despite objections, ... little
doubt that elective Councils will be formed by degrees in all of the
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N. {orth] Am. I^rican] provinces and with no detriment to imperial interests. 
But the opposition between landlord & tenant in P.E.I. render radical 
experiments more questionable here than elsewhere.” Disillusioned with 
events in Prince Edward Island since 1848, to an even greater degree than 
in Nova Scotia, Merivale had become very pessimistic concerning the future
O  (L
of Prince Edward Island and responsible government.
In most of the British North American colonies the problems of
responsible government were directly related to the inability of colonial
politicians to govern efficiently and to work together to solve their
social and economic problems. However in Newfoundland, because of its
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economic and social "backwardness", the problems were even greater.
When it was granted in 1856, the colonists used their new powers to block 
an important treaty between the British and the French which would have 
settled the long-standing dispute over the French shore. The consequences, 
therefore, were for the Colonial Office and Merivale extremely exasperating. 
Colonial politicians and the Colonial Office were working at cross-purposes, 
each acting out of self-interest and within their own understanding of the 
working of responsible government.
The first movement toward responsible government in Newfoundland 
came in 1849 and the initiative was taken by the colonial assembly when 
a question arose concerning tenure of office held by the members of that 
body. Merivale was quick to point out that any concession on the part of 
the Colonial Office would imply "very nearly the same thing as granting 
1 responsible government' itself" but Grey decided this important
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question. Grey, very conscious of Newfoundland’s problems, rejected the 
request because he believed the "wealth.and population" of the Island
OQ
must first of all increase.
In the spring of 1852 the issue of responsible government arose 
again at the Colonial Office. By this time, without the influence of 
Grey, Merivale was able to make a full report concerning the desirability 
of responsible government for this colony. The basic problem involved 
the close relationship between religion and politics in Newfoundland!
... political parties are so unfortunately influenced by religious 
differences, and where a Prelate of the R.C. Church has intimated 
his intention to take part in them as a political leader .... At 
present the state of parties seems to stand thus* 8 R.C. to 7 
Protestants in the Assembly: 5 Protestants to 2 R.C. in the Council:
but I cannot quite make out the number of acting members of the latter 
body.
A less favourable state of things for the introduction of respon­
sible (that is, party") government, cannot of course be imagined. Yet 
both sides of the question must be weighed. It must be remembered 
that the present system, while it never works very well in a colony 
with a numerous European population, works worst of all when it is 
regarded on all hands as provisional & temporary only. And one of 
its most questionable features seems tome to be, that it prevents 
rather than aids, the action of the conservative elements which may 
exist ....
Merivale concluded that the chief reason for not granting responsible 
government was " ... that opposition to democracy is in colonies generally 
the unpopular side; and that men will not take the unpopular side until 
they are forced; but will lean on the Home government, and its official 
representation in the colony, rather than exert themselves, as long as 
they c a n . M e r i v a l e ’s major objection was that the colonies would not 
be better governed if the colonists governed themselves.
In 1856 responsible government was granted, as Merivale put it so
simply, to this "unfortunate colony". Even the bill bringing responsible
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government into effect had been delayed many months because Protestants
and Catholics could not agree on the division of electoral districts. ^ 1
From 1856 until he left the Colonial Office in the spring of 1860, Merivale
watched Newfoundlanders struggle to make responsible government work 
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satisfactorily. In March of 1860 be stood by helplessly while the
colonial governor, Sir Alexander Bannerman, attempted to develop an
efficient government, laws and institutions for the colony. Merivale
gave Bannerman as much support as he had previously given Sir Edmund
Head in New Brunswick and in Canada. Once self-government had been
granted, Merivale realized that there was little either the governor or
the Colonial Office could do to help the colonists govern themselves
43except support the actions of the colonial governor.
In the late 1840's New Brunswick was just as poor as Newfoundland.
Most of the population lived in port towns and were involved in lumbering,
shipbuilding, fishing and subsistence farming. Like other British North
American colonies, New Brunswick lacked unity because of its geographical
position. Only the building of an inter-colonial railroad in the 1860's
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would bring about any significant change. Nevertheless, Merivale took 
a greater interest in this colony, probably because his friend,
Edmund Head, was appointed its governor. In 1848 Head consulted Merivale 
and Grey in London concerning the "strategy" to be adopted in granting
I 45responsible government to New Brunswick. Head was instructed to 
choose his "new" colonial ministers carefully thereby ensuring that 
self-government would be placed in trustworthy hands. As one historian 
has aptly remarked, this attitude reflected the "characteristic attitude 
of moderate liberalism —  ... sympathetic with reform but suspicious of
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revolution, and inclined rather to build on foundations already laid than 
to break new ground.
During Head's five years in New Brunswick, Head and Merivale col­
laborated, without too much interference from Lord Grey, in the process
of transferring political power to the colonists and trying to educate
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them for self-government. The most important problems, they realized, 
were economic. Only free trade and the development of a railroad con­
necting Halifax to Montreal, through New Brunswick,would change the 
isolation and the primitive economy of that colony. Head and Merivale 
experimented with the problems arising out of the new relationship between 
the governor and the assembly. As Head put it one year after his arrival 
in this colony, the influence of a governor had changed:
... a governor's power is mainly that nothing can be done without 
him. He has only to doubt & hesitate & require further document­
ation. His power of positive action independently must be small 
but so much the better for his tranquillity of mind. Personal 
influence with the members of the Council will do much too.^
Although the governor could not interfere in the domestic affairs of the 
49colony, he could still do a great deal to influence the course of
- 50 events.
In 1850 a political crisis arose because Head had failed to consult 
his executive council before he appointed a judge. Under responsible 
government he was, theoretically, supposed to govern through his council 
according to the wishes of the assembly. In this case, although the 
colonial politicians complained to the Colonial Office about the.action 
taken by Head, they did not quarrel with the appointment and the executive 
council did not resign in protest. Head was supported by the Colonial 
Office, especially by Merivale, whose minute summed up its attitude:
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”... if the affair ends in producing more unity of action and purpose 
among themselves |~the CouncilJ, good will have been done, even at the 
expense of some discontent with the Lt. Govr. 11 Once again, the primary 
concern of the Colonial Office was the development of efficient govern­
ment for these colonies. From this crisis Head and Merivale developed a 
greater perception of the practical problems of responsible government 
as Merivale revealed in a minute on the subject:
... the Lt. Gov.[ernoip has very accurately stated the principles of 
the system called "responsible government" in colonial administration. 
But his own statement shows in what respect it is, and must be, 
anomalous. The Executive Government of an independent community 
may be responsible to the Legislature only. The Executive Government 
of a dependency has a double responsibility: that of the Governor's 
Council towards the Legislature; that of the Governor himself to­
wards the Home Government: and it is the difficulty of reconciling
this double obligation which produces most of the temporary differ­
ences & hitches in colonial government as at present organized in 
the N. [orth] Am. jerican] provinces.
Despite the "hitches" Merivale and Head had little trouble with the
political affairs of this colony until 1854. New Brunswick continued to
be plagued with economic problems which responsible government could
provide no solution whatsoever.
Only free trade, in this case reciprocity with the United States, 
and the building of an inter-colonial railroad would lessen the economic 
isolation of New Brunswick in the 1850's. The former was accomplished 
but not the latter. The facts which governed both these decisions for 
the Colonial Office were the proximity of the colony to the United States 
and need to maintain the connection between the British North American 
colonies and Britain. The British feared that these colonies might be­
come annexed to the United States or become the cause of war between 
Britain and that country. Much was done in the Colonial Office to obviate
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both possibilities. The proposed route of the railroad, with loans
guaranteed by the British government, was to be along the Gulf of the
St. Lawrence and the Gasp£ peninsula rather than through New Brunswick.
The Colonial Office feared that the shorter and cheaper route desired
by the colonists would, in time of war with the United States, not
only be unsuitable for the military defence of the British colonies
but would also enable Americans to capture it easily.^ For these
reasons construction of the railroad was not started in the 1850*s.
The reciprocity negotiations were, however, successful and a treaty
was signed in 185k, The effect of this treaty was to link New
Brunswick more closely to the other maritime colonies and it brought,
at least for a time, prosperity to New Brunswick. Head had persuaded
the Colonial Office to include New Brunswick in the treaty. The
Colonial Office and Merivale were not opposed to this suggestion because
it complemented their plan to reduce the economic dependence of the
colonies on the mothercountry without noticeably weakening the
political connection.
Late in 1853 Head wrote a private letter to Merivale concerning
the state of New Brunswick. Despite the fact that the implementation
of responsible government had been more successful than in many other
British North American colonies Head reported:
... The fact is the last session of an assembly here, where 
there is no check on the introduction of money votes by any 
single member, is a scene of lavish jobbing of the grossest kind 
& it will be more than ever this winter because our revenue is 
larger. Every member tries to secure his re-election by this 
species of bribery. As it is of course I should not feel it 
necessary to weigh this matter further as it ought to rest with 
my successor if I am to be relieved this autumn. The present
House is a very bad one, though too feeble to do much mischief.
Pray give me as early a notion as you can of my prospect of
moving & let me hear from you.
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Merivale and the Colonial Office were satisfied, however, with Head's 
first governorship. Merivale minuted to the.Duke of Newcastle in 
February of 1854, that it "... must be matter of great satisfaction to 
Sir E. Head to have witnessed the rapid recovery of the province under 
his government from the state of extreme depression which existed in the 
beginning of his administration, and its present very flourishing con­
dition: though not, as he truly says, the result of any specific action 
on the part of government." Economic conditions improved because of the 
reciprocity treaty and prosperity in North America and Europe. As Meri­
vale pointed out the colony's political problems, arising from responsible 
government, continued.
The next governor, Sir John Manners Sutton, had greater difficulties 
with New Brunswick. He kept the Colonial Office informed about the prob­
lems within the colony but little was done. Merivale realized that unless 
the colony showed some financial stability the British government would 
not provide an imperial loan or a guarantee for one. Without a railroad 
to tie these scattered colonies together there was little basis for any 
kind of union. The Colonial Office was resolved that the initiative 
had to come from the colonial politicians. In 1858 it came in such a 
feeble and parochial manner that the Colonial Office rejected it as pre- 
mature. The greatest pressure came from Canadian politicians who, as 
Merivale observed in 1859, "... have rather injured the prospects of the 
whole scheme by using it for their own political purpose, i.e. that of
creating a balance in the East against the preponderating power of the 
57West " Any union would depend ultimately upon the development of
responsible government in Canada.
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Merivale had very little to do with the actual granting of responsible
government in Canada. Lord Grey was quite clear in his instructions that
it must be initiated by colonial politicians. In 1848 he minuted that,
if Canada was to develop, the "administration of all internal affairs"
should "... be left with very little interference indeed to the local
authorities. It may very probably be necessary very soon to extend this
system to other colonies in which the principle of responsible government
has been established but it is advisable to wait till the necessity shows 
58
itself." In this instance Grey relied to a great extent upon the advice 
of Lord Elgin. Within the next year, responsible government was granted 
to Canada.
Merivale contented himself with his role as legal adviser to the 
colony, for example, dealing with the defectiveness of bankruptcy law, 
with the use of lotteries to finance railroads, with the appointment of 
judges, and with the complaints from Egerton Ryerson, the Canadian jour­
nalist and educator, about the use of American maps in Canadian school- 
60rooms. In 1850 he helped to bring about the transfer of the postal
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system in British North America from imperial to colonial control. In
addition, he opposed the proposed Halifax and Quebec Railway scheme:
... however desirable it may be to encourage the settlement & 
improvement of our Eastern American colonies, all arguments which 
seem to assume that they need only encouragement to thrive like the 
West seem to be based on a fallacy. Climate & soil make the radical 
differences which no public work can cure: The State of Maine, with
more than an average amount of American enterprise does not advance 
like Ohio, nor will New Brunswick advance like Canada West. There­
fore all extraordinary outlay on the former is like spending money 
on barren land when there is still fertile to cultivate and though 
there may be very good politica^2reasons f°r it:> cannot be justified 
on strictly economical grounds.
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Merivale repeated the same warning throughout the 1850's with regard to 
British North America and southern Africa. The granting of responsible 
government to any colony was directly dependent on its economic maturity.
In 1853 Merivale and Head replaced Grey and Elgin. The former con­
tinued the Grey-Elgin practice of dealing with the affairs of the colony 
by means of private letters and despatches, using informal as well as 
formal means of communication. Unlike Elgin and Grey, Merivale and Head 
were aided by economic prosperity in Canada at least until 1858 and no 
serious crisis arose. Instead, colonial issues centred on mundane and 
sometimes humorous questions such as the conferring of titles on colonial
politicians and the order of precedence for the wives of colonials dining
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at Government House. In 1858 three important questions confronted Head
and Merivale: the possibility of the annexation of the Hudson's Bay
Company territories by Canada, the "double shuffle" crisis and the location of 
the "seat of government". In all three instances Merivale and Head were 
forced to interfere in these domestic disputes. The outcome proved to 
Merivale and the Colonial Office that responsible government had not 
developed very far and also that Canada and the other British North 
American colonies were not ready for federation.
Although the subject of a union of all the British North American 
colonies had been discussed for many years by colonial and imperial 
politicians, commentators and administrators, it was not until 1858 that 
it was seriously considered by the Colonial Office. Like the 1860's, 
the 1850's also had its debate on the practicability of a British North 
American federation. The attention of the Colonial Office was focused
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on this important issue largely because of Head's interest in it. Previ­
ously nn academic, Head was very interested in the abstract as well as 
the practical political problems of colonial development. In 1857 he 
set down his ideas in the form of a memorandum on the "expediency" of 
uniting either the maritime colonies or all of the British North American 
colonies. In 1857 he wrote that these considerations were not necessary 
because the "... temper of the United States & their future weight in all 
public affairs must make us think twice before we add to their strength.
But if we cannot shake off the B.N. American provinces -- what must we do— -
6 5
we must make the best of them."
Head's ideas on the viability of a federal union became significant
in August 1858 because of the "seat of government" question, whether the
capital of Canada should be located in Upper or in Lower Canada. Canadian
politicians could not agree and the matter had to be decided in Britain.
The resulting deadlock brought down "Head's Ministry", a coalition led by
John A. Madconald. Another important and related issue was the great
interest which Canadian politicians were taking in the Hudson's Bay Company
territories now that the British government, by the recommendations of a
Select Parliamentary Committee in 1857, had opened the way for Canada
to annex Rupert's Land,
Upon receiving Head’s despatch, Merivale and the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, became very worried. Merivale
wrote to Lytton: " I fear it must be, a very serious matter, and ominous
of troublesome complications for you to deal with, if not of a general
66
break up of Lord John Russell's united Canadian Republic." The next
despatch brought even more serious news because Head reported that he had
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refused to call an election for either the coalition of John A. Macdonald
or ^ts successor led by George Brown and A. A. Dorion. The consequence-
67
was the "double shuffle" crisis. Head explained to Lewis that Brown
had no chance of forming a stable government. and he thought, incorrectly
68as it turned out, that Brown knew it also. Head had used his wide dis­
cretionary powers, as the governor of a colony under responsible govern­
ment, not to dissolve the assembly and call an election because he believed 
the expense could not be justified. After receiving Merivale's advice
69that Head had acted correctly, Lytton supported the actions taken by Head.
The Colonial Office began to consider an alternative form of govern­
ment for Canada if the present one stopped functioning altogether. The 
discussion centred largely on the possibility of forming a federal union 
of all the British North American colonies. Merivale remarked that the 
chief problem of a federal union was "...it is chiefly popular with pol­
iticians, not in the community, and rather as a mode of getting out of
the inextricable scrape in which they seem involved by the present 
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Union." Merivale also wrote an important memorandum on federation, the 
state of responsible government and the desirability of sending private 
as opposed to public despatches to Canada. Concerning the political 
immaturity of Canadian politicians in the "double shuffle" crisis he 
wrote: "...Messrs. Brown & Dorion will know that nothing would injure
them so much in Canada as to invoke English interference. If they are 
in earnest, they will ask for the recall of the Governor." Even if the 
Canadian politicians did take this step Merivale was certain the Colonial 
Office would defend Head largely because British politicians were reluctant 
to interfere in the domestic politics of Canada after responsible govern—
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ment had been granted. As he put it: "I cannot but think that even
Mr, Roebuck himself would find it difficult to get any one to back him 
in a discussion on a Canadian change of ministry which in no way affects 
this country." Colonial self-government could work in the self-interest 
either of Britain or the white settlement colonies.
Merivale was opposed to a federation of the British North American 
colonies. He did not think Lytton should adopt this panacea because 
Canadians were not ready for it and there was a much better alternative. 
Although he admitted federation was a "... most proper subject: nor 
would even a Canadian Council be so unreasonable as to consider it other­
wise: But I do not see in the present stage of the affairs, what possible 
information you expect to get. If the Governor has personally erred in 
the matter, the private letter will call him to order." Private letters, 
Merivale explained to Lytton, had helped to avoid the problems which had 
arisen from public despatches which were published in the Canadian press. 
With public despatches the Colonial Office was frequently misunderstood:
"... they will certainly attribute to you a deeper meaning: and, if they 
did not, they would be affronted. They have no idea of the domestic 
affairs of two'millions of people being overhauled in Parl't like that 
of Sierra Leone or St. Helena." Canadians considered themselves, now 
that they had responsible government, as politically equal "under the 
Crown with the Imp. Gov't."71 Therefore, in order to avoid petty squabbles, 
Merivale and the Colonial Office had to use an informal system of commun­
ication.
Head was able to weather this political storm with the support of 
Merivale at the Colonial Office. The Colonial Office did not change
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its view of federalism until the 1860 !s and by then Merivale had left the 
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Colonial Office. Considering the economic and political situation of 
all the eastern British North American colonies it is difficult to dis- 
with Merivale s conclusion that in the 1850*s these colonies were 
simply not ready for federation.^
If the larger eastern colonies in British North America were not ready 
for federation and had many practical difficulties with responsible govern­
ment, it is no wonder then that the colonies of Vancouver Island and British 
Columbia did not obtain responsible government. In 1856 the Colonial 
Office took the initiative and ordered the colonial politicians to form
an assembly. Unlike eastern British North America, there was no struggle
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for self-government. In this case Merivale's dictum for the other
colonies was also true; economic and social development should occur before
7 6
a colony would be granted control over its domestic and external affairs.
In the negotiations for the grant of Vancouver Island to the Hudson's Bay
Company in 1848, Merivale had noted to Lord Grey: "Practically some time
must of course lapse before any representative assembly can be summoned.
But the H.B.C. have no power to render that it shall be postponed 'until
77
it is desirable1".
From 1849 to 1855 there was little economic development on Vancouver
Island other than the fur trade. There was no initiative by the colonists,
the Hudson's Bay Company or the Colonial Office to call an assembly. By
1855, Merivale began to doubt the viability of the colony;
I think it very doubtful whether a settlement can in reason be 
said to have been established, when after 6 years no attempt has 
been made to call the people together to manage their own affairs, 
though this may be no fault of the Company. It is also worth 
considering whether it is desirable the present state of things
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should longer continue with Russia on one side of the little settle­
ment & the U.S. on the other. But on the other hand, to depose the 
H.B. Co. will unavoidably entail some expense on the Home Government, 
for the place can hardly be in a situation to maintain i t s e l f .  78
In 1855 the Hudson's Bay Company informed the Colonial Office of its
desire to call an assembly of colonists on the Island but Merivale was
very cautious when he learned that there were only forty eligible electors. 79
Nevertheless, one year later, with the support of the Colonial Office,
80the colonists found themselves building a house of assembly. Respon­
sible government did not follow.
After the gold rush in 1858 a new colony was created by Lytton and 
Douglas on the mainland. Like Vancouver Island, it was granted represent­
ative institutions. At least until 1860, the Colonial Office relied
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largely on the advice of James Douglas, the governor of both colonies.
Distance from England, lack of knowledge by the Colonial Office and the
ability of Douglas dictated this situation. Merivale held out little
hope that these colonies would develop economically and become self- 
82sufficient. For example, late in 1859, he received a petition from the
"Reform Association at Queensborough inquiring whether the colony would
be allowed political rights. Somewhat surprised at this request, he
minuted that he had "... always wondered, & thought it rather a singular
sign of the times, that Sir E. Lytton's bold measure in starting this
colony without any political rights whatever had hitherto engendered so
83
little opposition." The petition was denied by the Colonial Office.
gy the time Merivale was transferred to the India Office m  the spring 
of 1860, his ideas concerning the granting of representative institutions 
and responsible government to the British North American colonies had
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changed. His work at the Colonial Office made him even more critical 
of the problems associated with colonial self-government. In 18^-1 
he had written. ...it is certain that when the expected boon 
arrives it will find the colony divided into two classes —  those 
who are its masters now, and those who expect to be its masters 
hereafter; and that it will find the minds of a large number possessed 
with a prejudiced hatred toward those elements of good society 
which may be introduced during the period of minority." By i860 
he understood that economic self-sufficiency should come before 
self-government.^
Cape Colony and Natal were not granted responsible government 
in the 1 8 5 0*s for different reasons. Southern Africa was vital 
as a strategic factor because Britain had to protect the sea routes 
to India. In the 18^0 's, led by the "influential Herman Merivale", 
a "convention policy" was attempted. It resulted in the independence 
of two Afrikaaner republics and the consolidation of British
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influence in southern Africa. ^ This policy, with the exception 
of a scheme to deploy military pensioners on the frontier, also 
discouraged British colonization. British settlers were heavily 
outnumbered by the Boers and even more so by Africans. The Colonial 
Office was therefore even more reluctant, if not resolutely opposed, 
to granting self-government. For the same reason, it opposed the
86
solution proposed in the late l850's by Sir George Grey, federalism.
As a consequence responsible government and federation were not 
given to the Cape Colony until the 1870's and not to Natal until 
the 1 8 9 0*s. The Colonial Office's dilemma was apparent: "Security
had to be balanced against economy." Self-government played 
only a minor role between these two pillars of British colonial 
policy in southern Africa from 184-7-1860.^
The Colonial Office knew a great deal about British North 
America: its geography, Amerindian culture and the economic
problems facing white settlers. Southern Africa and its inhabitants
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were largely shrouded in myths. Merivale, in 184-1, was an exception 
for he gave a precise description of the Boers:
... form still the mass of the people, living in single 
families, at a wide distance from each other, occupied in 
the pasture of their numerous herds, and in the most 
animating and dangerous exercises of the chase; they are 
strangely changed in outward circumstances from their 
Batavian i ancestors, yet are said to retain much of the 
same national character.^9
Later Merivale analyzed the actions of the Boers based on this
knowledge.
At the Colonial Office Merivale, using a primitive frontier thesis, 
ascribed the Boers* "trekking" to economic factors rather than to 
their "national character". The analogy which he used to explain 
their actions was the American west in the nineteenth century.
He attempted to explain the Boers to the Secretaries of State for 
the Colonies by comparing them to the "backwoodsmen in America" 
because the politicians knew more about the United States than Africa.
In this way he became, even with Lord Grey, influential. After 
a few months at the Colonial Office he informed Grey that the 
latest emigration of the Boers from the Cape Colony was caused not 
by their ’'disaffection" with the British government but because 
of their social and economic requirements:
It seems from the account of the Boers themselves to be 
literally a case of "overpopulation" according to the existing 
agricultural economy of the district. But I suppose there is 
something of the same passion which compels the backwoodsman 
of America & the squatter in Australia to leave civilization 
as far behind as they can. This instance ... is quite different 
from the movement of a^body of settlers en masse from political 
or social discontent.
Merivale was also aware that the colonial governor, Sir Henry Pottinger,
misunderstood the Boers and their way of life. He drafted and sent out
Q1
despatches with Grey's approval advising him of his error. The Office 
could only wait and hope that its instructions were obeyed, and when . 
they were not, it became more and more defensive in its attempts to 
govern southern Africa.
By 1847 the Colonial Office had not granted representative institu­
tions to the Cape Colony. The problem was very simple, the scattered
nature of the white settlements and the differing economic base of each 
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region. The pressure from white settlers for representative institu­
tions mounted and in 1849 the Colonial Office was forced to recommend that
representative government be given to the Cape Colony. The Office warned
93
the governor of the consequences.
In the meantime Smith had set out to enlarge the frontiers of the 
Cape Colony to the north and to include the territory to which the Boers 
had migrated only a few years before. This action, Smith's "forward 
policy", threw the Colonial Office into a state of alarm. For Merivale 
it raised legal problems: "Can a Governor, by his Proclamation, approved
by the Queen, through a simple despatch, extend the frontiers of the colony 
Can he thereby import into the newly acquired district the legislative 
power of the Colonial Legislature? Can he thereby import into it the 
existing law of the colony--in this instance the Roman Dutch law? I 
believe he can do all this, but I am quite unaware of the authorities by
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which these important questions are to be answered." If the annexed
territory became part of the British .Empire Merivale believed the Boers
had no right to representative institutions just because the Cape Colony
had them, because he felt the Boers should have a government consistent
with their own needs and aspirations. The rationale for Merivale's
"convention policy" was the right of the Boers to maintain their own
nationality and the freedom to develop economically without British 
94interference.
Another important problem which the Colonial Office was forced to
consider in the early 1850's because of the outbreak of the Kaffir War,
was the "native question". If the British did not withdraw from the
frontier then they would become responsible for the enormous cost of
defending the Boers against Africans. At the same time the Office had
very little control over the "native" policy of the Boers. By the end
of 1851 Merivale was convinced that withdrawal from the frontier "...
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will never be taken, unless under distinct orders from hence.”
From 1852-1854 "orders" from the Colonial Office formulated by 
Merivale were issued and a special commissioner, Sir George Russell 
Clerk, was sent and two treaties were signed with the Boers -- the Orange 
and the Sand River Conventions. After the signing of the Orange River 
Convention on February 16, 1852, Merivale outlined the reasons for taking 
this step, its implications for British policy and the future of the 
Boers:
It is unquestionably the recognition of a new South African 
Republic, and under their instructions I do not know what other 
course was open to the Commissioners. There was no alternative 
between absolute control & absolute freedom -- any partial mention 
of sovereignty over these people would inevitably have implied 
protection, and the expense attending it.
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Were the population of the Sovereignty simply composed 
of Boer^, X should believe the best course was to leave 
them equally freei the only difficulty in the case arises 
from something of a British interest having gathered at 
Bloemfontein 8c perhaps elsewhere within its limits.96
But the policy of withdrawal was short-lived. In 1854 Sir George
Grey was appointed governor of the Cape Colony primarily because
of his success with the Maori in New Zealand. Merivale hoped he
would be able to save the British government from another expensive
war in southern Africa.
By the time Grey arrived in the colony it had finally received
representative institutions. The Kaffir War had delayed the
implementation of a constitution and elections to the new assembly.
Even when these steps had been taken Merivale was not entirely
satisfied with the constitution or its operation because the assembly
was not being run by "men of experience" nor was it truly repre- 
97sentative. Merivale did not think that many of the white inhabitants
of the Cape Colony had enough experience to take an active role in
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the administration of the colony. After an assembly was called 
the Colonial Office began to receive petitions from inhabitants of
the "Eastern District of the Cape" for a separate executive but the
petitioners were not concerned with the fundamental problem of
99such a plan, the additional payment of the salaries of these officials.
The attitude of the Colonial Office began to harden against the
granting of responsible government.
When the first Cape assembly met in the colonial politicians
demanded that the legislative council have the power to amend money bills 
which, under representative government, only the colonial governor and his 
appointed executive council were allowed to have. Immediately, Merivale
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realized the implication: "Responsible government will no doubt be the
upshot ; whether it would be advisable to indicate in any way that it may 
be contingent on the adoption of strong measures of frontier defense may 
be worth considering."100 As in British North America, Merivale insisted 
that responsible government meant political freedom for the colonists 
and that they should take on the responsibilities of providing for their 
own economic and social development. In this case, settlers at the Cape 
must, under responsible government, also provide protection for themselves. 
The Colonial Office was supported by Sir George Grey who was attempting to 
create harmony between white settlers and Africans by a policy of "amal­
gamation". However, Grey believed that "amalgamation", his solution to 
the "native" question, should come before responsible government was 
granted.
In 1855 Merivale was astounded when he learned of Grey's decision to 
create a federation for southern Africa, an essential part of Grey's 
plan to "amalgamate" both whites and Africans. If implemented it would 
mean the end of the convention policy. Therefore Merivale was sceptical 
of federation;
There is every antecedent probability that the two Dutch South 
African republics, if left alone, will run through the career of the 
Spanish South American Republics. Great firmness, and great fore­
thought, will be required to resist the pressure of those who will 
endeavour to force the British government into interference, ... I 
think Sir G. Grey premature, to say the least of it, in alluding 
already to the probability of the reunion of these states under the 
British Crown in a kind of federation. 101
Despite Grey's intentions the Colonial Office felt, until 1858, that they
were bound to support the man they had chosen to solve the problems of
.— . 102 southern Africa.
Meanwhile the decision of the Colonial Office not to grant respons-
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ibl® government to the Cape Colony in 1855 had proven to be a wise one.
Local administrators had mishandled the colony's finances and there was
by 1856, a huge deficit. An official inquiry was held but it proved to
be inconclusive. Despairingly Merivale minuted: "This seems to be one
of the many cases in which 'Nobody' is ultimately in fault. If the Cape
Pari' t is satisfied, I do not know that we need pursue the subject further
 " The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Henry Labouchere agreed
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and nothing further was done. It proved once again to Merivale that
the Cape Colony was not competent to handle its own affairs.
In March of 1857 Grey used Pretorius' claim,, the leader of the 
Boers in the "Trans-Vaal" republicto the Orange River Territory, (which 
Merivale regarded as "preposterous" because it violated the treaties 
signed with the two republics in 1852 and 1854) to put forward "views 
of his favourite project of the 'Federal Union' under the British Crown." 
But Merivale^ supported by Henry Labouchere, saw the implications of Grey's 
policy:
. . . coalition should be likely to ensure through force from abroad 
& revolt within affecting one of the two states —  that the annexing 
State should be the most hostile to this country and the most addicted 
to slave-dealing —  and that the event should come to pass under a 
governor who loses no opportunity of expressing his dissatisfaction 
at what has been done and his hope of the reunion of the 0. R. Terr­
itory -- these are circumstances which no doubt try the principle 
of non-intervention to the uttermost,
Merivale minuted that Grey should be warned that the Colonial Office would
not sanction any union of the republics, the policy of the Colonial Office
was one of "non-interference" and Grey's sole concern should be the
defence of the southern African frontier and British interests within that
p - • 104frontier.
In 1857, after Grey had been warned by the Colonial Office,, he turned 
his attention to another area. He recommended a union of British Kaffraria
with the Cape Colony without consulting the Colonial Office. This proposal 
meant, according to Merivale, "...placing at once the whole of our Sth. 
African possessions under a popular legislature of two elective houses 
--and that while we maintain 9 or 10,000 men there." The chief ob­
jection by Merivale and the Colonial Office was economic*105 
One year later Grey proposed a federal government which would include the 
Cape Colony, Natal, British Kaffraria and the Boer republics.
Unfortunately some confusion was created by the changing of ministries in 
Britain and Grey did not receive, as he had in the past, unequivocal • 
instructions to the contrary. The new Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, paid very little attention to southern Africa and 
he left the problem to Merivale. Lytton was far more concerned with found­
ing the new colony of British Columbia and in September 1858 he left the 
Office for the weekend without signing the Cape despatches, the ones which 
were to tell Grey that the Colonial Office would not sanction his proposal. 
Merivale felt they were so important that he signed them himself and wrote 
privately to Lytton and told him that it was "not worthwhile to suspend 
their transmission for form's sake only...."  ^ Late in 1858
Lytton became ill and for a number of months, was unable to come to the 
Office. Merivale wrote privately to Lytton about the decisions being made 
with, of course, the latterrs approval. For the most part Lytton did not 
object to Merivale1s actions.
In October 1858 Merivale took a decisive step against Grey in order 
to bring his policy into line with that of the Colonial Office. At the 
same time Sir Edmund Head had also submitted proposals for federation 
in, British North America. If federation was not a suitable policy for 
colonies with responsible government then it certainly was not for south-
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ern Africa, It appears there was no private communication between 
Merivale and Grey as there was with Head. As Merivale minuted succinctly 
on October 5th: "But I think the Governor has fallen into the same
error imputed to Sir E, Head and on a question, in one respect at least^ 
more delicate: inasmuch as ’federation' certainly means one or the other 
of two things: either enormous expense to the mother-country, or the
independence of South Africa." He recommended that Grey should be re­
minded that there is "another party" which he must consult^ the
108"Imperial Government".
Grey responded by sending a long despatch giving his version of
recent history of southern Africa at the end of which he concluded
there was only one solution, federation. Merivale, who had been at the
Colonial Office for eleven years and had observed the development of
southern Africa during the "history" of which Grey was writing, minuted
to Lord Carnarvon, the parliamentary undersecretary, that Grey's:
. . . historical sketch is very disappointing to me. I had
expected greater fairness & freedom from mere passion,..when his 
judgement was seriously appealed to. The facts are so distorted 
or loosely stated, as to be worthless: the motives which he
attributes (and I speak from knowledge of successive Secretaries 
of State) purely imaginary. Unless he is referring to some ex­
pressed sentiments of Sir George Clerk, whom he is always con­
troverting: but I cannot suppose so.
Merivale went on to give the young and inexperienced Carnarvon a
lecture on the history of southern Africa. Merivale!s "history" lesson
revealed the wide gulf which now separated Grey and Himself:
The Cape Colony was confined for many years to the old Dutch limits. 
Little more than twenty years ago the Boers began to emigrate in 
number beyond the limits of the colony -- partly because they were 
disgusted with slave emancipation: more, I dare say, because, as
Sir G, Grey suggests, the countries beyond the boundary were found 
better adapted for their pastoral purposes. It became the policy 
of this country to follow them, treat them as rebels & subdue them} 
a policy chiefly founded I believe, on missionary motives. The Boers
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trekked into Natal they were conquered, & annexed. They trekked 
into the Orange River Territory -- they were conquered and annexed. 
They trekked beyond the Vaal —  they were not indeed annexed, but 
they were kept at a distance as enemies. At last a change came over 
our policy, produced simply by some reaction against the missionary 
spirit, by a conviction of the idleness of attempting to follow 
Boers wherever they might "trekk", and, far more than aught else by 
awful impressions of increasing expense, & fear of Parliament,
These, I believe, have been the mainsprings of our policy —  mission­
ary feelings pulling one way, dread of expense the other —  and not 
the strange MachiaveELsras imagined in this despatch. The result is 
the two treaties of which so much has been said.
Merivale went on to demolish Grey’s analogy based upon the latter*s
experience of New Zealand in the creation of a federation for southern
Africa. The major difference was that southern Africa was a strategic
area and **a vast section of a continent” whereas New Zealand was not.
Merivale1s most forceful reason was economic. Grey's proposal, if carried
out, would create a "new United States" in southern Africa and would give
that state:
... the power of war and peace; while the only consolation for such 
abandonment of power is to be taken away from us: for we are to find
and pay the soldiers, only with the hope of "prospective diminution"
-- and we know, I fear, what the "prospective diminution"^ turn out.
The ultimate rewards he holds out, of increased trade and advancing 
colonization, are to repay us.
109He concluded that the whole plan was "wild & impracticable".
When Grey disregarded the next despatches, which ordered him to desist, 
the Colonial Office had no alternative but to recall him to account for 
his disobedience. Merivale put the case to Lytton in March of 1859
as one in which ",. .there is no help for it. Sir G. Grey is so evidently,
to my mind, bent on forwarding his scheme of Federation, that X must say 
with all reluctance I have no reliance whatever on his statements on sub- 
jects bearing on it On May 30, 1859 Merivale wrote to Lytton in
Hertfordshire telling him that, after fully considering the case, he
thought it would be "better to recall Sir G. Grey" because of "his 
absolute disregard for orders" otherwise he would "likely bring the 
Home Government into very heavy difficulties and responsibilities" .
Grey had submitted his federation scheme directly to the Cape Parliament 
without the consent of the Colonial Office. With great prescience Merivale 
summed up the dilemma of southern Africa from his own day to present in 
the form of a question: "The time may very possibly come (if he [Grey]
is left alone) when startled by the appearance of a Great South African 
Republic, men will ask, 'why was not this stopped at the outset when it 
might have been?1" Merivale also told Lytton to wait until early July 
to send out a very guarded statement of recall and one without "censure".
By the time the letter reached the Cape Colony, however, Grey had de­
parted for London and the ministry which had sanctioned his recall had 
fallen. The new one, with the Duke of Newcastle as Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, rescinded the order. The whole business became a 
fiasco for Grey, Merivale and the Colonial Office.
In the meantime there, were renewed efforts by the Cape colonists to 
obtain responsible government as well as federation because of Grey's 
pronouncements. Merivale, very disillusioned with the whole situation, 
did his best to make sure that responsible government was not granted by 
linking it with Grey's federation scheme for southern Africa. By 1860, 
with Grey's recall, responsible government along with federation, was 
discredited in southern Africa. It was therefore, as Merivale argued 
once again, inconceivably "... rash to trust Imperial interests too
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exclusively to their cognizance."112 By the end of March I860, Merivale 
was transferred to the India Office and was no longer involved in the 
controversy.
If southern Africa was a graveyard for colonial governors, it was 
also important in Merivale’s administrative career. Merivale wasp within 
a year, "promoted" to the India Office, There is no evidence that he was 
removed by the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, the fifth Duke 
of Newcastle, for his part in this affair although Merivale was partially 
responsible for these events. It is more likely that Merivale was be­
coming increasingly disillusioned with the continual vacillation of 
British policy in southern Africa. When an offer came from the India 
Office, probably from his old friends, Sir George Russell Clerk and Sir
113Charles Wood, he took the new position to "escape” the Colonial Office, 
Merivale had fewer problems with colonial self-government in Natal 
which was, in the Colonial Office, his special concern. Natal had not 
received representative government because a few hundred white settlers 
were surrounded by at least a hundred thousand "natives". There was no 
reference at all by Merivale or his colleagues to the strategic import­
ance of the colony on the sea routes to India, although they might have 
simply assumed that fact. In their view, the greatest need for the 
colony was to increase its economic development and thereby reduce
114
imperial expenditure. The "native question" was therefore paramount.
Natal, like other British colonies at the time, was plagued by 
internal problems which affected the white settlers and their attempts 
at self-government. All was quiet in the colony until Benjamin Chilly
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Pine arrived from Sierra Leone in 1852, Pine failed to remain impartial 
in colonial disputes. He quarreled with Theophilius Shepstone over the 
latter s native policy. He attacked Shepstone in his despatches to the 
Colonial Office and, in 1852, he suspended Shepstone1s Registrar, After 
examining the evidence Merivale disallowed the suspension because "the 
whole evidence seems to show a very unfortunate state of things, and to 
lead to the suspicion that while Mr. Pine is the object of very unscrupu­
lous hostilities from others, he is himself addicted to strong partialities.
and to choosing his favourites without much regard to their decency of 
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conduct. In the same year he feuded with the Recorder, because Pine
charged that the latter was acting as a "partizan" in the administration
of justice in the colony.
These problems, although annoying to the Colonial Office, were
minor compared with the chief obstacle to the development of representative
institutions in Natal. Late in 1852 Pine asked the Colonial Office
whether the colony could have an assembly. In his minute to Sir John
Pakington, Merivale reflected that there was:
... no objection that I am aware of to the introduction of 
representative institutions into Natal & on the contrary many 
reasons in favour of it, were it not for the one great difficulty 
—  the formidable "native" question. How a free government will 
work in the presence of 100,000 natives of these savage & predatory 
races, I cannot pretend to anticipate. I can only say that the 
boldest policy is often in such cases the most successful.
Merivale thought it would be better if "municipal institutions" were
given to Natal before an assembly was called. He said that he would
write to Sir George Clerk to look into the problem while the latter was
117
in southern Africa negotiating the treaties with the Boer republics.
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In April of 1853 the Colonial Office decided that Natal should j 
have municipal institutions but not representative government. Merivale 
acknowledged that the problem was one of the "most difficult" he had 
confronted at the Colonial Office:
. .. Lord Grey was firmly of opinion that they were essential to 
the good working of a constitution and certainly the experience 
we have acquired of the mischief resulting from their absence in 
many colonies speaks strongly in favour of his view. At the same 
time it is very difficult to create any feeling in favour of these 
institutions among colonists, who are apt in such matters to be 
led by some small political section of active people who are all 
or nothing in the way of constitutional rights. And they will 
even set themselves against municipal institutions as only a device 
for delaying complete freedom —  as was the case in Australia. A 
good deal no doubt is owing to the habit engendered by our modern 
system of Crown legislatures, of expecting that everything local 
is to be done by Government for them.
As was often the case in the 1850’s, the Secretary of State fully approv-
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ed Merivale’s minute and the draft despatch.
After 1852 and the granting of municipal institutions to Natal there 
was only one other occasion when the possibility of representative in­
stitutions was considered. After the Sand River Convention, Pine reported 
the likelihood of a number of Boers returning to "British protection" in 
Natal. Merivale speculated that if a sufficient number arrived in the 
colony then the setting up of an assembly and a constitution might be 
seriously considered. Few Boers apparently wanted to move back into
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British territory and that was the last that was heard of the matter.
The white settlers in Natal were simply too few in number, defenceless, 
except for British sea power, and surrounded by too many Zulu to receive
lf f 120 self-government.
By 1861 Merivale, in the second edition of his Lectureswas much 
less favourable to colonial self-government than he had been in 1841.
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The reasons for this change are quite evident from a close examination
of his minutes at the Colonial Office and his Lectures. In British
North America and southern Africa as well as in Australia, New
Zealand, the Mediterranean and in the Far East, Merivale was directly
involved in changing the political relationship between Britain and
these colonies* No longer were the colonies to be given only two
choices, either "absolute" freedom or complete dependency. He
became aware that the most important factor in the development of
colonies was economic, that is, the amount of capital, land and
labour which the colony possessed and, even more important, the
relationship between these factors. He became, as a consequence, less
concerned with the question of "separation". The future of the British
121Empire would be decided by the colonies themselves, not by Britain.
In less than fifteen years Merivale began to see that each colony 
had its own particular problems. Imperial analogies were helpful but 
British policy could not be based solely on these because, in most cases, 
differences in their social and economic circumstances were far too great. 
In Natal by i860 no representative institutions had developed because of 
the insolubility of the "native" question. The Cape Colony was faced with 
the same problem but the number of white settlers was increasing and 
they were demanding responsible government. However, the strategic 
importance of the Cape Colony made it impossible for the Colonial Office 
to grant their request* In British North America there was a similar 
diversity. Vancouver Island, because of a lack of white settlers and a 
preponderance of Amerindians, received representative institutions only
168
in 1856 and even then, it was still under the control of the Hudson's
Bay Company, British Columbia became a crown colony only after the
gold rush in 1858 and was not granted self-government until it joined
the Canadian confederation in 1871, The eastern colonies all received
responsible government by i860 but they had not become, as the Colonial
Office had hoped, economically and politically self-sufficient, A
change in the political relationship between Britain and these colonies
did not for the most part bring about the social and economic changes
which Merivale and his colleagues had desired.
In l86l Merivale emphasized in his Lectures the problems which
responsible government had created in British North America. These
colonies, he explained, had been given "free institutions as a kind
of bribe to take care of themselves. The colonists have taken the bribe,
but show no disposition whatever to take on their necks the yoke of
the supposed conditions." They had accepted the privileges associated
with political freedom, but had not the ability or the willingness
122to take on their responsibilities. The experiment was, for a
Victorian liberal, a sad commentary, and one which taught the lesson
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that "self-government" did not imply "cheap government". ^ It 
had also created a confusing, and, at times, a highly disruptive 
situation for the colonial governor in his relationship to the 
Colonial Office and colonial politicians. Responsible government brought 
about "...little more than a transfer of local patronage from the old 
executives —— commonly a local and unpopular "clique" -— to the popular 
side. The real importance and magnitude of the revolution, though fully
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foreseen by the statesmen who planned it, were scarcely understood by the 
colonial or by the British public until some time later, 11 Despite the 
problems which had arisen under responsible government in the 1850rs 
Merivale was quick to point out that it was impossible to return to the 
former system which had not worked as well and was characterized by 
"corruption" and a "constant internal antagonism".
Merivale emphasized in his minutes at the Colonial Office and later 
in the second edition of his Lectures, the importance of the economic 
factor. Economic development had helped these colonies and, as a by­
product, had made responsible government a qualified success. There 
was no denying the "beneficial effects" when a colony gained its freedom 
from Britain. There was the
.,. cessation, as if by magic, of the old irritant sores between 
colony and mother country ... . Not only are they at an end, but 
they seem to leave hardly any traces in the public mind behind 
them. Confidence and affection towards the "home", still fondly 
so termed by the colonist as well as the emigrant, seem to super­
cede at once distrust and hostility. Loyalty, which was before the 
badge of a class suspected by the rest of the community, becomes 
the common watchword of all: and, with some extravagance in the 
sentiment, there arises no small share of its nobleness and devotion. 
Communities, which but a few years ago would have wrangled over the 
smallest item of public expenditure to which they were invited by 
the executive to contribute, have vied with each other in their 
subscriptions to purposes of British interest; in response to 
calls on humanity or munificence, for objects but indistinctly 
heard of at a distance of half the world. Nor is the advance 
in social progress, contemporaneous with this change, less remark­
able than the improvement in public feeling. Progress of this 
description depends so far on economical than political causes, 
that it is necessary to pronounce with caution respecting its 
origin: nevertheless the fact itself is undeniable.
But time has not yet been afforded to test the real merits 
of the system, or to ascertain whether it furnishes in truth a 
practical and durable form of government or no.
In addition, Merivale was very much aware of the manner in which respon­
s i b l e  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  w o r k e d  i n  A u s t r a l i a  a s  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  B r i t i s h
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North American colonies, especially the economic differences in these
regions and the type of settlements which had developed, Merivale
realized it would be very difficult to "correct" the "excesses and
errors" of responsible government from Downing Street, The colonial
environments would inevitably help to shape them "into democracy" and
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only violence would be able to stop this political advance.
Merivale proposed an "experiment" which he hoped would make the 
colonists more "responsible". It was a modification but not a radical 
change in their mode of government. His plan was to separate "adminis­
trative office from political place". Rather idealistically, he hoped 
it would provide the colonists with more efficient and cheaper government.
It might also even make the political life of the colony more stable and 
less reliant on patronage but he admitted that such measures were 
"limited" in their effects because:
They might aid the temperate working of democracy, and smooth away 
some pressing difficulties. But they would in no respect affect 
its real spirit and tendencies. It remains to consider the far 
more important question, what effect may be produced on these by 
the advance of time, by the. increase of popular power, and the 
increase along with it of popular intelligence.
If there was a method of planning the development of these colonies it 
was to be found only in the future, in the "gradual and slow" formation 
of the "national character" of each community. Though the political 
connection between the mother country and the colonies might become slight, 
Merivale believed that Britain would still be able to aid in colonial 
development by means of the advice of the Colonial Office and the guid­
ance of the colonial governors.
At the Colonial Office Merivale had become aware of the extreme
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importance of the colonial governors in the practical working of
responsible government, A good colonial governor would help to obviate
the errors and the ..excesses" which occurred. His role* Merivale
emphasized, was just as important after the granting of responsible
government as it had been before and was not one of "parade, and sentiment
only11. His description of the functions of the colonial governor was
extremely cogent and it reflected his experience of working with Head
in British North America and with Grey in the Cape Colony. "Under
responsible government" he believed the
... functions of a colonial governor ... are (occasionally) arduous 
and difficult in the extreme. Even in the domestic politics of the 
colony, his influence as a mediator between extreme parties* and 
controller of extreme resolutions, as an independent and dispassion­
ate adviser, is far from inconsiderable, however cautiously it may 
be exercised. But the really onerous part of his duty consists in 
watching that portion of colonial politics which touches on the 
connection with the mother-country. Here he has to reconcile, as 
well as he can, his double function as governor responsible to the 
Crown, and as constitutional head of an executive controlled by his 
advisers. He has to watch and control, as best he may, those 
attempted infringements of the recognized principles of the connect­
ion which carelessness or ignorance, or deliberate intention, or 
mere love of popularity, may, from time to time, originate* And this 
duty, of peculiar nicety, he must perform alone* as we have already 
seen in considering the subject of executive councils. He can have 
no assistance. His responsible ministers may (and probably will) 
entertain views uite different from his own. And the temptation to 
surround himself with a camarilla of special advisers, distinct from 
these ministers, is one which a governor must carefully resist. 127
The colonial governor was indispensable to the British Empire even after
the granting of colonial self-government. He alone would be able to
mediate personally between imperial demands and colonial interests and
thereby maintain a modicum of co-operation between Britain and the colonies.
If the plan of the Colonial Reformers to distinguish between colonial
and imperial interests were put into effect Merivale had no doubt that
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the result would be "separation" because the colonists with their
128developing nationalism would not " ... long endure the new system."
Merivale's conclusions led him into an imperial paradox. The 
granting of colonial self-government meant that the colonial politicians 
would have control over their own domestic affairs, eventually including 
the administration of the native population. While aware that the latter 
needed protection from the white settlers Merivale also knew that the' 
native population would, in terms of material progress, hinder the 
development of these colonies. The essence of the paradox was, he 
discovered in the 1850’s, the difference between European and native 
conceptions about land and labour.
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Chapter 5: Slavery and the "Native Question", 1837-187^-
The most important consequence of the granting of colonial self- 
government in the British Empire was that it created complex 
problems for the Colonial Office concerning the future of the native 
population. Before he was appointed to the Colonial Office, Merivale 
had considered the effects and the possible solutions for the British 
government when white settlers moved into a region, took the land and 
commanded the labour of the aboriginal population. In the nineteenth 
century this imperial dilemma was termed the "native question".
"Natives" were regarded as a lower class like the Irish or the poor 
in Britain and British liberals sought to better the material con­
dition of these people by means of the panaceas of education and 
religion. Their object was humanitarian and their methods were 
usually paternalistic. Merivale, in his role as a commentator on the 
"native question", was both naive and at times utopian in his attempts 
to find a solution. As an imperial administrator he was involved in 
the ineffectual attempts to implement the schemes of "amalgamation"
(gradual union leading to assimilation) and "insulation" (reservations). 
British "native" policies failed largely because of resistance by native 
peoples and the weaknesses of imperial administration rather than 
British racial attitudes,’*’
For Merivale "race" was a cultural idea derived from early nine­
teenth century ethnography, not a pseudo—scientific rationale which 
determined that native peoples were physically and, therefore, 
intellectually and materially inferior. Until the 1860's, at least, 
his ideas on this subject were not very different from those of his
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British contemporaries and were derived from a wide variety of written 
sources rather than direct observation.^ In his study of political 
economy Merivale was eclectic in his ideas about race, was seriously 
concerned about the history and culture of all peoples, for example 
aboriginal Americans, Mexicans, Corsicans and Africans and he main­
tained this interest until his death. In the late 1860’s, for instance 
as permanent undersecretary at the India Office, he took a great 
interest in the first archeological survey of India.3 He had little 
patience with the propagators of racism in Britain in the I860's. In 
his Historical Studies in 1865, Merivale developed a racial theory 
which was designed to satirize pseudo-scientific racial ideas:
The North produces the races of more commanding aspect: it sends 
them forth conquering and to conquer; they subjugate the so-called 
feebler races of the South; but, in the midst of their conquests, 
they sicken and perish, and become extinct. The populations of the 
South gradually penetrate northwards, and by their own more proli­
fic multiplication, as well as by crossing or intermixture, in 
which their more essentially vigorous nature attains predominance, 
they efface the type of the Northern races, and cause it ultimately 
to disappear.4
Merivale was always aware that the future of every race was not predeter­
mined by heredity.
Merivale?s scepticism of racial theories was connected to one of the 
most controversial questions of the nineteenth century and one which was 
closely related to the "native question", slavery and the slave trade. 
Compared with his contemporaries such as James Stephen, his predecessor 
at the Colonial Office, and Thomas Babington Macaulay, the historian, 
Merivale was never directly influenced by missionary and humanitarian 
societies in London.3 He approved of the cessation of slavery and the 
slave trade within the British Empire but wrote that hysterical crusades 
against such evils in Britain would not help the native peoples, freed 
slaves, white settlers, or the Colonial Office solve the social, political
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and economic problems created by slavery.6 His analysis of slavery and 
the native question" was therefore placed in the context of classical 
political economy rather than in an evangelical, religious one. He 
viewed slavery in his Lectures as one of the solutions to the "native 
question although a highly unsuitable one. His evaluation of slavery 
and its consequences was focused on the British West Indies after 1833.
Unlike Henry Taylor, Merivale?s colleague at the Colonial Office,
who believed that emancipation of West Indian slaves in the 1830 Ts had
been "one of the simplest of all questions of organic change", Merivale
7
was extremely aware of its complexity. Once the slaves had been freed 
many questions arose. What would be the social and economic function of 
freed blacks in the society in which they had lived? How were they to 
be educated in order to take their political role in an assembly of 
settlers? Despite being "free" they would still be bound economically 
to their former master or a new one. Above all they would still be 
forced to live with the white settlers. Both the former slaves and 
native peoples were at inherent disadvantages, Merivale postulated, once 
they came into contact with European civilization. They were in exactly 
the same economic position as the labouring classes in Britain.. As a 
remedy Merivale could only propose the usual liberal panaceas of- efficient 
government action, religious instruction and education. In Merivale’s 
view slavery and the "native question" were not mutually exclusive and
their effects were similar.
Merivale became increasingly concerned with both problems in the 
1830’s especially the Report on Aborigines in 1837. Frequent references 
to the Report are made in the first edition of his Lectures in 1841. 
Originally, however, Merivale's interest appears to have been stimulated
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by accounts from travellers and missionaries in the West Indies, North
g
America and Africa. His analysis of the problem appeared in articles 
in the Edinburgh Review and in his Lectures and greatly influenced sub­
sequent commentators on slavery, particularly Eric Williams in his
9
Capitalism and Slavery.
Merivale1 s ideas concerning slavery and the slave trade were based 
upon his historical interpretation of European expansion overseas. He 
compared the Spanish colonial empire in South America in the seventeenth
century with the British Empire in the nineteenth century.
His conclusions did not entirely take into account the differing histori­
cal contexts in which these two empires had operated. Like his British 
contemporaries Merivale deplored the Spanish use of slave labour, the 
"avarice" and the "practices revolting to human nature" which had often 
accompanied it.^ In contrast the "great measure", introduced by the 
British in 1833 which abolished slavery within the British Empire was a 
"national act of disinterested self-denial". From the moral and political 
point of view of his own age he admitted that abolition was extremely 
important. It would not, in economic terms, "produce any very great 
revolution" in the immediate future. He pointed out that the abolition 
of the slave trade earlier in the nineteenth century had increased the 
cost of production and had failed to permit the extension of cultivation. 
However, the primary cause of diminished prosperity of the British West 
Indies after 1815 was due to increased competition from other areas of 
the world, the East Indies, Demerara, and Mauritius. As a classical poli­
tical economist he believed political measures were not sufficient to
remedy economic problems.
Slavery for Merivale and his contemporaries was a most "difficult
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and intricate subject. Merivale was chiefly concerned by the economic 
consequences of the abolition of slavery which was linked to another 
important dilemma of the nineteenth century, the "native question", 
because both involved the impact of European overseas expansion upon 
native peoples. Slavery differed from the "native question" only in the 
degree of control exercised by Europeans.
Slavery and the "native question" were always, in his view, connected 
wibh two important economic factors, the amount of good land and the 
availability of a supply of cheap labour. It was, he argued in his 
Lectures, "more profitable to cultivate a fresh soil by the dear labour 
of slaves, than an exhausted one by the cheap labour of free men." That 
was however, not the case in the British West Indies. The soil had 
become so exhausted from centuries of use that it no longer mattered a 
great deal whether the supply of labour was slave or free. Slavery had 
been abolished in 1833 when it was no longer economically profitable and 
it made little difference to the British. Therefore the British had no 
right to call themselves "saints" and the "rest of the world sinners".
The large ports and industrial cities such as Liverpool and Manchester 
has grown tremendously as a consequence of the slave trade. In the 
nineteenth century they had profited by the "exchange of their produce 
with that raised by the American slaves; and their present opulence is 
as really owing to the toil and suffering of the negro, as if the hands 
had excavated their docks and fabricated their steam engines. For 
Merivale slavery was a "social evil" which differed not in kind but only 
in degree from pauperism and child labour in Britain. As a result 
Britain should, in the future, do its utmost to "watch, as far as xn her 
lies, over the interests of the negro race" but with care and respect for
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the independence of other states.1-1
Merivale was also highly critical of Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton1 s 
manifesto and his expedition to western Africa. The whole plan, Merivale 
concluded quite correctly, was "visionary" and had no chance of success 
as a substitute for slavery. The reasons for his rejection of Buxton's 
plan for civilizing Africa were economic. The use of "government 
bounties in Britain to establish a flourishing commerce between Africa 
and Britain was hopeless because the means of attaining the objectives 
were inadequate. Economic change was necessary before any improvement
would occur in the condition of blacks. The possibilities for such change
13depended upon the amount of available land, capital and labour.
As early as 1841 Merivale perceived the economic effects of the
abolition of slavery in the British West Indies. There were conflicting
opinions concerning the reaction of blacks to their new freedom. On the
one hand blacks in the British West Indies were reported to have been
spoiled by the payment of wages which they spent on articles of luxury.
While commercial activity had been greatly stimulated with respect to
consumer goods, Merivale noted the decrease in the production of staple
14
products which had been the backbone of the West Indian economy. On 
the other hand many blacks had used their freedom wisely and had passed 
through the ordeal of enfranchisement most triumphantly, as far as order 
and good conduct are concerned." Most reports revealed the scarcity of 
"civil crime". Social and political freedom, he concluded, must be 
accompanied by economic prosperity and its concomitant, individual econo­
mic freedom.1^
By the 1860's Merivale was less certain of these early statements 
concerning the material progress which had been achieved since emancipation.
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This change also affected his attitudes toward slavery in the United
States. He believed the writings of the abolitionists and their opponents
were unreliable. The only other source was statistics taken from the
official, reports of administrators who had been working in former slave
societies. Statistics were, however, "only conclusive within certain
limits because it was "very rare for an English functionary to remain
long enough in those colonies to form correct notions respecting them,
without acquiring prejudice on one side or the other, if he did not carry 
16
it out with him." It was exceedingly difficult for Merivale to form 
an opinion about economic and social development in the British West 
Indies since 1833.
Despite these cavils, Merivale thought he saw signs of change and 
even improvement in the British West Indian colonies. The formation of 
"a middle class of inhabitants, chiefly coloured" and "independent of 
manual labour", who were engaged in commerce, was one indication. The 
freedom of this class working to their full potential would lead event­
ually to general prosperity. This idea was, however, extremely vague and 
certainly not mapped out in any coherent fashion. The lower classes 
would be induced to work by competition, specifically by the introduction 
of imported labour from other parts of the British Empire. Labour would 
be plentiful, wages would fall and eventually, productivity would increase. 
By 1861 Merivale estimated that the British West Indian colonies had
reached almost the "same amount of productiveness which they had before
17slavery was abolished. He was certainly overly sanguine about the 
consequences of slave emancipation.
Merivale9 s comments about slavery were not always confined to the 
British Empire and he recognized that different varieties of slavery
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existed throughout the world. For example, the influence which the Arabs
exerted over Africans on the east coast of Africa concerned Merivale as
a commentator and as an administrator at the India Office. In 1844 the
Arab empire , based in Zanzibar, was powerful and its economic basis 
18
was slavery. Nevertheless this empire was very different from European 
empires in the Americas. Slavery was part of the African "social system" 
and immediate emancipation was not always the best for slaves. ^  Therefore 
Merivale concluded it was not as "hideous and unnatural institution" as 
European varieties. While deprecating the "idea of European political 
intrigue" in the Arab "empire", Merivale hoped that slavery would gradu­
ally disappear in eastern Africa by means of the peaceful presence of 
British commerce.^
Two years later Merivale commented on slavery in its American context
despite being aware of the "enormous difficulties" involved in dealing 
21with it. In 1860 he compared the consequences of slavery to the social 
and economic characteristics of the region in which it existed. He 
concluded that it was natural for the Arab "empire" in eastern Africa to 
have slavery but it was both "anomalous and exceptional" for the United 
States to maintain the institution because the latter, as a former part 
of the British Empire and inhabited by Europeans, had a 'higher civiliza­
tion". If slavery continued white Americans would, in the long term, 
suffer from its effects. On the other hand, considering emancipation,
slave—owners would naturally feel their way of life was being endangered
22
and would respond "by creating a reign of terror around them.1 The 
only possible solution was, using the precedent of the British West 
Indies in the 1830’s, "progressive emancipation", that is, the gradual
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emancipation of slaves during which the worst evils of slavery would be 
eliminated and, at the same time, the slave owners would not feel that 
their economic existence was being destroyed. If liberal attempts at 
amelioration failed to work, however, then Merivale advocated that change 
should be introduced by means of "an arbitrary and sweeping policy.
Merivale based these conclusions on "historical truth and practical 
experience" rather than moral grounds. Slavery should be put into 
perspective because it was a human characteristic and differed only in 
"degree" not in "kind" from the "thousand other forms of compulsory 
subjection of one man to the will of another —  1Texploitation de l’hommp 
par l’homme —  which prevail among civilized and uncivilized nations."
He was also critical of the consequences of slave emancipation in the 
United States after the Civil War because the American Negro was still 
under the economic and social control of white Americans in the United 
States. Once again he emphasized that the two problems were not mutually 
exclusive and were the consequences of "dealings of Europeans with 
subject races". ^
At the India Office Merivale did his utmost to stamp out the 
"iniquitous traffic" of slaves in Zanzibar. David Livingstone, who was 
in 1872 "Her Majesty’s Consul for Inner Africa", sent a report on the 
slave trade to the Foreign Office. He protested that it was being 
conducted by British subjects, chiefly by east Indian merchants, colla­
borating with Arab slave—dealers off the coast of Zanzibar. Subsequently 
the report was sent to Merivale and he took responsibility for the pre­
paration of a draft despatch to India. Both politicians and administrators 
at the India Office took Livingstone’s accusations seriously and asked 
the Governor-General of India to discuss with his Council the following
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alternatives. The first option, which was frequently exercised on both 
the west and east African coasts, was to dispatch a British naval force 
to board vessels transporting slaves on the high seas. Secondly, British 
treaties with Zanzibar could be revised. Thirdly, the best means,
Merivale argued, would be to obtain the co-operation of Indian rulers to 
pass laws which would prosecute Indian merchants engaged in the trade 
and thereby cut if off at its source. Although he was aware the slavers 
had always found means of circumventing laws against slavery Merivale 
emphasized, in his draft despatch, that it was the only means of dealing 
with the offenders. The British government still had to respect the
national boundaries of independent states such as Zanzibar which had not
outlawed the slave trade.25 As an administrator Merivale was concerned 
with slavery and helped to bring about its cessation within the British 
Empire. He was also able to place it into perspective as part of the 
larger problem of contacts and conflicts between Europeans and native 
peoples.
The "native question" was the most important problem of European 
expansion overseas. Merivale realized that the problems which were raised 
by the "native question" were connected to other important imperial 
concerns such as responsible government, free trade, commercial companies, 
missionary enterprises and imperial defence. Eventually Merivale perceived 
that the problem was an insoluble one and the best that could be done was
to ameliorate the condition of the native peoples in the present and hope
that in the future they would be able to adapt their culture to European 
civilization. It was extremely ironic that Merivale was aware of these
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difficulties but found it increasingly impossible to influence British 
imperial policy as an administrator. Changing British attitudes toward 
race in the 1860 s put him out of step with his administrative colleagues,
9 f ipoliticians and public opinion.
Merivale s attitudes to the "native question'*, developed in the 
1830 s when he was appointed Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, 
were influenced by three changes in British society. Merivale's two 
incisive and important chapters on this question in his Lectures were 
a direct response to the Report on the State of the Aborigines. However 
the manner in which he responded to the question was not simply influenced 
by the humanitarianism of Exeter Hall. Merivale's ideas were shaped by 
two other developments, the development and popularization of free trade 
and the growing importance of political economy as a body of systematic 
knowledge which proposed answers to the problems with which the British 
Empire was confronted. In many instances the}^  were linked in such a 
way that nineteenth century political economists advocated the panacea 
of free trade. The doctrines and the application of free trade ran 
directly counter, however, to the evident need for the British, government 
to protect the native peoples by direct intervention in the domestic 
affairs of white settlement colonies. The dilemma for Merivale was acute 
and his responses to the ''native question" affected his attitudes towards 
other important imperial questions.
In his "Introduction to a Course of Lectures on Colonization and 
Colonies" published in 1839, Merivale wrote that the native question 
was the "greatest moral difficulty of colonization „ The effect of 
European expansion on native peoples had been "misdirected". Whatever 
the reaction of Amerindian, African or Maori, conflict between white
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settlers and the native peoples was a certainty. Consequently the latter
had been reduced to a "servile or quasi-servile state" or had been
removed from contact with Europeans. Moral rationalizations by Europeans
had done nothing to explain or solve the dilemma because:
When men superior in intelligence and in power are brought into 
contact with their feebler brethren, when they are turned 
loose among them without the possibility of a complete, efficient, 
and, above all, a disinterested control, to expect that they 
will not grossly abuse their power, is to imagine that the evil 
principle of human nature will be rendered harmless by diminished 
restraints and an extended sphere of action.
This situation could not be resolved by a change in the methods of 
colonization because the consequences of cultural contact were unpre­
dictable. The only hope was amelioration by Europeans after contact.27 
In his Lectures Merivale provided a substantial explanation for his 
gloomy prognostications.28
In Merivale’s historical analysis the roots of the "native question" 
dated from the beginning of European expansion in the Americas in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. He closely examined the Spanish 
expansion into South America and concluded that it had been characterized 
not by "principles" but rather by pragmatic decisions made in an "irregular" 
and "arbitrary" manner.29 The consequences had been disastrous reducing 
the native population through disease and warfare. Imperial governments 
also had to pay for long, costly wars. All attempts by European govern­
ments to rectify the situation had been "ineffective .88 Nevertheless 
he felt there had been some signs of improvement. The Spanish regime in 
South America had been both "monstrous and unnatural but it was 
important to put the Spanish experience in its historical context. From 
the point of view of the Spanish government and the white colonists the 
"normal state of the subject Indian had always been regarded as one of 
servitude or quasi-servitude".31 There were ameliorative circumstances
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which tempered the worst effects of the Spanish system of which the role 
of the Jesuits and their missions was the most significant. The Jesuits 
could never compensate for the loss of Amerindian "liberty of action",32 
nevertheless they had done their best to treat their charges with kind­
ness, to care for their physical well-being■and to provide moral instruc­
tion. In the 1840Ts Merivale constantly stressed the value of religious 
instruction in teaching native peoples the "rudiments of civilization".33 
He hoped that an "amalgamation" of both societies would be the consequence.
Merivale's advocacy of religion as the primary agent in the process 
of amalgamation was based upon his belief that the desire for religion 
was common to all cultures. If Europeans followed the dictates of their 
religion they would, he hoped somewhat naively, act tox^ard native peoples 
with "zeal, perseverance, and charity". On the other hand the native 
peoples would undergo a change of life which would alter their "savage" 
habits. Merivale would have liked to have seen the native peoples become 
Europeanized while losing their traditional culture.34
Merivale did not believe non-Europeans were physically inferior. 
Instead he viewed them in terms of the class system in Britain and 
frequently compared them to the labouring class. They were thus materially 
inferior, but if they attained political freedom they would enjoy the 
prosperity of the "wholly emancipated classes". Once native peoples had 
adapted to the ways of European civilization, had been set free and 
become "industrious" they would be protected by British law.35 The latter 
would also provide for an orderly transition and security for a colonial 
society undergoing these changes.38 Merivale s judgments concerning the 
"native question" reflected his ideas of the state of British and 
European society. This perspective no doubt limited the alternatives 
which he put forward to solve the "native question" m  his Lectures.
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After dealing with the problem at the Colonial Office he was less certain
of the capacity of Europeans to civilize those with whom they came into 
contact.37
Merivale did not divide Europeans into either heroes or villains 
in their treatment of native peoples. All were imperfect in their 
principles and methods of "native" administration. He did not, however, 
question the presence of Europeans overseas. Only in the early 1850’s 
in southern Africa Merivale supported a policy of withdrawal.®® Very 
few nineteenth century commentators or administrators questioned the 
possibility of European withdrawal from their overseas territories.®®
With the exception of southern Africa Merivale advocated more direct 
British intervention in colonies as a means of protecting native peoples 
from white settlers.
Merivale was aware of these particular effects but he never spent 
an inordinate amount of time bewailing their consequences because "the 
wretched details of the ferocity and treachery xtfhich have marked the 
conduct of the civilized men, too often of civilized governments, in their 
relations with savages, either in past times, or during the present age, 
Cwer0 rich almost beyond precedent in such enormities." In his Lectures 
Merivale was much more interested in finding a solution to these problems 
the essence of which was "the duty and right policy, of colonists and 
colonial government towards the native inhabitants of the regions which 
they occupy. " 1*0 Historians have taken Merivale's comments about the deva- 
sbabiqg consequences of British conduct toward native peoples out of 
context and have disregarded the thrust of his argument, the alternatives 
for amelioration. 1+1 He believed that to exaggerate the effects of contact 
was
... a painful, and I am sure an unnecessary task. The general 
features of the subject are by this time sufficiently known, 
and perhaps regarded with sufficient abhorrence: it remains for
us now to act; and with a view to that purpose, it is perhaps 
desirable that we should not cease to dwell so exclusively on 
the dark side of the picture, as many have hitherto done; still 
more, that we should not rest contented with vague and general 
desires of good, or imagine that the evil influences at work are 
to be counteracted by great undirected efforts —  by proclaiming 
principles by organizing societies —  by pouring forth the 
lavish contributions of national generosity, without examining 
for ourselves the channels into which they are to flow. All this 
is little better than idle philanthropy; or, it should rather be 
said, than the mere fulfilment of certain ceremonies, by which 
the mind relieves itself of the sense of a debt.
In contradistinction, what was needed were "practical and dispassionate
views" and actions requiring an enormous amount of "patience", "faith",
"zeal", "firmness", and lastly "contentment in small successes and
imperfect agents." **2 Merivale was accused by his contemporaries and
later commentators for being much too pessimistic but it made him shy
away from facile solutions.
Merivale had reservations about the efficacy of solutions which
advocated a change in the "system" by which the native peoples were
governed. The errors made in the past, he argued cogently, were not
due to "conception" by any metropolitan government but rather a general
lack of understanding of the consequences. "Execution" of policy by
the imperial government was the factor which had been most often ignored.
He perceived that "laws and regulations" were almost always unenforceable.
The actions of the "trader, the backwoodsman, the pirate, the bushranger"
were far more important elements in the development of the relationship
between the native peoples and Europeans than laws. Laws reflected the
society which established them and were of limited value as a means of
social control between two or more different cultures. Laws and religion
were not of much use after the "natives" had lost their "natural tendencies
and capacities" and "ancestral habits" through contact. British imperial
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policy had to take this fact into consideration.
If the attempts at "reform and amelioration" were not originally 
thwarted by the perverse wickedness of those outcasts of society" then 
the first white settlers would arrive and a similar effect would occur. 
The only realistic response by the imperial government would be the 
restraining arm of power . The imperial government should act systema­
tically with tact, prudence, and firmness" with the ultimate objective 
being the ’protection" and "civilization" of the native peoples. By 
this means Merivale hoped it would be possible to reduce the worst 
effects of contact between the colonizers and the colonized. Ultimately 
he believed that the only solution was the "Euthanasia of savage 
communities", by which the native peoples would suffer a gradual erosion 
of their culture by a process of "amalgamation" . 1*3
The power of the imperial government could be used effectively to 
protect the native population by "the appointment in every colony of a 
department of the civil service for that especial purpose, with one or 
more officers exclusively devoted to it.lfLftf The idea, although not 
original, had never before been tried in British colonies. The Spanish 
colonies in South America had such an institution and Merivale believed 
it had worked fairly well. He was aware of the presence, in the British 
continental colonies in America, of the office of Deputy Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs, which had been established and extended to Quebec and 
Acadia after the Conquest in 1760. He recognized the powerlessness of 
the Deputy Superintendent to protect Amerindians in the past and wanted 
to expand it into a more formal and larger branch of imperial government. 
In Canada there had long been "... a considerable and expensive Indian 
department, with superintendents, secretaries, and interpreters; but the 
mismanagement of the affairs of that colony, as regards the natives, seems
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to have rendered them of little service, except to superintend the mis­
chievous (practice of the annual delivery of presents." He did not approve 
of the Department because it was run by white settlers who had little 
sympathy for the well-being and protection of Amerindians and who were 
primarily concerned with the material development of their colony. If 
the settlers obtained the power to protect Amerindians then the future 
of the latter would become even more perilous.
The history of Amerindian-European contact was crucial to Merivale’s 
interpretation of the "native question". In 1841 he advocated removing 
"altogether from the colonial legislature" responsibility for the protection 
of Amerindians. It should be in the "hands of the central executive" 
which would then delegate its power to a special imperial department. The 
most important advantage of this system would be its impartiality, as 
Merivale put it, to "arbitrate dispassionately between classes". The- one 
disadvantage would be distance, the problem of obtaining accurate inform­
ation from each colony in order to make a judgment when conflicts arose.
In the end, however, Merivale believed the "able execution of native 
policy depends far more on individual tact, zeal, courage, and humanity" 
in making decisions than the "goodness" of any "systematic arrangement".
At the Colonial Office he followed this precept by relying to a large
4 5
extent upon the experience of colonial governors for accurate information.
The officers of this imperial department would be responsible for 
the "detection and prosecution of offences committed against the native 
and the "regulation of contracts" between "master and servant . Instead 
of passing fixed laws regulating labour Merivale argued that better 
protection would be provided if each case was examined individually by 
an officer from the department. In cases involving transient labour, 
the officers would also have the right to "control the summary power"
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which for example, travellers could use against "native” labourers. The 
development of such a department and the delegation of specific duties to 
these officers raised the crucial question of enforcement. Merivale 
was acutely aware of the problems involved in applying the laws of 
one culture to another. His scheme would not succeed without solving 
the legal difficulties which would confront the officers.
Native peoples needed the protection of English law because it 
was the only way to check the actions of white settlers, traders and 
merchants. English law was however, a distinct product of English 
culture and "natives” in each colony would be placed at a distinct dis­
advantage if placed under the direct jurisdiction of English law. They 
would, he argued, be ”... ignorant of it and would be tried for crimes 
of which they are not aware." Recognizing these problems Merivale 
believed it was an insoluble dilemma while "natives" remained in their 
"uninstructed state". A policy of amelioration must therefore follow 
protection; only then would cultural and economic conflicts in British 
colonies be reduced. 1*6
On the question of amelioration Merivale was greatly influenced 
by the governor of South Australia,. George Grey and his solution of 
immediate amalgamation. Both "natives" and settlers should be put 
under British law from the initial period of contact. If natives 
did not interfere with white settlers they should be left alone and 
allowed to retain their own customs and laws. Merivale recognized the 
limitations of Grey's plan. It did not take into account cultural 
differences among such diverse peoples as Amerindians, Australian 
aborigines, Maori or Africans. He concluded that no one solution or 
policy was practicable for all regions of the British Empire. Central 
control and flexibility were both needed. "Officers" in the native 
department" should possess this legal power until the native peoples
become mature enough to understand the laws and culture of British 
society. The consequences of a lack of flexibility were obvious, "a 
constant danger, either of the reduction of the native to actual 
slavery, or of the uncertain, and therefore mischievous interference 
of the authorities to prevent hardship in particular cases." Merivale's 
scheme was essentially a primitive type of trusteeship with officers 
functioning as imperial ombudsmen.
These imperial officers would also have power to deal with those 
who lived closest to the native peoples, the white traders, merchants 
and settlers. These "lawless aliens" possessed an "enormous power" for 
evil, committing such offences as selling alcohol. One possibility which 
had been put forward to deal with the "buccaneers" and their raids on 
New Zealand was to give the Royal Navy "certain legal powers" which 
would make them into a kind of "locomotive tribunal, to take cognizance 
of offences committed by British subjects against natives on the high 
seas and in the islands. " 47 In 1841, as a temporary measure, Merivale 
considered this idea which dealt only with the consequences of contact 
not with its cause.
The use and ownership of land was another important problem. Native 
peoples had different economies and ideas concerning property from 
Europeans. Amerindians, for example, lived at a subsistence level and 
generally shared their property within their extended family. Unlike 
most nineteenth century Europeans who led a sedentary existence on the 
farm or in a town, Amerindians moved about seasonally in search of food. 
These economic and cultural differences created disadvantages for native 
peoples when a reserve policy was implemented. To Merivale it was quite 
clear that "... fixing a body of people, generally harassed by defeats 
and wanderings, and in a condition most unfavourable to speedy improvement 
and in the midst of a country in process of rapid settlement" would fail
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because the establishments of the whites soon press on the limits of 
of the Indian ground; generally long before the Indians, kept, by 
the policy hitherto observed by American governments, in a state of in­
sulation from the whites, have learnt to improve it.1' Despite its good 
intentions the consequences of a reserve policy were disastrous for 
white settlers and native peoples. Valuable agricultural land was left 
idle because the Amerindian economic base was hunting, trapping and 
fishing. The only solution was to create more reserves in "some distant 
territory" which would last until the settlers moved into that particular 
area and then the same process would occur over again. A reserve policy 
was therefore only a temporary measure and obviously did little to solve 
cultural and economic conflicts arising from prolonged contact.
A reserve policy was also not in the best interests of the native 
peoples. Migration from their traditional hunting lands had caused a 
"loss of capital and of comfort" and of even greater significance the 
"tribe, become agricultural, is thus placed in a country far more abound­
ing in game in its former seats, and exposed to the strongest temptation 
to relapse into the hunting condition." This constant shifting of the 
economic base was ruinous to the native peoples and they became entrapped 
in a kind of social and economic limbo, losing their original skills and, 
at the same time finding it almost impossible to adapt to an agricultural 
economy. Confusion and loss of purpose caused the "last and greatest of 
all these causes of degeneracy" -- "insecurity, the despair of permanence, 
the conviction of approaching annihilation. It is no wonder then that 
the "native" exhibited a kind of "sullen apathy". Merivale's analysis 
of the disadvantages of a reserve policy was quite accurate. At the 
Colonial Office, however, he was unable to do much to prevent the 
development of a reserve policy in British North America and southern Africa.
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In 1841 Merivale foresaw only three alternatives for the "ultimate 
destiny of native peoples. The first was the most obvious, they might 
be exterminated . The second was "insulation", essentially a reserve 
policy. The third, "amalgamation with the colonists", was the one 
which he preferred at that time.
Merivale did not believe "extermination" would ever occur. He did 
not, however, give any reasons for this position. If it was "inevitable" 
that they perished then, he concluded rather pessimistically, there was 
no use even considering the problem at all. It only remained for 
Europeans to "insure that the inevitable end be not precipitated by 
cruelty and injustice." Merivale’s objections to the theory of "necessary 
depopulation" prompted this conclusion.
Merivale was equivocal about amalgamation because he failed to 
distinguish between immediate and gradual amalgamation. Both "reason" 
and "experience", he argued, made assimilatory schemes "impossible".
The Spanish and Portuguese experience had revealed the "ill success" of 
previous attempts. This "civilizing process" was "slow" and "uncertain"* 
The consequences of such a solution would also be unsatisfactory for the 
development of native peoples and white colonists. Religious and educ­
ational instruction for the "savage" might succeed in making him "more 
innocent" but at the same time Merivale observed that it would hinder 
his £the "savage’s intellectual development. The ultimate effect 
would be to render the apparently "civilized savage" into a person who 
was "feeble and dependent”. As far as the colonists were concerned the 
project of civilization also gave them undue hardship because it would 
take too long to obtain any concrete results. The cultural and 
economic differences were simply too great.
There was, in Merivale's view, only one practical solution to the 
"native question", amalgamation. Compared to extermination and 
civilization it was the "very keystone, the leading principle, of all 
sound theory on the subject —  that native races must in every instance 
either perish, or be amalgamated with the general population of their 
country." By amalgamation Merivale implied that it was a form of
acculturation between white colonists and native peoples. In his own
words it meant the "union of natives with settlers in the same community, 
as master and servant, as fellow-labourers, as fellow citizens, and, if 
possible, as connected by intermarriage." To be successful this alterna­
tive had to be an "immediate and an individual process —  immediate, if 
not in act, at least in contemplation." The emphasis had to be on the 
present not the future and the aboriginal peoples had to be regarded 
from the outset as "potential citizens". Although Merivale admitted 
amalgamation I seemed to be "somewhat wild and chimerical" he believed 
that it was better to confront the problem directly with "prudence" and 
to act quickly rather than to delay. He regarded the process of accul­
turation as irreversible and amalgamation was therefore the "only possible 
Euthanasia of savage communities. " 48 He did not believe that the native
peoples could return to their traditional way of life.
One of the chief advantages which amalgamation possessed was 
simply that it had never been tried before "in earnest" in the history of 
European overseas expansion. Attempts had been made but there had not 
been a co-ordinated effort by church and state over a long period of time. 
The only instances had been in New France and Spanish America in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and they had been, relatively
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speaking,failures.^ When Merivale attempted to describe his plan of 
amalgamation in more detail in his Lectures,however, there was very 
little to distinguish it from other assimilatory schemes.
For Merivale and his contemporaries religion was to be the most 
important means of bringing about the "civilization of savage tribes". 
Merivale's idea of amalgamation , if implemented, would have lead to 
assimilation. The key to the success of both was the similarity of 
European and "native" religious beliefs which "in the savage races of 
mankind, from the most advanced to the most degraded, the sense of 
religion not only exists, but exists accompanied by that which may be 
termed its necessary condition in the human mind —  a feeling of 
pressing want, a longing for support, a craving after instruction. " 50 
With proper religious instruction aboriginal peoples would be able to 
overcome their "material" and "intellectual" backwardness. He realized 
that some of the native peoples had greater opportunities to advance 
more quickly than others. Amerindians had a better chance to amalgamate 
more quickly than Australian aborigines because the former were more 
sophisticated in their religious beliefs.
In this process Merivale regarded the role of missionaries as 
crucial. He had no doubt that missionaries had been, like other informal 
agents of empire, producers of both good and evil effects. The Jesuits 
in South America, the Church Missionary Society in New Zealand and the 
American Society of Friends in the United States had experienced set­
backs but, considering the frequent exaggeration of reports of their 
work, Merivale concluded that they had made some progress. Nevertheless, 
it was quite a different matter whether native peoples benefited
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from contact with missionaries. Merivale was optimistic and found
on minute examination how many little insulated spots of light 
appear to present themselves in the gloomy map of aboriginal 
ethnography —  how many little communities exist, almost over­
looked by travellers who perceive only the general face of things, 
in which Christianity is professed, and the arts of life 
cultivated, and orderly and moral habits prevail, at one and- the 
same time, because the development of religion and civilization 
has proceeded together. How far the comparatively slight amount 
of good which has resulted, after all, from so much zeal and self- 
devotion, is owing to its misdirection; whether a different mode 
of teaching Christianity might not, in many cases, have led to a 
more satisfactory result; whether the instructors of savage 
tribes have not dwelt too much on their deficiencies, and too 
little on their advantages, regarding them rather as creatures 
out of whom the old life was to be utterly extirpated, than as 
possessed of an exquisite moral sense and high religious 
capabilities ... .
He regretted that he did not have sufficient scope in his Lectures to 
undertake a more thorough investigation and as a consequence he kept 
an open mind on the subject. In the next thirty years in his published 
works and at the Colonial and India Offices he became less optimistic 
about the value of missionaries in the process of amalgamation because 
he discovered they had helped to create social and economic conflict and 
moreover prevented amalgamation by "insulating" the "natives" from the 
white settlers.
The work of missionaries, although "indispensable", was not sufficient 
to complete the process. Teachers of more secular matters, particularly of 
science and technology, were also essential agents in the material progress 
of European civilization. Merivale proposed that the imperial government 
supply qualified teachers to educate young fiatives . This part of Merivale s 
plan involved another difficult question for both whites and natives , that 
jLgj whether these young people would be immediately or gradually inter- 
grated into European schools. Merivale believed the former would be the
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best for both, whites and natives11 because 11... children of most native 
races are fully or more than a match for those of Europeans in aptitude 
for intellectual acquirement. Indeed it appears to be a singular law 
of nature, that there is less precocity in the European race than in any 
other. In those races in which we seem to have reason for believing that 
the intellectual organization is lower, perception is quicker, and 
maturity earlier." He concluded that children of both groups would 
benefit from their mutual contact. He precluded the possibility that 
native people might not want to remain as they were and would not mind 
a "relapse into barbarism". He did not understand that one of the con­
sequences of a "material training, in the arts and industry of a civilized 
life" might at the same time destroy their culture.
After the missionary had awakened in native peoples the need for 
material progress and the imperial government had provided the necessary 
secular education;, the process of amalgamation would occur. Colonists 
and "natives" would intermarry, their children would form a new society 
and ease the cultural tensions which had hitherto existed. Merivale 
believed that miscegenation would be "impossible to prevent" and he pointed 
to the fur trade society in Rupert's Land as an example of the possibilities 
inherent in amalgamation. He was essentially correct in his assertion 
that miscegenation was a "... considerable check to that mutual repulsion 
which arises merely out of prejudices of colour, and for which there can 
be no substantial reason where slavery does not exist. And there is 
strong testimony to the superior energy and high organization of many of 
these half-blooded races. " 51 He was never impressed by moral arguments 
against miscegenation except insofar as it might initially cause "degradation"
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among native peoples. Merivale was not dogmatic about the efficacy of 
his plan because it was, like other ideas of mankind, imperfect.
Merivale believed that there were two objections to amalgamation.
The past had "proved" that native peoples were "irreclaimable" and 
therefore any attempt to change them in the present or in the future was 
futile. Merivale quickly disposed of this pessimistic assertion pointing 
out that it was not inevitable. Such an attitude denigrated the potential 
of native peoples to survive in the modem world as well as the efforts 
of Europeans to come .to terms with the problems of European-aboriginal 
contact.
The second objection was, Merivale confessed, much more "fatal".
Some commentators, such as Charles Darwin, had argued that the theory 
of necessary depopulation decreed that "... the feebler race must yield 
to the stronger; the white is destined to extirpate the savage." Aware 
of a new school which made the theory of necessary depopulation into a 
"science", he was highly critical of applying biological analogies to 
human beings. According to Merivale, such a view was false because it 
confused cause and effect; moreover the decline in population was a 
consequence of "natural agencies". Events in the natural world did not 
necessarily bear any relation to those in the affairs of mankind because 
"if it be true, that the mere presence of a white population is sufficient 
to cause the red Indians, or the Polynesians, to dwindle and decay, 
without any assignable agency of the one or the other, it must be confessed 
that this is an anomaly in the laws of Providence utterly unexplained by 
all our previous knowledge, wholly at variance with all the other laws 
by which animal life, and human society are governed." Referring to the
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"recent revelations" of George Catline, a traveller, in North America, 
Merivale stressed that such important causes as "firearms", "spirituous 
liquors" and "epidemics" were sufficient to explain the "devastation".
He concluded that racial theories hid the material causes and provided 
his contemporaries with a means of escaping from their own guilt, the 
real problem and its possible solutions.
Merivale used history, reports from travellers, missionaries, 
imperial officials, and statistics to reveal that, in most instances, 
depopulation was not inevitable. In North America the situation was not 
good but there was no evidence that Amerindians would disappear in the 
future. In Mexico, "perhaps in Peru", and in southern Africa there was 
no doubt that the opposite was true. In the second edition of his 
Lectures, Merivale was less optimistic concerning the ultimate fate of 
native peoples but he still did not believe that the theory of necessary 
depopulation was correct. Once again he emphasized that material causes 
such as the "great recent mortality of female children" in New Zealand, 
wars and disease accounted for depopulation. The "deterioration of the 
human race" was not due to inbreeding of any particular group because, 
if that was true, not only would native peoples be dying out but so also 
would the population of the Scottish Highlands, the Swiss and Italian 
Alps, and "doubtless many other mountain regions". If material causes 
were insufficient to account for depopulations then there must be some 
other causes in combination, with which we are not acquainted. 1
The idea that the native peoples would inevitably disappear because 
they did not have the capacity or the potential to develop like Europeans, 
was dismissed by Merivale as misleading. He drew upon archeological
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evidence which revealed Amerindians had been a great people before 
contact with Europeans. Amerindians, who were known to the first Euro­
peans who came to North America, were the "mere fragments of a great 
family of the human species, losing, in every successive generation, 
something of the qualities which had distinguished their predecessors, 
diminishing in numbers and resources, and on their way towards extinction; 
and there are some who hold the same opinion respecting all the races 
commonly called savages." Amerindian-European contact had brought about 
the process of decline. Merivale did not preclude the possibility of a 
renaissance among the native population and he cited examples of the 
successful adaptation of southern Africans working with Moravian mission­
aries and of Amerindians with Anglicans in the Red River Colony and in 
Canada.
Herman Merivale’s experience as an administrator made him less
optimistic concerning the fate of native peoples in 1861. Merivale's
scheme of amalgamation should be judged as an experiment devised by a
lawyer and a political economist who had no practical experience. From
1841 to 1861 his views changed substantially and he was aware of the
"futility of sanguine expectations". Failure to solve the "native question"
was not due just to a lack of "perseverance" and the use of "reason and
truth" by Europeans, but one which was extremely complex. 52 Therefore it
certainly could not be easily solved if it could, in fact, be solved at
all. Despite a few examples of success in various parts of the world
the project of national cxvxlizatxon, which at once roultxplxes the 
numbers of Europeans in the distant parts of the earth, and arms 
them with even greater superiority of force than heretofore, tends 
also to diminish the caution and considerateness which formerly to 
some extent controlled them in their intercourse with its feebler 
inhabitants; more easily able to awe them, to subjugate them, to 
exterminate them; less fxt to excite their love or thexr respect, 
to evangelize or to civilize them.
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One of the important elements in the scheme of amalgamation,
missionary instruction, had made little or no impact upon Amerindians
or Africans since 1841. Nevertheless he concluded that there was hope
for change in the future and he based this judgment on one of the most
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notable exceptions, the success of missionaries in the Pacific. The 
reasons for Merivale's changing attitude to the "native question" from 
1837 to 187 -^ cannot be understood apart from his experiences as an 
administrator at the Colonial Office from 1847 to 1860. The next two 
chapters will analyze Merivale's relations as an imperial administrator 
with Amerindians and Africans.
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Chapter 6 : Amerindians and Imperial Administration
in British North America, 184-7-1860
Herman Merivale’s greatest failure was his inability to find a 
solution to the "native question". His attempts to develop a com­
prehensive "native" policy and, even more importantly, to implement and 
administer such a policy, were wholly inadequate. Merivale, shortly after 
his appointment to the Colonial Office in 1847, recognized that in each 
region the "native question" was unique. The massive task of developing 
"native" policies, xdLthout adequate resources to assess each situation 
and to implement a course of action, was far beyond the capacities of the 
Colonial Office. Merivale and his colleagues in London had to rely upon 
the ideas and actions of the colonial governors. In addition by the early 
1850’s colonial self-government had been granted to the white settlement 
colonies and, as a consequence, administrative control over native 
peoples gradually passed from the Colonial Office to the white settlers.
The only two exceptions in British North America were the Hudson's Bay 
Company territories and Vancouver Island. In southern Africa the 
situation was exactly the reverse. Responsible government was not 
granted because no adequate solution to the "native question" could be found.
Imperial administrators in the 1840's and 1850's were largely con­
cerned, when dealing with the "native question", with conflicts between 
native peoples and white settlers over land and labour. Solutions were 
utilitarian and usually similar to those propounded by Merivale in his 
L0Qtures, specifically the alternatives of extermination, insulation 
and amalgamation. Another alternative, slavery, was not considered
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because it had been outlawed in 1833 in the British Empire. The pressure 
of humanitarians and their societies effectively ruled out extermination 
as well as slavery. Nevertheless there were a number of commentators who 
believed that native peoples would disappear as a result of "natural" 
causes such as disease or starvation. Imperial administrators, only 
considered the more practical schemes of insulation and amalgamation.
The former, in the short term, led to the alienation of lands held by 
the native peoples and, later, to the loss of their economic self- 
sufficiency. The scheme of amalgamation would entail immediate loss of 
the traditional economy and culture. In the end, however, the "native 
question" was not decided by these theoretical, and largely utopian, 
ameliorative measures. Many factors were important: the demands of the 
white settlers for colonial self-government; pressure from politicians 
and the Treasury to rationalize the Empire in economic terms; the failure 
of missionaries to "civilize" and christianize "native" culture; of great 
importance, the resistance, sometimes armed, sometimes passive, on the 
part of native peoples to attempts by Europeans to change their way of life.
As a commentator Herman Merivale’s position had been to maintain,as 
long as possible, metropolitan control over the relationship between white 
settlers and native peoples by a policy of insulation or amalgamation. In 
1841 he believed the best alternative was amalgamation. As an administrator 
experiencing these problems and their consequences directly, he recognized 
that both schemes were relatively innocuous as far as their original 
objectives were concerned. In each case there were variations but the 
consequences were similar. Inadequate knowledge of conditions in each 
region and the attempt to rationalize British imperial policy by
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means of free trade and colonial self-government were the primary reasons 
for the failure of the Colonial Office to administer adequately the 
"native question" in the 1850fs.
The permanent officials of the Colonial Office usually agreed on 
measures to be adopted to solve the "native question", especially after 
James Stephen left the Colonial Office in 1847. With Stephen went the 
"old missionary ideal of segregating natives from contact with the white 
settlers". In 1841 Merivale believed amalgamation was the best solution 
but as an administrator he was less certain. Control over "native" 
affairs passed slowly to the colonists in British North America and later 
in southern Africa. The "native question" was Merivale’s greatest con­
cern at the Colonial Office and he had a substantial impact on this aspect 
of British imperial policy.^-
In British North America Amerindian and Metis problems seldom reached
the Colonial Office and, if they did, very little action was taken on
2 / them. Amerindian and Metis did not fit into any future plans for the
British North American colonies. To a certain extent Merivale and. his
colleagues were limited in their interest in the plight of native peoples
in British North America by their lack of knowledge. If one looks at the
particular case of Herman Merivale, it is obvious that his ideas and the
sources upon which he based his decisions were, for the time in which he
lived, typical. Merivale took a great deal of ethnographical interest
in Amerindians but still described them largely in stereotypes:
... CtheyJ seemed possessed of higher moral elevation than 
any other uncivilized race of mankind, with less natural 
readiness and ingenuity than some but. greater depth and force 
of character; more native generosity of spirit, and manliness 
of disposition; more of the religious element; and yet, on the
other hand, if not with less capacity for improvement, certainly
less readiness to receive it; a more thorough wildness of
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temperament; less curiosity; inferior excitability; greater 
reluctance to associate with civilized men; a more ingovernable 
impatience of control. And their primitive condition of 
hunters, and aversion from every other, greatly increases 
the difficulty of ^ncluding them in the arrangements of a 
regular community.
Except for their religiosity, they were, therefore, certainly not very 
susceptible to a scheme of amalgamation.
Merivale believed Amerindian religiosity had been the cause of the 
creation of the image of the Indian as "unpredictable". The Indian 
obeyed only the dictates of his religion and was thus "a law unto himself". 
Comparing Amerindians to other native peoples Merivale concluded that 
they were "wonderfully developed", despite the fact they were not Chris­
tians. But their religiosity hampered their educational development, the 
second primary step in his scheme for their amalgamation. They were too 
self-sufficient and satisfied with their existence to gain such 
"advantages" of education as "intellectual acquirement" and then "material
improvement". From the viewpoint of a graduate of Oxford University, he
4
concluded Amerindians were "barbarians" and he realized white settlers 
also viewed them as "savages".^ Acting on these assumptions white 
settlers had pushed Amerindians into the interior of the continent until 
there was no more room:
... C an<Q  the vast surface of the Prairies was unable to receive 
the retreating myriads who had been expelled from the Forest.
Then the reflex took place. Thinned, dispirited, degraded, the 
remnants of powerful tribes returned eastwards toward their 
former seats; and either threw themselves on the mercy of govern­
ments, or attracted attention to their wants by becoming dangerous 
neighbours on the skirts of the settled country. Then, and rarely 
till then, reserves of lands were alloted to them, in various 
parts, both of the States and of Canada; and endeavours were 
made to Christianize and civilize them. Up to that time, the 
notion of assigning to them a property in a part of the sgil 
they once occupied seems to have been hardly entertained.
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Merivale was aware, as early as 1841, that the major problem in dealing 
with the native peoples of North America was the conflict over land.
This question was crucial to the condition of Amerindians while Merivale 
was at the Colonial Office in the 1850’s.
The Atlantic region, comprised of the colonies of New Brunswick,
Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, had been one of the 
first areas of European-Amerihdian contact in North America. Despite 
having more than three hundred years in which to solve the "native 
question", by the 1850's the British government was still not any closer 
to a solution. The Beothuk of Newfoundland had become extinct by 1829 
and twenty years later the Colonial Office believed that a similar fate 
would befall the Micmac. Although Micmac title to land had been acknow­
ledged by the British government,white settlers, usually squatters, con­
tinued to alienate land. The Micmac were not consciously ill-treated or 
made slaves. They were for the most part simply ignored and, as one 
historian has remarked, the "ideal Indian was the invisible one."
The Micmac in the 1850’s had to be either exterminated or amalgamated. 
They had been converted to Christianity in the seventeenth century but 
had not been forced to give up their traditional way of life as hunters 
and fishermen. Experiments had been tried to settle them on farms but 
each had failed.^ The only other solution, which had been tried in New 
Brunswick, was the reserve system by means of which lands were granted 
by the Crown to the Micmac for their occupancy and use. The reserve 
"system", however, which had been set up in 1779, had many flaws. The 
Micmac were not granted lands outright nor compensated for the loss of 
lands they had previously held. They were treated "equally" with white 
settlers. For example, to obtain land they had to apply for it by
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petition, in English, to the proper government authority. Even then the 
Micmac did not have full title to the land because the grants "only 
entitled them to occupy and possess during pleasure". Until 1847, little 
had been done for the Micmac. Moses H. Perley, the Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs for New Brunswick, had in the 1830’s done his utmost to 
make both the Colonial Office and the Legislative Assembly aware of the 
problems of the Micmac but he had been disregarded because the Assembly 
refused to have the squatters removed from Micmac land.
In 1841, the new colonial governor, Sir William Colebrooke, began-to 
take an interest in the land question. He consulted with Perley and, 
through Perley, with the Micmac who believed that at long last something 
was going to be done. The Indian Act of 1844 was not very satisfactory 
for the Micmac because it alienated reserve lands and gave only fifty acres 
of land to every family. The Micmac were to be removed to separate villages 
while the remainder of their lands were to be sold or leased at public 
auction. Income received from this sale was to be put into trust to 
"civilize" the Micmac. The law was approved by the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Lord Stanley.
After the Act was implemented, Perley immediately perceived the total 
inadequacy of the legislation. The Micmac were removed and settled in 
villages, however, they received no compensation for their reserve lands 
because few white settlers could afford to buy the land. The government 
had to sell the land at low prices, often on credit, and most of the revenue 
which had been collected paid only for the administration of the land 
sales. Meanwhile the squatters refused to move or to buy the Indian land 
on which they lived. When Perley objected to Colebrooke, the latter 
expressed sympathy but said that he could not obtain the consent of the
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Assembly to change the Act. Ha knew the Assembly would refuse to allocate 
funds for the welfare of the Micmac either by means of an annuity or by 
leasing the lands on a long term basis. He did, however, send a full 
and rather “gloomy report" to the Colonial Office with Perley*s critical 
comments on the Act.
This despatch and Perley*s report found its way to Lord Grey, the 
Land and Emigration Commissioners and, ultimately, Herman Merivale in
g
1848. Colebrooke's despatch correctly stated that the land question had
always been a source of conflict between the colonists and the Micmac.
However, the governor also argued that unless the problem was quickly
solved the economic development of the colony would be retarded. The
colonial government and railroad entrepreneurs were demanding that these
lands should be made available. Very pointedly, he observed that the
Micmac were declining in numbers and it was very easy to conclude that
9
the Micmac needed less land and the colonists needed more. Merivale, 
in his minute on the Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioner*s 
report, wrote that the Secretary of State for the Colonies should wait 
until the new governor, Sir Edmund Head, arrived and submitted his views. 
After reading all this material Merivale minuted that the land issue was 
crucial and warned: **... if the Assembly continue to sell Indian lands
at 4 s.'[^shillings] an acre there would be only a capital of fc 12,000 
secured for their benefit after all the existing reserves had been parted 
with . " 10 Like many new colonial governors, Head was briefed by Merivale 
and the Secretary of State for the Colonies on this and other questions 
at the Colonial Office before he left for New Brunswick. The Colonial 
Office decided to make a decision based upon Head's findings. 11
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Head immediately sent Lord Grey his report which was largely based
upon Perley's original criticisms. At the same time, Head attempted to
find a compromise between Perley's report and the assembly's assertion
that the Act had never been given sufficient time to prove itself. In
retrospect, it seems very difficult to uphold the position of the assembly
because the Act had been simply disastrous for the Micmac and had left
them with less land, no money for the land they had lost and economic
and social dislocation by their removal to separate villages. Head, as
a new and inexperienced governor, needed the support of the assembly in
order to govern the colony. Head proposed a "new set of instructions"
to the Act which would help to ameliorate the condition of the Micmac.
He also believed that there were only two ways of handling Amerindians
in a colony such as New Brunswick: to admit that they had legal rights
and to recognize that they needed to be protected from white settlers. At
least for a time he concluded, they should be made wards of the govera- 
12
ment.
Head's recommendations revealed that the most important problem con­
cerning Indian-European relations in New Brunswick was land and its usage. 
Two land commissioners should be appointed for each county, these commis­
sioners would supervise the sale of Indian lands and a "separate fund" 
should be allocated from the income derived from the sale. This fund 
would be used to provide for "the ordinary relief of the Indians" in each 
year and the remainder was to be held in trust and "untouched" unless the 
Governor and his Council should decide that part of it should be used "for 
some permanent object of utility, such as a school or chapel for the 
Indians" or the "industrial training" of the younger members of the tribe. 
Timber on Micmac reserves was also to be protected. Lastly, compensation
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should be paid to the Micmac for land which had been taken from them and
used as part of the civil list fund of the colony.
Despite these changes, Head was just as pessimistic concerning the
future of the Micmac as his predecessor had been. He doubted whether there
would be any "permanent improvement" or any "real advancement" because
their numbers were declining rapidly and they were a "harmless race". Head,
unlike Merivale, believed in the theory of necessary depopulation of native
peoples and he spent very little of his time on Micmac affairs. He was
13more concerned with introducing responsible government. Head also ' 
suggested that Moses Perley, the one person who knew the most about the 
Micmac in New Brunswick, should not be allowed to implement the new 
instructions, Perley had openly disagreed with the policy of the govern­
ment as embodied in the Act of 1844 and had conveyed his views to the 
Micmac after announcing the policy. Technically Head was correct, but
practically, as he realized himself, he had now lost the most informed
14
official the colony had on Micmac affairs.
The Colonial Office’s response to Head's report was not ambiguous. They
knew very little about the Micmac and had no choice but to defer to their
colonial officials. They told Head to put the new regulations into force
without Perley's aid. Merivale agreed with the Colonial Office's
"expert" on Indian affairs in eastern British North America, Arthur
15
Blackwood, and Lord Grey, the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Merivale had very little influence on Indian policy in this region because 
he was preoccupied with Amerindian affairs in Rupert's Land, Vancouver 
Island and British Columbia.
Head's new regulations failed because they had not taken into account 
the advice given by Perley in his report concerning the alienation of land.
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White settlers had simply ignored the new regulations."^ In the 1850’s the
Indian fund was not large enough to provide relief because white settlers
did not buy Indian lands. They simply squatted on the land of moved and
17bought land more cheaply elsewhere. The "administration of Indian 
affairs remained chaotic. Matters beyond the scope of individual commis­
sioners continued to go directly or via the Provincial Secretary’s Office 
to the Surveyor General, the Crown Lands Commissioner, the Executive 
Council, or, if extra money was needed for emergencies, the Assembly 
itself." Moreover only a small amount of money was provided each year for 
the relief of the Micmac by the assembly and the Colonial Office.
Indian affairs in New Brunswick in the 1850's were characterized by 
imperial mismanagement and colonial neglect. The Micmac suffered econo­
mically but they survived extinction because lack of financial resources 
prevented Head's policy of "improvement" from being implemented. Micmac 
lands were not entirely sold because the settlers had found land available
more cheaply elsewhere. The problem of squatting remained, however, a 
18very serious one. The situation in Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia
was very similar to that in New Brunswick.
In the early 1850's an incident occurred which accurately revealed
the Colonial Office's neglect of Indian affairs in these colonies. Silas
Rand, a Baptist minister and one of the few men seriously concerned about
the Indians of Nova Scotia, sent a petition in English because the Micmac
were not able to do so. Merivale minuted that he did not believe that it
was a genuine petition because it "was written and conceived in English".
As a consequence, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of
Newcastle, merely referred the claims of the petitioners back to the
19
colonial government and nothing was done. The demands of the Micmac
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for aid were ignored by Merivale, the Colonial Office and the local
20government and this case was not an exception. Although the Indians 
in Canada fared much better during the period from 1847 to 1860, imperial 
policy did not differ significantly from that of the Atlantic colonies.
British imperial policy with respect to the Indians in Canada from 
1830 to 1860 consisted of protection and insulation leading to amalga­
mation. Indians were to be protected from the white settlers by putting 
them on reserves, if they were not already on one. This policy made 
Indian land available to the greatly increasing number of white settlers, 
a process which had been underway since the American Revolution. It 
was also assumed, erroneously, that putting Indians on reserves and 
encouraging them to amalgamate with white settlers would help to lower 
the cost of Indian administration. The Colonial Office’s primary 
interest in the Indians in Canada was economic not humanitarian.
Nevertheless the Colonial Office and the colonial governors were 
genuinely concerned about the welfare of these people. They knew a 
great deal about the Indians in Canada because of the writings of travel­
lers, military officers and missionaries. Generally their attitude,
21
including Merivale's, was one of paternalism. Unfortunately their 
attempts to protect the native peoples was subordinated to an imperial 
policy which had accompanied the coming of free trade and responsible 
government in Canada in the 1840’s and was designed to make the colony 
economically and politically self-sufficient. Their chief purpose was 
to cut down on British imperial expenditure. This object of British policy 
was stated clearly by Grey in 1853 in his Colonial Policy, There are only 
two references to Indians and they both deal with Grey’s attempt to cut 
expenditures: "With regard to the Indian Department, as by the
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arrangement lately made, the extinction of the charge (except so far as 
regards some payments for their lives to individuals) is provided for 
within five years, no further steps are required to be taken." 22 
Merivale agreed with Grey’s idea on this aspect of British imperial 
policy.
In his Lectures Merivale had written, as one historian has noted, the
"best summation of the conventional wisdom of Empire (as it stood)" with
regard to the "native question" in Canada. He had been particularly
scathing in his comments concerning inefficiency in the Indian Department.
In a position to implement a scheme of amalgamation at the Colonial Office
he did nothing at all to change the situation because he was more concerned
about implementing responsible government and dealing with its consequences.
In addition his interest in "native policy" in Rupert’s Land and the Pacific
Northwest overshadowed this problem in Canada. As permanent undersecretary
he supervised all aspects of colonial policy and read most of the incoming
despatches but he simply did not have enough time to deal with more than a
handful of specific problems.
In 1841 Merivale had accurately described the problem which Amerindians
in Canada faced. They had been granted certain legal guarantees by the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 but their condition in Canada by the 1840's was:
... a remarkable instance of the mischievous manner in which 
even the best intentions towards the Indians have been carried
into execution. After declaring in the most solemn language
the perpetuity of the cession of the lands, it ends with the 
saving clause, ’unless the Indians shall be inclined to part 
with them’. By virtue of this proviso, every art has been 
introduced to obtain their consent to the usurpations made 
upon them; bit by bit they have been deprived of their 
magnificent hunting-grounds, which are not altogether possessed 
by whites. 23
228
Despite being aware of this situation Merivale did nothing in the 1850’s 
to alleviate it. He agreed with Thomas F. Elliot that responsibility 
for Amerindians in Canada should be transferred to the local government 
because this policy complemented the introduction of responsible govern­
ment and free trade. In addition they believed that these people were 
already experiencing the "Euthanasia of savage communities".
From 1856 to 1860 the Colonial Office debated these problems with 
Head who had been transferred to Canada from New Brunswick in 1854. Their 
greatest concern was the methods to be adopted to transfer control of
these Indians to the Indian Department. A special commission was also
24
set up to inquire into this problem. Merivale’s attitude was callous
considering his views in his Lectures fifteen years before. In a minute
of June 6, 1856 commenting on Head's plan, Merivale believed that it
would be adequate to "get rid of the responsibility of the Home Govern-
25ment" in the matter. Merivale's view prevailed in 1856 when he composed
the draft despatch to Head for Henry Labouchere, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies. This despatch gave Head approval to do as he liked,
with the consultation of his Executive Council, as long as it "—  at the
same time is consistent with the full preservation of the faith of the
26
Imperial Government so far as it may be pledged to the natives." The 
inconsistency of this policy was quite apparent. Aware of the promises 
made to the Amerindians in Canada in 1763, Merivale, his colleagues and 
the colonial governors were divesting themselves of responsibility. The
Indians were never consulted and were left to fend for themselves.
In 1860 by an imperial act, responsibility for their welfare was given 
to the local government. Merivale’s ideas and good intentions as a 
commentator were minimized when he became an administrator at the Colonial
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Office and had an opportunity to do something constructive. The Indians
of Canada fared even worse after 1860. Paternalism by the imperial
government was over but dominance by colonial politicians and administrators
27
was to increase in the future.
The contradiction between Merivale's ideas as a commentator and his 
actions as an administrator were already present in his Lectures with 
respect to land policy. He argued that settlement colonies should have 
control over their own land because "if we recognize the principle that 
colonists should govern themselves, except in those particulars where the 
exercise of self-government would necessarily clash with the imperial 
sovereignty, this is one of the functions which should seem in theory
more peculiarly fit to be exercised by the colonial, not the imperial,
28
authorities." Merivale did not reconcile the difference between white
29
settlers using the land for agricultural purposes and aboriginal title.
Before the nineteenth century the problem had not arisen because, he
argued, there had been no "systematic regulation" in the "disposal of
lands"; there was plenty of land for all to use for agriculture, hunting
and trapping and lastly, the "danger from Indians" kept the white settlers
30
from straying too far into the wilderness. However, in the nineteenth
century, he believed that a colony, in order to develop itself economically,
needed to be self-sufficient in,land, capital and labour. The latter
was the most important element of the three because "land and capital
31are both useless unless labour can be commanded". Merivale began to 
understand this contradiction when he examined questions concerning the 
Hudson's Bay Company territories.
230
In eastern Canada in the 1850’s the economic function of Amer­
indians had disappeared and it appeared to many commentators that they 
would either become extinct or would eventually become assimilated with 
the white settlers. In Rupert’s Land and on the Pacific northwest coast 
the situation was very different. It was an area of which only a few 
traders and missionaries had any knowledge. The Cree, Assiniboine and 
Blackfeet still had an important role in the fur trade although the trade 
itself was in decline. These Indians were the chief source of labour.
It was clear, although not usually acknowledged by the Company, by the
British government or Merivale before 1847, that these people held title
32
to the land on which they were living. There was only a very small
agricultural settlement at Red River. During this transitional period
33
Merivale became involved with Rupert's Land.
Merivale's main concerns were with land, its usage by the Hudson’s
Bay Company and its title by the Indians; labour, the Amerindian economy
basically consisting of hunting, fishing and trapping furs; capital, the
monopoly and economic control of the Company. The Hudson’s Bay Company's
presence was, despite its monopoly, generally in the interests of the
Amerindians. The Company needed the latter as a skilled labour force in
the fur trade just as the Indians were dependent on the Company’s trade
goods. Merivale revealed his reasons for supporting the Hudson's Bay
Company as early as 1848 when he had to deal with the complaints of
Alexander K. Isbister, a former employee of the Company, against the
34
Company's treatment of the native peoples in its territories.
Merivale was in a quandary; as a free trader, he also supported the 
monopolistic rule of a commercial company. He became the liaison between
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the Colonial Office and the Hudson’s Bay Company and his decisions in
cases involving Company rule were accepted by many Secretaries of State
for the Colonies.
The greatest problem was the distance of the Colonial Office from
the Red River colony. The administrator in the metropolis, thousands of
miles away from Indians and traders, found it difficult to make a
judgment. The administrator had to find someone who was relatively
impartial, such as Merivale’s "imperial officer" or "Protectors” of the
35
Indians as described in his Lectures. However, his suggestion had not
been adopted by British imperial administrators. As a substitute, Merivale
relied in this case and others, on the reports of naval and military
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officers or colonial governors who understood the problems.
Merivale therefore put great weight upon the report of Major John 
Crofton, who had been appointed governor of Assiniboia and commander of 
the troops stationed at Red River. Unfortunately, Crofton had been 
tampered with by George Simpson before he had made his report which ex­
onerated the Company. Merivale dismissed Isbister's accusations that the 
Company was using liquor to obtain furs from Amerindians and, on the whole, 
he concluded that the Company’s rule was "very advantageous to the Indians".
He argued that if the Company's monopoly ceased, the fur trade would become 
open to all traders and the situation would become much worse because the 
Company and its competitors would use liquor indiscriminately as a trading item.
Merivale suggested to Lord Grey that the only solution was to appoint 
a special military officer or English traveller to check upon such com­
plaints and then report directly to the Colonial Office. He rejected the
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use of missionaries and their reports in such disputes because he believed 
that they had a vested interest in the Indians. Another proposal was the 
appointment of a commission in England which would be sent to investigate ' 
the complaints. He cautioned Grey that a commission would mean a direct 
investigation of the Company and its relationship with the native peoples 
in Rupert's Land and might lead to the cessation of the Company's respon­
sibility and its replacement by the Colonial Office.
Influenced by Merivale, the Colonial Office refused to take on the 
difficult task of creating a new crown colony in Rupert's Land. Merivale 
realized that the financial resources of the Colonial Office were severely 
limited and it could not readily replace the Hudson’s Bay Company. In 
addition he believed the Company, like the East India Company, had one 
important advantage over the Colonial Office:
... their power of dealing on a regular system with inferior or less 
powerful races. The Hudson’s Bay Company have converted for trading 
purposes an immense region into a fur preserve, with a success which 
is perfectly astonishing, and could not be believed were it not in 
evidence from the supply of furs. Of course, this was simply for 
their own interest. But it could only be done through introducing 
a strict and vigorous disipline, which nothing but self-interest 
would have introduced, and which forms the best possible basis of 
dealing with savages.
Merivale also compared the situation to that south of the forty-ninth 
parallel and concluded that there was no "alternative between the present 
system and perfect freedom, that is, such a state of perpetual war and 
pillage as subsists in the American prairies." He ended this minute by 
stating bluntly that "Mr. Isbister would have us destroy a regular govern­
ment on account of its corruption, when the only alternative for it is 
37
anarchy." Grey agreed entirely with this analysis and sent out a
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despatch based upon Merivale1s minute. For the Colonial Office, law 
and order was more important than the welfare of Amerindians in Rupert's 
Land.
From 1852 to 1860, hampered by many problems, the Colonial Office
continued to refuse to take on the responsibility of governing Rupert's 
39
Land. Merivale feared that the cessation of the Company's rule would
permit the extension of agricultural settlement into Rupert’s Land. The
relative equality and reciprocal self-interest among the Company, the 
/
Indians and the Metis would therefore be replaced by material and tech­
nological changes and ultimately a very different economy and society.
In 1854, a proposal came to Downing Street for "rapid communication" 
between the Pacific northwest coast and Canada which was designed to 
bolster the defences of British North America. Merivale rejected such 
projects because he believed that Rupert's Land was not ready for such 
development:
When population overflows the great western region of the States,
& Canada, it will find its way into the far less attractive plains 
of Northwest America, and not before. In the meantime, it may be 
doubted whether these are not as advantageously placed under the 
control of an anti-colonizing body like the Hudson's Bay Co. which 
keeps up the fur-bearing animals in vast preserves, and keeps peace 
with the Indians, as under bands of wandering emigrants who would 
soon waste the former and quarrel with the latter, as is the case 
on the southern side of the States line...
Merivale realized that change would come and would be precipitated by the
40
expiry of the Company's licence. Some indication of this process had 
already been presaged since the formation of the Red River settlement 
by Lord Selkirk.
In March 1857 Merivale received a request from the Hudson's Bay 
Company for troops to be sent to the Red River colony to help put down
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alleged (by the Company) unrest in that settlement by Amerindians and Metis.
A group led by William Kennedy, the uncle of Alexander Xsbister, was,
according to the Company, stirring up trouble. These ntrouble-makers” had
learned of the appointment of a Select Parliamentary Committee to inquire
into the Hudson's Bay Company monopoly and the validity of its charter.
Such agitation would hurt the Company's chances of renewing their licence
and of maintaining the monopoly because the Company had always argued that
it had governed its territories cheaply and had maintained law and order
among the Indians and Metis. Merivale discounted the Company's claims of
American involvement in the agitation and the possibility of conflict
between Britain and the United States if the British government intervened.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies agreed to his recommendations to
send the Royal Canadian Rifles from Montreal to Red River via Hudson 
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Bay. The troops were sent and the Hudson's Bay Company, aided by
Merivale and the Colonial Office, who did not fully investigate the
Company's charges, prevented organized protest by the native peoples
42
against the Company's economic control, Merivale's support of the
Company's monopoly was so strong that he did not hesitate to send military
reinforcements to maintain law and order.
Meanwhile, the question of the Hudson's Bay Company charter and
renewal of its licence still remained of the utmost importance. The
negotiations which the Colonial Office was conducting concerning the
renewal of the licence of exclusive trade were long and complicated.
Despite the fact that this question concerned the Indians and Metis, they
had little voice in the outcome, although an Anglican missionary, Reverend
Griffiths Owen Corbett and Isbister gave evidence to the Select Parlia-
43mentary Committee in 1857. In 1858 Merivale expressed surprise upon
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receipt of a letter from Corbett concerning aboriginal rights to land. 
Merivale*s minute is important because he was the Colonial Office's legal 
authority:
... I mean the claims of the Indian tribes over portions of Lord 
Selkirk's land & generally over the territories comprised in the 
Charter. The Americans have always taken care to extinguish such 
rights however vague. We have never adopted any very uniform 
system about them. I suppose the H.B.C.had never purchased from 
such claimants any of their land. And I fear (idle as such claims 
really are, when applied to vast regions of which only the smallest 
portion can ever be used for
On this occasion the permanent undersecretary was wrong because there 
were no land claims and aboriginal rights were not seriously considered 
by the British government.
In December 1859 William Kennedy again raised the issue of land with 
the Colonial Office. Merivale advised the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, the Duke of Newcastle, to answer Kennedy very cautiously because 
the issue raised was one of "considerable importance". He went on to state 
that in the past the British government had never recognized the "territ­
orial rights" of Indians but there had been no conflict because of the 
reciprocal economic self-interest of the Company and native peoples in 
the fur trade and the lack of agricultural settlement. Taking a legal 
interpretation of aboriginal rights, he told the Duke of Newcastle to do 
nothing until the question of the Hudson's Bay Company's "rights to the 
soil are terminated" because "...it might be pretty safely assumed, that 
no right of property would be admitted by the Crown as existing in mere 
nomadic hunting tribes over the wild land adjacent to the Red River 
Settlement. But the agricultural Indian settlements (if any such exist)
discussions are not unlikely
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would be respected and that hunting ground actually so used by the Indians 
would either be reserved to them or else compensation made . " 14'5 The land 
question continued to cause conflict and culminated in rebellions in 
1869-70 and 1885.
The Pacific northwest coast, the colonies of Vancouver Island and 
(in 1858) British Columbia, were different from the rest of British North 
America because of the nature of the native peoples. They were not nomadic, 
in contradistinction to the Cree, Assiniboine or Blackfeet, but lived, by 
and from the sea. Their economic and cultural life was very rich. In sum, 
they were self-sufficient and in a far better position to resist the en­
croachments of fur traders, gold miners and later,white settlers. Moreover 
these Indians far outnumbered their white counterparts. In the colonial 
period, the response of the British to the various Indian groups was pre­
dominantly one of fear. 145 In the period from 1847 to 1860 there was more 
evidence of armed conflict on the Pacific northwest coast than elsewhere 
in British North America. With one exception, Richard Blanshard, the 
Colonial Office supported the actions' taken by their offical representatives 
particularly the colonial governor, James Douglas, and the various com­
manders of Royal Navy ships stationed in the area.
In 1843 Merivale had written that the northwest coast of North America 
was "... the last corner of the earth left free for the occupation of a 
civilized race." This region was an exception because Merivale believed 
the "romantic days in which every adventurer saw, in the first green 
shores which greeted him, the nursery of some new empire to be called by 
his name, are gone by for ever." Merivale’s knowledge of the native peoples 
was also deficient, if not misleading. Confidently he wrote that these 
Indians were
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... few in number, chiefly subsisting by salmon fishing and on roots, 
and very inferior in physical power and in ferocious energy to their 
brethren of the Prairies. But, for this very reason, they offer the 
less obstructions to the operations of the colonist; and, it must be 
added, that their simple, inoffensive habits of life are found to be 
accompanied in many cases with a moral elevation, which ranks them 
in the scale of humanity far above most savages; and forms but too 
striking a contrast to the morals and habits of the wandering whites 
and half-breeds who visit them from the East.^
Within ten years Merivale discovered that the Pacific coastal Indians were
neither "inferior", "inoffensive" nor "simple". In addition, he was to
experience the impact of "wandering whites and half-breeds" upon the
development of Vancouver Island and British Columbia, particularly during
the gold rush on the Fraser River in 1858.
Unlike the eastern colonies of British North America, Vancouver
Island and British Columbia did not have the same problems concerning land
and its usage by Indians and white settlers. There are a number of reasons
for this important difference. Plenty of good land was still available.
Governor James Douglas avoided conflict over land by signing fourteen
"treaties" with the Indians on Vancouver Island between 1850 and 1854,
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and set aside reserves for other groups of Indians. Until the 1860’s
there were few white settlers on Vancouver Island or the mainland colony.
The Hudson's Bay Company had been responsible for colonization but they
had done little under very difficult circumstances, particularly the
distance from Britain and the high price for land set by the Colonial
Office. By 1860 Merivale realized the Hudson's Bay Company was, with the
exception of lands occupied around their posts, "mere squatters" although
ones under "peculiar circumstances". The Company had not derived title
to the land from the Indians and the land question would be the centre of
49
controversy for many years.
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Land was not, however, an important cause of armed conflict in the 
1850's. There were othe.r differences of far greater significance.- ..The
Colonial Office and Merivale had an important influence on the outcome
of these conflicts. Imperial administrators and politicians did not,
however, understand the cultural and economic differences which existed
between Indians and whites on the northwest coast. As a consequence, they
relied upon the colonial governors and the commanders of the ships of the
50
Royal Navy to maintain law and order. Primarily concerned with avoiding 
the cost of full-scale warfare, which was occurring in southern Africa 
at the same time, the Colonial Office relied upon the Hudson's Bay Company 
to maintain good relations with the Indians as it had done in the past. 
These objectives were sometimes unattainable as the Fort Rupert incident 
in 1850 revealed.
The first governor of Vancouver Island was the inexperienced Richard 
Blanshard. Despite ill-treatment by the Hudson's Bay Company since his 
arrival in the colony in March 1850, Blanshard had supported the Company's 
Indian policy and had opposed the "importation and manufacture of ardent 
spirits". He had dismissed accounts of "barbarous treatment" by the 
Company as "entirely without foundation". Blanshard was confronted with 
a crisis at Fort Rupert in the summer of 1850 when the news of the murder 
of three deserters from a Company ship by the Newitty, a Kwakiutl group 
living at the northern end of Vancouver Island, was received at Fort 
Victoria. By the time Blanshard*s despatch had reached the Colonial 
Office in November 1850, Blanshard, using men and ships of the Royal Navy, 
had already punished the Newitty. Both sides sustained few casualties and
the Newitty gave Blanshard the bodies of the murderers. Blanshard thought
he had acted quickly and efficiently.
The Colonial Office and Merivale, already disenchanted with Blanshard
for his quarrels with the Hudson's Bay Company, were very displeased with
his conduct at Fort Rupert but they were not at all concerned about the
Newitty. Upon receiving Blanshard's despatch, Merivale minuted acidly
that the "... Governor's account is so meagre that it leaves everything
unaccounted for..." He suggested to Grey that they should ask the Company
for further information. The Company obtained a comprehensive report from
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their Chief Factor on Vancouver Island, James Douglas. It was not until 
February 1851 that the Colonial Office discovered what had happened at 
Fort Rupert.
The Hudson's Bay Company's report concluded that the murder of the
three men made it imperative that Vancouver Island should receive better
military protection. The Colonial Office, acting upon the advice of
Merivale, dismissed the incident because it was "...only that of the
murder of three seamen who were trying to escape from their ship, in a
part of the island distant from that occupied by the Company." There
had been no threat to the colony by the Newitty. Merivale based his
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judgment upon Douglas' report of the incident to the Company. The 
consequences of this conflict for Blanshard and Indian- European relations 
were important. The affair led to the resignation of Blanshard as 
governor. For his hasty action, taken without the approval of the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Blanshard was severely rebuked by 
Grey. Blanshard was partly the victim of his own inexperience because 
he had acted without instructions,although he had made the attack on the 
Newitty with the approval of the Company's representatives including
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James Douglas. Blanshard made little impact, militarily or culturally, 
upon the Newitty. They had suffered few casualties and the attack correspon­
ded to their views on crime and punishment. Other confrontations in the 
1850's would follow the same general pattern. The chief difference would 
be the growing use of gun-boats by the Royal Navy to dominate the Pacific 
northwest coast.^
The Colonial Office had learned that its power to control Indian- 
European relations in this distant colony, was, as Mervale put it, limited: 
"To give orders from hence as to the conduct to be observed towards Indians 
in Vancouver Island seems rather unlikely to be of much service. If the 
colony is to maintain itself, as was the condition of its foundation, the 
local government much needs to be left very much to its discretion as to 
dealings with the natives in the immediate neighbourhood of the settled
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parts, although distant excursions against them may be discouraged...."
The Colonial Office responded to the Fort Rupert affair by relying more 
than ever upon the Hudson's Bay Company and James Douglas, the new gover­
nor, to prevent full-scale warfare. Merivale consoled himself with the 
argument that "... whatever their demerits, the Co. has one merit, viz. 
that of systematically dealing with the natives, instead of the caprice 
of ordinary settlers; and that to this is owing the general absence, in 
their territories, of anything like the fearful massacres & fighting of 
which we receive occasional accounts from the American side of the frontier." 
Once again in another region of British North America the Colonial Office 
had abrogated its responsibility for Indian affairs. The only check they 
retained was upon the actions of the colonial governor.
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In the following years James Douglas was given the opportunity to
conduct Indian-European relations largely without any interference from
either the Hudson's Bay Company or the Colonial Office. The Office had
very little knowledge concerning this region and most of its views were
based upon reports received from Douglas after any particular event and its
judgments were formed, therefore, almost entirely on Douglas' interpreta- 
56
tion. Although the Secretaries of State were not always aware of
Douglas' power, Merivale certainly was. He wrote in 1856 "...there can
be no doubt the safety of the little British settlement here depends
wholly on the firmness and discretion of the governor’s conduct toward
57the Indians: military defense there is none." As a consequence, Douglas, 
very much aware of his situation and that of the Colonial Office, was in 
command of the circumstances. In 1857 he was able to mount a successful
expedition against the Cowichan on Vancouver Island with the approval of
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the Colonial Office and the aid of the Royal Navy. In the same year he
helped Governor Isaac Stevens when conflict occurred.in the Washington 
59Territory. Douglas was confronted with an important crisis of his own 
the next year.
Both Douglas and the Colonial Office feared the worst after the dis­
covery of gold on the Fraser River and the arrival of gold miners, mostly 
American, in the spring of 1858. Douglas consulted the Colonial Office 
because he was governor of Vancouver Island and had no jurisdiction over 
the mainland. Since the major fear of both the governor and Merivale was 
an armed clash between the miners and Indians, Douglas asked for instruct­
ions. Lord Stanley responded by leaving the whole matter "to Mr. Merivale's
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judgement”. Merivale immediately gave Douglas power to govern until a
lieutenant governor’s commission could be sent. Merivale realized the
inadequacy of issuing gold licences without having the power to enforce
them, and concluded "... that on the whole the best directions will be, to
let things take their course as regards the licences & the gold diggings,
but to prevent, if he {^Douglas} can, and if he cannot, immediately report
upon, any proceedings inconsistent with the assertion of British dominion
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over the territory?" Fortunately for both Douglas and Merivale, many
miners left the area by the fall of 1858 and there were only a few serious
. 61 incidents.
Much of this success can be directly attributed to Douglas who acted
quickly and effectively and, indirectly, to Merivale and the Colonial
Office who gave him their complete support. By 1860 Merivale had become
completely dependent upon the ability of James Douglas to act decisively
in a crisis. Merivale's minute of August 12, 1858 on a petition from the
Aborigines Protection Society is extremely important because it revealed
his reason for supporting Douglas:
I would acknowledge civilly & do nothing more. These gentlemen are 
well meaning -- at least many of them -- & they represent a common 
& healthy British feeling: but the worst of it is that "protection 
of the aborigines" has become with them a“technical profession"
They never see, or pretend to see, two sides of a case: consequently 
their practical suggestions, when they make any at all (which I must 
do them the justice to say, is very seldom) are of a character which 
would probable cause some astonishment to people on the spot.62
Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton agreed with Merivalefs assessment and instructed
him to send a copy of the petition to Douglas as a matter of form. By
the spring of 1860 when Merivale left the Colonial Office he was relatively
optimistic concerning the future of Vancouver Island now that the Hudson's
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Bay Company had given up its attempts at colonization. The greatest
problem however, had not been solved: "it seems to be a very attractive
region: & likely to prosper greatly, if the settlers can be secure against
the Indians: at present (thanks to Hudson’s Bay Company management) these
seem very tractable." In order to avoid the experience of wholesale
"massacre" in other parts of North America, Merivale continued to advocate
the "... occasional use of the Queen’s naval & military force", although
63
it had an effect "more by shew than even by execution". To implement 
this policy, the Colonial Office had to rely, as it had done in the 1850's, 
upon the colonial governor and the commanders of the gun-boats of the Royal 
Navy#
The pattern of the relationship between the Colonial Office, native 
peoples, the Hudson's Bay Company and white settlers was evident in 
the British North American colonies by 1860. The de facto, if not formal, 
control over native peoples passed from the Colonial Office to local 
legislatures in the North Atlantic colonies, with the exception of 
Newfoundland where the Beothuk were extinct and the Micmac ignored,in Canadc 
and in the two Pacific northwest colonies of Vancouver Island and British 
Columbia. The Hudson's Bay Company territories,which remained under 
Company management and control until 1869, were the only exceptions.
Merivale completely supported the Hudson's Bay Company's Indian policy.
In the case of Vancouver Island and British Columbia, he approved of James 
Douglas! actions and the use of the Royal Navy in preventing full-scale 
conflict between Indians and white settlers, fur traders and gold miners,
Merivale did not attempt to apply a scheme of amalgamation as had been
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outlined in his Lectures because he realized it was impracticable.
In southern Africa, Natal and Cape Colony, he discovered similar 
problems, primarily those of labour and land but very different conditions. 
Merivale and the Colonial Office had more difficulty in obtaining knowledge 
concerning southern Africa and therefore had to rely to an even greater 
extent upon their governors in their attempts to formulate and implement 
a sound "native" policy. Their attempts to administer "native" affairs 
will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7: Africans and Imperial Administration
in Southern Africa 1847-1860
In southern Africa, Natal and Cape Colony, the Colonial Office 
encountered similar problems, primarily those of land and labour but 
very different economic conditions* There was much more conflict 
between Africans and white settlers than between Amerindians and British 
North Americans. The Colonial Office refused to grant responsible 
government to the white settlers, although the Cape colonists were given 
representative institutions. Nevertheless, control over "native" 
affairs passed gradually to the colonial politicians.
Merivale was, in l84i, aware of the consequences of a reserve 
policy for Africans. As an administrator he did his best to check the 
growing power of the white settlers in southern Africa but, by i860, 
it was obvious that he and the Colonial Office had failed in this 
objective. The major reason was the discrepancy between imperial 
policy and its implementation. Administrators in London set up a land 
policy system but did not provide sufficient funds for its execution.
The introduction of a hut tax in Natal was the best example of this 
process. In Cape Colony the Colonial Office relied upon Sir George Grey, 
who had been the colonial governor in South Australia and New Zealand, 
to protect and "improve" southern Africans by a scheme of amalgamation. 
All these attempts failed and created more conflict than the Colonial 
Office had ever expected.
The British Empire had originally been extended into southern 
Africa largely for strategic reasons* The region was an important link 
between Britain and the most important part of its Empire, India. 
Emigration schemes had been tried in the l820*s but had failed.^ Most
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of the white settlers were not British but of Dutch background, the
Boers. In l8*fl Merivale was aware of the problems of southern Africa.
However, lacking precise knowledge concerning African economies, he
had argued that the "South African natives" were
... a pastoral people, rich in flocks and herds; to whom the 
notion of property appears to be familiar; subject to chiefs 
maintaining a greater state, and ruling larger bodies of men 
than the natives of our other settlements; warlike and 
sanguinary, and rendered, unhappily, more so by the constant 
hostilities between them and our colonies, which appear to 
have been for many years encouraged by our authorities; but 
evidently susceptible of much improvement.^
Like Amerindians southern Africans were supposed to be susceptible to
such ameliorative measures as insulation or amalgamation. The primary
object of British policy was to reduce conflict between Africans,
Boers and British settlers while maintaining a strong military and
naval presence in the region. Merivale and his colleagues succeeded
only partially in this objective.
Before i860 Colonial Office policy was designed to insulate British
settlers, Boers and Africans from one another. Southern Africa
exhibited little economic potential and was certainly not valuable
enough to justify the expense of colonization and military expenditure
to protect the colonists from Africans. A policy of containment
was attempted but was never successfully implemented. The only
exception was the withdrawal from the Orange River Sovereignty in
1852-185^. The policy failed because it ignored the realities of
contacts between dissimilar cultures and because of the actions of
successive colonial governors, most notably Sir Harry Smith and Sir
George Grey, who had different objectives and who acted without prior
consultation with the Colonial Office. Conflicts between Boers and
Africans involved colonial governors in frontier wars and territorial
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expansion was the consequence. Southern Africa was a "reluctant" 
frontier only insofar as it existed in the minds of the mandarins in
■Z
London and only until 185^. Merivale’s role in this process was
anomalous but significant. From l8V? to i860 he had to work very
closely with Sir George Barrow, the senior clerk in charge of rhe
African Department, because the latter was "barely competent" and spent
most of his time merely summarizing despatches rather than analyzing 
Zf
them. Merivale had to read the summary and often the despatches
again. As a consequence and especially after the departure of
Lord Grey in 1852 he had a great influence over British colonial
policy in southern Africa.
In 18^7* Sir Harry Smith, governor of the Cape Colony, in response
to the continued migration of Boer farmers, annexed the territory
between the Orange and the Vaal Rivers without consulting the Colonial
Office. It took almost six years before the Colonial Office abandoned
the Orange River Sovereignty and then only at very great expense
to Britain. Merivale perceived that the problem precipitated by
Boer migrations was economic rather than political. Annexation was
"futile" because "... whatever limit is taken, assuredly the Boers
will overstep it again..." and the consequences were clear: "... every
additional annexation renders the next annexation more reasonable
and more plausible, until a stand is taken at once the end seems
5
at an indefinite distance." In the next few years Merivale kept 
minuting to Lord Grey this same response. He concluded that the Office 
should, if possible, leave the Boers to themselves in the interior 
of southern Africa. Generally, however, Grey ignored Merivale.
The only exception concerned the land question in the Orange River 
Sovereignty in 18^8.^
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At this time Lord Grey and Sir Harry Smith were mainly concerned
7
with the Boers* movements and the possibility of a war with Africans.
In his proclamation announcing annexation Smith had omitted any
reference to the legal status of Africans. Boers were to become
British subjects and to enjoy all the rights and responsibilities
of British rule. The "native tribes", however, were to be left
"... to their own government subject only to the general protection
of Her Majesty." Merivale realized at once this position was
illegal and ambiguous. Boers were supposedly free and independent
British subjects but Africans were still "distinct and independent
tribes" despite owning the land which Smith had placed under British
sovereignty. In Merivale’s draft despatch to Smith he pointed out
that this distinction was
•.• unknown to English law, and could not be established in 
a Possession of Her Majesty, unless, indeed, by Legislative 
measures expressly taken for the purpose. Wherever Her 
Majesty's Sovereignty is proclaimed, all inhabitants of the 
region over which it is proclaimed, become Her Subjects, and 
become, moreover, subject to English law, in the absence of 
regular laws of their own, unless special permission be made 
to exempt them from it. Nor is this rule without practical 
application and importance, since the difficulty arising from 
the collision between British Laws and Native Usage might 
immediately arise unless care were taken to prevent it.®
In order to overcome the legal difficulties and "to quiet land titles",
the best alternatives would be to make the Orange River Sovereignty
part of the Cape Colony, into a separate colony such as Natal or give
power to the governor "to constitute 'aboriginal districts', like that
9
given to the Governor of New Zealand." The then governor of New 
Zealand was in fact Sir George Grey, who, in 185^, was appointed
governor of Cape Colony.
The reason for the Colonial Office's decision to appoint Sir
George Grey became apparent in the years from l8*f8 to 185^* Both Sir
Harry Smith and Sir George Cathcart failed to deal satisfactorily
with the enormously complex problems which they encountered, as did
the Colonial Office. The consequence was the outbreak in 1850
of the Kaffir War which lasted for two y ears.^ This war cost the
British government almost one million pounds, led to the recall of Sir
Harry Smith and to the desire of the Colonial Office to withdraw
from Boer territories. The Sand River Convention in 1852 gave the
Boers independence in return for their promise not to supply arms or
ammunition or make treaties with Africans. The British government
retained the rights of free trade and exploration in their former
territory and limited themselves to the regions south of the Vaal River
Until 185^ the Colonial Office was satisfied with a policy of "indirect
11
rule" as implemented by the new governor, Sir George Cathcart.
During the Kaffir War Grey handled the process of decision-making* 
Merivale was merely an observer of the War but it taught him respect 
for the power of the "savage people" and it also provided him with 
"... a fresh illustration of the tendency of the Protectorate system
13at a certain point, viz. to alienate the Chiefs The latter
had been stirred to action, he believed, by the influence of mission**- 
aries who acted as "political advisers and agents", "half by circum­
stances and half by choice This tendency for missionaries to
interfere in southern African affairs made decisions more complex 
for both the Colonial Office and the governors. Merivale wavered 
between blaming African leaders and European missionaries for such 
conflicts. In the Kaffir War he went so far as to hold missionaries
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responsible "for the conduct of those chiefs, and the consequences". 
Merivale1s allegation was later substantiated by the investigation 
conducted by Sir George Russell Clerk who had been appointed special 
commissioner to settle claims for compensation in the Orange River 
Territory. The new Secretary of State for the Colonies, the inex­
perienced Sir John Pakington, entirely approved Merivale1s despatch.^
Lack of initiative by Pakington, the hesitancy of Sir George 
Cathcart to act without definite orders from the Colonial Office and . 
"confused communications" made it impossible for the British to imple­
ment the Sand River Convention until June 1852. Execution of the policy 
of withdrawal was finally given to Sir George Russell Clerk. Merivale
completely supported Clerk in his task of settling claims for compen-
15sation from Boers in the Orange River Territory. Despite having
reached a settlement with the Boers, the Colonial Office was unable to
reduce the causes of conflict between Africans and Boers. No treaty had
been signed and even if it had been, Merivale lamented, "experience" had
X6revealed clearly "that Treaties with the Kaffirs are of no avail." The 
British had only gained a more compact northern border to defend and the 
important issue of land policy and its implementation still remained to be 
solved.
Meanwhile Sir George Cathcart proposed to set up a land commission to 
ensure the occupation of land on the northeast frontier of the Cape Colony, 
lands belonging to the "Tambookie tribe". Of even greater importance was 
his proposal which would "...sever all the territory of British Kaffraria 
lying north of the Amatole mountains from B. Kaffraria and annex it to the 
Cape Colony -- peopling it with European settlers. This is so contrary 
to the policy originally pursued, and if I am not mistaken to that which
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17Gov. Cathcart has himself hitherto recommended, that it requires notice ...."
No sooner had the Colonial Office finished one war and decided on a policy 
of financial retrenchment and territorial containment it was confronted with 
another proposal for expansion into the interior. Despite its knowledge 
and experience of the complex problems confronting southern Africa, the 
Colonial Office soon found itself considering new panaceas formulated by 
Cathcart*s successor, Sir George Grey, who arrived in the Cape Colony in 
December 1854.
Impressed by Sir George Grey's systematic, personal and highly
paternalistic native policy in New Zealand after the Maori Wars in the
1840's, the Colonial Office hoped Grey would produce the same results in
southern Africa. Despite being warned by the experienced and able Sir
George Russell Clerk, of the "snare and delusion" of attempting to
"extend British influence among the Border Tribes outside the Cape 
18Colony", the Colonial Office put its trust in Sir George Grey and his 
policy of amalgamation. It was persuaded by Grey's promise to amal­
gamate Africans and move them into the. Cape Colony and thereby end costly 
wars in the interior. The buffer zone, which the Colonial Office had 
established on the northern frontier, was also to be removed. The only 
request Grey made was a monetary one and he stated he would need financial 
help only until 1857. The choice, he declared, was obvious, spend money 
now and trust in his policy or be confronted with long and costly wars in
the future. The Colonial Office relented and reversed its policy of con-
*. 19 taxnment.
Merivale and other members of the Colonial Office supported Grey, but 
immediately upon receiving the first despatch in which Grey reported his 
meeting with the "Gaika tribes" Merivale was sceptical. Sir George Barrow
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asked Merivale if "the despatch was satisfactory". By 1855 there had been 
so many failures to implement these policies that Merivale responded pessimis­
tically: "I hope so, but 'more land' was as usual the demand, & the
20
Governor only postponed it." He still believed that a consistent land 
policy which was rigorously implemented was needed in order to avoid con­
flict. He took the demands of the "Gaika tribes" seriously. Nevertheless 
he supported Grey's plan to employ Africans on public works, in agriculture 
and to remove them to new "locations" largely because of Grey's previous 
"success" with the Maori in New Zealand. It also accorded with
his own view of amalgamation as argued in his Lectures in 1841, except
21that miscegenation was never considered.
After 1854 the alienation of African land and labour increased 
under Sir George Grey and his policies were supported by Merivale and 
the Colonial Office. The most important event which made the scheme
of amalgamation possible was the cattle-killing by Bantu-speaking peoples
in British Kaffraria in 1856-1857. They had responded to a messianic
prophecy, killed their cattle and then, when fulfilment failed, they were
reduced to starvation. Despite Grey's attempts to help, these people
were reduced from a population of approximately 105,000 to less than
40,000 within one year. Those who did not die were relocated in the Cape
Colony. Grey did not have to use force in order to amalgamate them but
22
he gained the end for which he had planned.
At the same time, however, the Colonial Office, taking Grey at his 
word, reduced its expenditures in the Cape Colony. Grey found himself 
unable to implement his plans for the "civilization" and improvement of 
Africans who were not living in the Cape Colony. To make matters worse 
there was a threat of war between Basuto and Boers in the newly-created
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Orange Free State. Merivale and the Colonial Office hoped that Grey would not
"enter into offensive or defensive alliance" with the Boers and destroy the
23agreements promulgated in the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions.
On January 19, 1857 Merivale advised Henry Labouchere on the rationale of 
British policy toward Africans and Boers in the Transvaal and the Orange 
Free State:
... the great object was to get rid as soon as might be [[possible] 
of the enormous burden of British military protection. Hence­
forward Kaffre wars, if such there were, must be colonial, not 
British. The colonial frontier must therefore be strengthened 
by the union of the White, whether living under British authority 
or in dependent governments. And the Blacks must feel that in 
provoking one they were ensuring the discountenance, if not the 
active hostility, of all -- that they had nothing to expect from 
rivalry or difference of policy between their white neighbours or 
rulers.
Of course it was impossible not to foresee possible 
injustice to natives from such stipulations: but, I think, it
was considered to shrink from them on this account would be to 
exercise over scrupulousness, & look farther into the con­
tingent future than our real duty required.
Merivale believed the primary British interest was to maintain the Cape
Colony for strategic purposes, not to amalgamate or "civilize" Africans,
much less become entangled in wars between the latter and the Boers.
Britain did not want, as Merivale argued in 1857, to become the "constant
and unwillingly ally of the Orange and Trans Vaal Republics", He warned
Labouchere, that Sir George Grey's policy of amalgamation was very
different from that of the Colonial Office. Grey was governing the
"Kaffres" directly and "comparatively independent of the Cape Parliament",
moreover he was involving the British government, with a force of approxi-
24
mately 8,000 men, in a military relationship with the "Kaffres". The 
consequences of this policy became apparent within a few months. By then, 
conscious of Merivale's repeated warnings, the demands of the Treasury for 
economy and Grey's attempts at amalgamation,the Colonial Office had become
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increasingly aware! of the problems associated with British "native" policy
25
in southern Africa,
In 1857 his budget, cut from & 40,000 to >£ 20,000, Grey’s policy of
amalgamation was stalled. Further disputes concerning his faulty
accounting methods and his defiance of the Colonial Office's order not
to develop a federation for southern Africa led directly to his recall.
Grey wanted to federate the Orange Free State and the Transvaal republic
with the Cape Colony and Natal. This policy was in direct contradiction
to British policy since 1852. Merivale was aware of what the consequences
would likely be. Federation of southern Africa meant that, as was the
case in British North America, Colonial Office control over "native"
policy would be handed over to the white settlers. Grey was recalled
because he had disobeyed direct orders not to discuss federation without
instructions from London. Merivale had a large role to play in Grey's
recall because he drew attention, in his minutes on Grey's despatches,
26
to discrepancies between Grey's actions and Colonial Office policy.
In the late 1850's the debate between Grey and the Colonial Office 
over federation was paralleled by a conflict concerning amalgamation, 
especially the missionaries' role in this process. In 1841 Merivale had 
written that their work was essential; in the 1850's he recognized 
missionaries were contributing to territorial expansion and conflict 
in southern Africa. He minuted to his colleagues that Grey "...cannot 
mean that, after having constituted them, we must keep them in perpetual 
tutelage, or until all those questions are 'adjusted' which all experience 
shews never can be adjusted so long as the adjustment is to be by the 
efforts and at the expense of a third party. It is however unfortunate 
that a determined line of policy should be entrusted to the conduct of
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an officer who thoroughly disapproves of it," In 1858 Grey reported
conflict between Boers and Africans in the Orange Free State but he did 
28
not intervene. Merivale and the Colonial Office were relieved at this
news. It would, however, be very different if Grey formed a federation
because the treaties signed in 1852 and 1854 would end and the British
would once again become directly responsible for any wars in southern 
29
Africa. In 1859 upon receiving a despatch from Grey, reporting that
Adam Kok, a leader of the Griqua, was selling his peoples1 land to
Boers, Merivale incorrectly observed "... that Captain Adam Kok is a
mere imposter and lay-figure, kept up by certain missionaries & others
for the purpose of working on the British government through supposed
faith in treaties." As in British North America, Merivale distrusted
missionaries because he was very much aware of their pervasive influence
over native peoples. As a consequence the Colonial Office did nothing
30
to prevent the alienation of Griqua land.
In 1859 Boers began to attack African villages and "mission stations"
in the Transvaal Republic. The Colonial Office refused to do anything
to help these British subjects because they were afraid they might
become involved in yet another costly war. As Merivale declared a few
months earlier, and he found support from others in the Colonial
Office, the Church of England was nothing in "the heart of Africa" with-
31out the "flag of England". In this particular case the "flag of
England" would not come to the aid of the missionaries. It would be an
open question "whether government would embark in a war in the heart
of Africa on account of Mr. Moffat & Dr. Livingstone,..." and "...happily,
32
on which there is no occasion to decide now." When, the attacks con­
tinued Merivale suggested that the Colonial Office advise Grey that the
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treaty with the Trans Vaal Republic was "violated, and that it is
consequently the intention of the British government to allow the supply
. . 33
of ammunition to the natives,..." It was not a very satisfactory
solution for the missionaries or Africans because it would draw them
into greater conflict with Boers without direct military support
from the British government.
The Colonial Office failed to develop a consistent and firm
"native" policy in the Cape Colony in the 1 85 0*s. The dominating
motive was economic, not humanitarian, specifically the desire to reduce
imperial expenditure in the colony, as was the case in most of the
British North American colonies. Merivale did not try to implement
the scheme of amalgamation as outlined in his Lectures in 18^1 but, up
to a certain point, he did support Sir George Grey's plan. Grey and
the Colonial Office, often at odds with one another, failed to develop
a satisfactory "native" policy for the Cape Colony and they also did
much in the long term to bring about the alienation of African land and
labour. The complexity of these problems in southern Africa, however,
made it very difficult for the Colonial Office to understand the
34
problems much less solve them.
In Natal British imperial administrators had a much better chance
to develop a "native" policy. Natal had more economic potential with
its staple crop of cotton than did the Cape Colony and the Colonial
Office could justify more expenditure for all aspects of its development.
There was more co-operation between Merivale, who was in almost
complete charge of the colony in the Colonial Office after 1852, the
colonial governors and the Commissioner for Native Affairs, Theophilius 
35Shepstone. Unfortunately for Africans the consequences were not
much better. By i860 effective control over African land and labour 
was in the hands of the white settlers. All that remained from 
alienation of African land and labour was a fund derived from the hut 
tax which could be used by white settlers to "improve" the material 
development of the colony.
Natal, in the late l8k0's and throughout the l850's, was the
colony in which Merivale seriously attempted to develop a policy of
amalgamation. Since 18^3* when Natal first became part of the British
Empire, Shepstone's policy of insulation had been adopted. Shepstone
wanted to move Africans to separate "locations", a system similar to
that developed in Canada in the l830's, then "civilize" them gradually.
This policy would be implemented by means of indirect rule, specifically
by Shepstone working with African leaders. The colonial governor from
1850 to l855i Benjamin Pine, wanted to replace Shepstone's method by
immediately introducing amalgamation in order to maintain a consistent
"native" policy for southern Africa. The reserves would be phased out
and Africans would be relocated in villages close to white settlements.
They would then amalgamate and, most important of all, become labourers
for white settlers. The Colonial Office agreed with Pine because it
wanted to introduce a plantation economy based on cotton and sugar and
thereby develop Natal's material existence. Merivale was critical of
both insulation and amalgamation as policies for Natal primarily because
he believed that they did not relate to the life of Africans nor would
these policies protect or ameliorate their condition. In 18^7$ k®
opposed relocation of Africans because, in Barrow's words, it was a
"bold if not barbarous measure" especially if, as Merivale pointed out,
36
it was done forcibly.
In the same year Lord Grey proposed to tax the Zulu, a sub­
group of the Nguni people, and the proceeds would be set aside
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for their development. Merivale based his objections to this hut tax
upon incorrect ethnological premises:
4) The plan of direct taxation of the natives is ... not 
founded on any suggestion of the authorities at Natal, but 
suggested from hence to them. In framing all such plans, 
it has often occurred to me that besides the dislike to 
taxation common to savages & civilized people, an additional 
difficulty arises from their inability to comprehend 
individual liability to taxation as we understand it'. "Where 
the "tribal system" as Mr. Shepstone calls it is very strong 
there is often scarcely any notion of "property at all, 
among the inferior members of the tribe, except in such 
articles as they have appropriated by labour; dress, weapons, 
etc. The land is the tribe's & the cattle are the tribe's, 
and each member has only the usufruct according to the usages 
of his tribe.
Now in Natal there seem at present to be a number of 
tribes -- strongly organized in all probability as is generally 
the case in South Africa -- and also a great number of natives 
in respect to whom the old tribe organization has been broken 
up by emigrations and, who hang only loosely on the Chiefs. It 
might perhaps be worth considering, whether, in the case of the 
tribes inhabiting definite locations, the tax might not be 
imposed, not on individuals but on the tribe: the Chief being
the person answerable, & the property of the tribe the fund 
answerable. I suspect this sort of "tribute" would be more 
suitable to the notions of many savage races than a direct 
tax on individuals. Of course such an idea could only be 
thrown out for men like Mr. Shepstone to consider. It may 
be, he would think it too great a recognition of the power 
of the Chief,^^ut it may also be the least in a choice of 
difficulties.
Grey took Merivale's advice and partially changed the draft despatch to 
39Natal. Shepstone adopted Merivale's suggestion probably because he
thoughtit would not disturb his relationship with the chiefs and the
tribes. The result was the development of a hybrid and contradictory
"native" policy in Natal.
With this advice from the Colonial Office Africans were "relocated"
40
without too much expense and little conflict. The hut tax was collected,
"by tribe", and they were allowed to pay in cattle rather than in European 
41
currency. In the first year Shepstone reported that he had collected over
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Jl 8j831 by means of the hut tax at an expenditure of only/^514. Merivale
and Grey believed that they had been successful and recommended
a "permanent addition" be made to Shepstone’s income collected from the 
42
hut tax fund. Early in 1851 they promoted him but did not transfer
him to another colony because he was so valuable in Natal. Shepstone
was now the second most important official in the colony, the first was the
43new Lieutenant-Governor, Benjamin Pine. Pine, jealous of Shepstone’s
influence and success, quarrelled with him largely over the use to which
they would put the hut tax revenue.
Shepstone, supporting the white settlers, believed the revenue
should be used to improve "roads and other public works" in the colony
as well as to develop, as had been originally hoped, the condition of
the "natives". Pine thought it should be used for "native purposes only".
Involved in the Kaffir War at the same time, Merivale emphasized to Lord
Grey the "critical" nature of the problem. The Colonial Office had to
44make sure the Zulu did not join the conflict. In 1851 the conflict 
between Pine and Shepstone became an open one. Pine demanded that he be­
come solely responsible for "native" affairs in Natal and control the 
Zulu indirectly by a system of magistrates rather than directly through 
Shepstone himself. Merivale recognized the question was one which was 
"fundamental fto]) ... the future government of the natives".
After a most perceptive analysis of the two schemes Merivale supported 
Shepstone and direct rule because his policy of insulation had worked.
Pine wanted to begin the experiment of "gradual amalgamation" now that the 
Zulu were safely in their new "locations". He wanted to start immediately 
to reduce substantially the amount of land at each "location". The 
"natives" would then "...be taught to cultivate land individually &
reclaimed from pastoral life: they will also (I cannot comprehend
why, unless because their means of subsistence will be diminished) be­
come more ready to serve the whites as agricultural labourers.11 Meri­
vale regarded this development with "considerable apprehension" 
especially because of its "popularity with the Whites" and its ten­
dency to foster the alienation of Zulu land and labour. "Dispossession 
of the land of the "natives" for a second time "... which the natives 
dread beyond everything else" would, both Shepstone and Merivale 
agreed, cause a great amount of social and economic disruption in Natal 
Therefore, Merivale concluded, that he favoured insulation because 
amalgamation "...requires one of two things: either the constant 
employment of a military force sufficiently large to overawe: or, to 
leave the Whites to govern & defend themselves." Merivale and Shep­
stone were overruled when Lord Grey sent out a draft despatch approving
of amalgamation because he believed the power of the "native chiefs"
45
must be "broken".
Alienation of Zulu land and labour continued until i860. Pine
dispossessed the Zulu of their land and broke up the tribal structure
while attempting to turn them into "good" labourers. The hut tax was
used more and more to finance projects for white settlers. Merivale
justified this change because there was a large surplus by 18^2 and
because of the rise in administrative costs incurred by the "necessity
of ruling 100,000 natives." Clearly the plan to tax the "natives"
in order to "improve" their social and economic conditions was now
being used to develop a plantation economy at the expense of the 
46"natives". In May 1852 Merivale minuted to Lord Desart, the 
parliamentary undersecretary, that Shepstone's system of insulation was 
at an end, the locations had been broken up and amalgamation would be
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inevitable. As a safeguard he suggested, and it was approved by the new
Secretary of State for the Colonies, that two special commissioners be sent
48to Natal to report on the success of Pine's endeavours.
The next demand of the white settlers was that the revenue from the
hut tax should be used only for their own purposes. In April 1852 Merivale
received a request from the Bishop of Cape Town to provide missionary
education for the Zulu in Natal since Pine had apparently neglected this
necessary step in amalgamation. Merivale supported the application for
£3,000 from the hut tax revenue and it was approved by Sir John Pakington.^
The consequences revealed the helplessness of the Colonial Office to
develop a consistent and firm "native" policy. By June 1853 the
acting governor, Major Preston, reported the collapse of this scheme
because of "a dissatisfied Community". By 1853 Merivale believed the
usefulness of the hut tax was over:
I own that it is with regret I see the little effort made to 
secure this fund to its proper purposes & that it seems likely 
to be chiefly absorbed in the current expenses of the Natal 
government, including the maintenance of a civil establishment 
which seems to me beyond its real wants. Of course this is not 
wholly so: the maintenance of the resident magistrate, for
instance, is an item fairly chargeable on what is raised from the 
natives: but much appears merely to go into the general revenue.
The claim of certain of the colonists to have this treated as 
their own income raised by taxes among themselves, must I think 
be unavoidably over ruled even in the event of representative 
institutions being granted: &^hen 100,000 taxpayers will 
assuredly not be represented.
One year later his fears were confirmed when it was reported that out of
a total o f £36,000 collected from the Zulu onlyjj 9,000 had been spent for 
51their welfare.
In 1854 the special commissioner made his report to the Colonial Office. 
Pine was summoned to London to argue his case and Shepstone submitted an­
other report. Merivale considered all the views and then submitted his
recommendations to the Duke of Newcastle.
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The three reports, Merivale minuted accurately, agreed that the Zulu 
should be removed from Natal "...into the unclaimed territory which is 
bounded by the Orange River Territory to the North-west: Natal to the
North-east: British Kaffraria to the South-west: and the Ocean to the
South-east." The manner in which the Zulu should be governed remained 
the greatest problem. Shepstone wanted to govern the Zulu "under his own 
personal superintendence" and set up a "kind of consular or agency post 
among them." Pine on the other hand, wished to break up the "locations" 
altogether and amalgamate the Zulu which would "bring them into the 
relation of servants to Europeans." Merivale regarded Major Charles 
Owen's proposals as not "very practical" and "a complete settler's report". 
Reduction of the "upset price of land", with the purpose of tempting more 
Boers to settle in Natal, would only increase land speculation and more­
over the Boers would not submit to compulsory military service. Raising 
the hut tax would only cause more discontent among the Zulu, Owen's 
proposal of self-government for the white settlers would end British* 
control over the hut tax and "native" affairs in the colony. Merivale 
had no solution because he was aware that the whole problem was simply too 
complex:
It is disheartening to be able to offer little but criticism 
on the plans of these able men -- but in the anomalous con­
dition of things presented by a community of 5 or 6,000 whites 
with little prospect of increase, confronted with 120,000 all 
but independent savages, I see little to be done but to main­
tain, as well as we may, the existing state of things and trust 
to the development of a better one.
He could only suggest a compromise and the eventual abandonment of the
52
problem to the white settlers and the Zulu.
iroin l855 to i860 in Natal the white settlers gradually increased
their control over the Zulu. In 1855 "compulsory service" by "native"
53
labourers was introduced.^ In 1856 Sir George Grey proposed the
introduction of "representative institutions" for the white settlers
and it was approved despite Merivale’s objection. The "presence of
100,000 natives", he argued again, was a "formidable" one. Grey
also urged the introduction of "Coolies" into Natal to work on the
sugar estates and the immediate amalgamation of the Zulu. In l8f>7,
affected by this social and economic disruption, a civil war broke out
among the Zulu. Approximately 4,000 refugees entered Natal and the
acting lieutenant governor received the approval of the Colonial
Office to use these people as "registered labourers" for three years
on the sugar estates. Part of the large revenue from the hut tax was
57now given to the white settlers. By this time, with their social
organization disintegrated, their land and labour alienated, the
Zulu were in a perilous condition.
Shepstone's policy of insulation had been changed beyond recognition
Opposed to amalgamation and its consequences, Shepstone wrote a long
vindictive letter to the Secretary of State in 1 85 8. Merivale,
however, dismissed it because he believed Shepstone1s complaints were
caused by a difference of "personality" between Sir George Grey and
Shepstone. The Colonial Office now supported Grey, amalgamation, and
the white settlers but the Office *s problems in Natal were far from over.
In 1 8 5 8 , after turning down the requests of the Natal legis—
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lature to control the hut tax revenue, the Colonial Office found 
itself in direct conflict with the white settlers. The legislature 
"stopped supplies" which were vital to the administration of the
colony. Merivale knew the colonists relied upon British military 
power to protect them in case of war with the Zulu. Therefore he told 
the Secretary of State, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, to tell the new 
governor, John Scott, to warn the legislature that if it continued 
its actions the British government would withdraw all military 
s u p p o r t I n  this case the Office was successful in preventing
6tthe white settlers from obtaining complete control over the hut tax.
Merivale realized the conflict was not over but he was no longer
burdened with this question because he was transferred to the India
Office in the spring of i860. In Natal the Colonial Office had
been only partially successful in retaining control over "native"
62
affairs. The vacillation between the policies of insulation and 
amalgamation had, however, caused a great amount of social and economic 
disruption among the Zulu.
In l86l Merivale published the second edition of his Lectures with 
numerous additional notes and appendices which revised his original 
ideas and judged his and the Colonial Office's policy with regard to 
the "native" question. The idealism and facile solutions of l84l 
were no longer apparent. In l84l he had hoped amalgamation would both 
improve, protect and help to integrate the native peoples into the 
British Empire. In l86l he believed it had been a "success" mainly 
in southern Africa and only with regard to labour. The consequences of 
the "strange collapse of the Caffre power, under the influence of 
scarcity and superstition", had been important in creating a situation 
in which "... great numbers of natives appear to have taken voluntary 
service under the settlers, and to have performed it with reasonable 
steadiness." Africans were to be "civilized" and "improved" until 
they became landless and eventually a working class in southern
63Africa. J Merivale had done much, both as a commentator and as an
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administrator, to establish the "broad principle that the natives must, for 
their own protection, be placed in a situation of acknowledged inferiority, 
and consequently of tutelage."
The Colonial Office’s policy of amalgamation had largely been one of 
failure. In British North America there had been vacillation from amal­
gamation to insulation. It had failed to prevent alienation of land 
and labour because, as Merivale argued cogently, of the
...perpetual compromises between principle and immediate 
exigency. Such compromises are incidental to constitutional 
government. We are accustomed to them: there is something
in them congenial to our national character, as well as 
accommodated to our institutions; and, on the whole, we may 
reasonably doubt whether the world is not better managed by 
means of them rather than through the severe application of 
principles. But, unfortunately, in the special subject before
us, the uncertainty created by such compromises is a greater
evil than even errors of principle.
Such "greater evil" had resulted in the " Caff re" and Maori wars in the
1850’s and the I860’s. Merivale was aware of the problems caused by the
clash between white settlers and the native peoples but he had no solutions
other than the early and mid-Victorian liberal panaceas of insulation and
amalgamation.
Metropolitan and colonial control had both proved to be unsatisfactory. 
As Merivale put it when "...all allowances are made, it cannot be doubted
that a consistent and regulated system of management of the natives by the
home executive would be better, as regards justice towards the natives, 
than the arbitrary will of the settlers. Unfortunately, no such system 
has ever been established by us, or seriously attempted." Rather pessi­
mistically Merivale believed that little progress had been made and 
"...these feeble survivors of an obsolete world seem to be passing on, with
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at least a fair protection from injustice and oppression, towards 
that extinction which we have become accustomed to regard as the 
melancholy termination of the prospect.”
Merivale*s experience with "native” affairs at the Colonial 
Office made him aware of the essential contradictions inherent in 
British imperial policy. The liberal panaceas of insulation and 
amalgamation propounded by Merivale and the Colonial Office conflicted 
with the demands of white settlers for material development. The 
"native" question in both British North America and southern Africa 
was exacerbated by the alienation of the land and labour of the 
native peoples and the inadequacy of the Colonial Office*s land policy 
and labour theory. The consequence was the expansion of the British 
Empire and, at the same time, "subjugating" what Merivale and other 
Europeans regarded as "inferior races*1. It also led to "frontier 
wars" and the indiscriminate destruction of non-European civilizations. 
It was extremely ironic that the failure of the Colonial Office's 
"native policy'* was paralleled by its inability to develop the 
material existence of new colonies in British North America and 
southern Africa. Merivale was even less successful in his dealings 
with the Hudson's Bay Company in the Pacific Northwest and Rupert's 
Land.
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Chapter 8: The Hudson’s Bay Company in the Pacific
Northwest and Rupert’s Land, l8*f7-l860
By i860 Merivale regarded the Colonial Office’s policies on
free trade and the ’’native question” as failures and responsible
government as only a qualified success. Adequate knowledge of
imperial problems was not sufficient to solve them. Merivale was
not able to achieve the goals which he had written about in his
Lectures in l8*fl because he did not have the power nor the financial
and administrative resources at the Colonial Office. When dealing
with the Hudson's Bay Company in the Pacific Northwest and Rupert’s
Land, Merivale was confronted with grave difficulties. There was no
analysis of the Hudson’s Bay Company or its activities in his Lectures
largely because the regions under its control were not by his definition
colonies. The same was true for India and the East India Company.
By his own admission he also lacked geographical knowledge of the
territories under the control of the Company. Moreover, his advocacy
of the doctrines of free trade made him averse to the monopolies
possessed by chartered companies but there is no indication in his
writings before l8*f7 that he had thought of an alternative to the rule
1
of the Hudson's Bay Company. His ambivalence was compounded because 
he argued in the l8*f0's that the Company's territories in the Pacific 
Northwest and Rupert's Land were the last areas in the world which 
were suitable for the development of white settlement colonies. By 
i860, however, after dealing with the Company, Merivale conceded that 
he still had no satisfactory solution to the problem. Although he had 
contributed to the creation of two new colonies they were neither
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prosperous nor thriving. Clearly he and his colleagues in Downing
Street had failed to combine the imperial interests of trade and
settlement in the Pacific Northwest and Rupert’s Land.
From 18^7 to i860 Merivale had a significant role as the Colonial
Office's liaison with the Hudson’s Bay Company's officials in London.
He became aware of the great potential of both regions for the British
Empire but was almost completely ineffectual in his attempts to
reduce the power of the Company. Nevertheless the British government
became increasingly responsible for the Hudson's Bay Company's
territories in the 1850's because, ironically, the Company's officials,
particularly George Simpson and Edward (Bear) Ellice, decided it
was time to pull out of these regions which were becoming economic 
2
liabilities. Merivale was no match for these veterans of the fur 
trade. By i860 Merivale had adopted many of their arguments and 
with only one exception, the non-renewal of the Company's licence of 
exclusive trade west of the Rockies in 1859* had in effect become a 
creature of the Company. It proved to be an incongruous situation. 
Merivale, an advocate of free trade, spent a great deal of his time in 
Downing Street propping up the declining monopoly of a chartered 
company. Except for his tenure at the India Office it was one of the 
most significant failures of his administrative career.
In the early l8*f0' s Merivale had written that the Pacific 
Northwest was one of the last regions in the world which had potential 
for colonization by white settlers. In addition to a temperate 
climate the area was relatively undeveloped and populated only by 
Indians and a few employees of the Hudson's Bay Company. He foresaw
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no conflict between trade and settlement. Relying primarily on the
observations of Sir Charles Lyell, the British geologist, Merivale
was enthusiastic about its economic potential. The only drawback
he could foresee which might deter British expansion was the
increasing influence of the United States. Presaging one of his
arguments at the Colonial Office he wrote that the only counterweight
to the American presence was that of the "remarkable Society”.
Admittedly the Hudson's Bay Company was "not very responsible to
either State" but it was powerful and moreover had "all the instincts
and habits" which were "thoroughly British and anti-American". He
concluded that the Pacific Northwest was ready for settlement by 
3
white settlers.
In l8V7 in another article in the Edinburgh Review Merivale 
wrote that the British presence on Vancouver Island should be 
augmented to counter the influx of American traders. His primary 
concern, at least ostensibly, was to bring law and order to the 
Island. He had always argued that the "chief weakness" of American 
expansion into the western interior of the North American continent 
was its uncontrolled response to the environment: "The tendency of
her agricultural classes to spread and scatter themselves over an 
enormous extent of territory, prevents the rise of cities, the growth
of habits of order and respect for law— the progress, in short, of
L
civilization." The impact of changes in technology and transportation 
had promoted this expansion. American "pedlars", "merchants" and 
"great capitalists" were taking full advantage of the opening of roads, 
canals, post offices, stage coach routes, railway lines and the 
telegraph to expand the republic westwards. By comparison, Merivale
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argued, the British government and the Hudson’s Bay Company were 
"poorer competitors".-' Unlike other imperial commentators Merivale 
was able to do more than simply warn the British public of this 
situation for, in the same year, he was appointed to a position of 
responsibility at the Colonial Office.
In the late l8*+0's the economic situation of the Hudson's 
Bay Company in the Pacific Northwest was precarious. Competition from 
American traders, the decline in the quantity and quality of the 
fur-bearing animals and the strength and independence of the various 
Amerindian groups made the Company willing to give up its establish­
ments.^ Vancouver Island was, however, valuable to the British 
government because of its strategic location. In the 1850*s the 
Royal Navy would begin to guard the multitudinous approaches to
New Caledonia. The British government hoped that the presence of
7
the Royal Navy would help to contain American expansion. As far as 
the Company was concerned one of the most pov/erful arguments in its 
decision to remain in the region was provided by George Simpson 
before the Colonial Office decided to give the Company a charter of 
grant to Vancouver Island. Simpson noted that the coal which had 
been discovered on the Island would be able to provide large 
quantities of fuel for the Company's ships trading in the Pacific.
In any event he argued that the Company should keep the Island because 
"... the Indian trade & fishery would go far to defray the expenses 
of the post [Fort Victoria^ ".^ Accepting Simpson's rationale the 
Company's officials in London decided that it had very little to 
lose if it retained Vancouver Island.
The problem for the Colonial Office was very different. James
Stephen was opposed to placing the British government in the hands
9 'of the Hudson’s Bay Company. Another Liberal and free trader, 
William Gladstone, Lord Grey’s predecessor, spoke against the 
charter of grant in the House of Commons but in vain. With Stephen* 
retirement in October 18^7, Grey went ahead with his plan to combine 
the imperial interests of trade and settlement on Vancouver Island. 
Inexperienced and obedient to his new political master, Merivale 
drafted the terms of the agreement. He approved of the charter of 
grant in spite of his arguments for free trade six years previously. 
By the terms agreed upon the Company was made ’’unfettered11 from 
imperial controls except for the Island’s ’’Civil Government” which 
would be the responsibility of the Colonial Office’s representative, 
Richard Blanshard, who became the first governor of Vancouver Island 
A few months later problems arose which began to cast doubt on 
the wisdom of this alliance between the Colonial Office and the 
Hudson’s Bay Company. Simpson reported to his superiors that an 
Indian massacre had occurred near V/alla V/alia on the Columbia River. 
Despite the fact that the Company had been on friendly terms with 
these Indians, the Company lent the American government eighteen 
hundred dollars to help American authorities prosecute the war which 
ensued. Simpson's major fear was that the Company’s trade might be 
disrupted and also that two trading posts would have to be abandoned 
if the hostilities were, as he put it, ’’protracted". He suggested 
that the Company ask the Colonial Office for permission to request 
the Admiralty to send a warship to Vancouver Island in case the war
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spread to British territory. Such a vessel would, he hoped, be able
to return "occasionally” to protect the interests of the "honourable
Company" against its "disorderly neighbours". The Admiralty sent a
warship but it was not stationed permanently at Fort Victoria until
the Company moved its headquarters from Fort Vancouver to Vancouver
Island. Quite naturally the British government objected to paying for
the protection of the interests of a commercial company in American
t e r r i t o r y . I n  the Pacific Northwest the Colonial Office and the
Hudson's Bay Company were strange bedfellows under the blanket of
the British Empire.
Another problem ensued because of personal conflicts between
Richard Blanshard and James Douglas, the Company's chief factor on
Vancouver Island. Originally the Company had wanted to appoint
Douglas governor on a temporary basis and at least until the colony
attained economic self-sufficiency. The Colonial Office, because it
had been under attack in the House of Commons, appointed Blanshard to
12
counter the great influence of the Company. Blanshard was, however,
completely inexperienced. It was, in fact, his first and last
governorship. He disagreed with Douglas over important aspects of
Indian policy and he got very little support from the "colonists" who
13were either employees or former servants of the Company. Faced 
with many complaints about Blanshard's conduct the Colonial Office 
rather unfairly accepted the Company's point of view. Merivale 
concluded and Grey agreed that Blanshard would have to go: "Gov.
Blanshard should not make these charges against individuals without 
specifying names & facts, but the rupture between him and the Company's 
people ... is evidently such that no co-operation is to be expected
28^
between them....” In the fall of 1850, after the "miserable
affair" at Fort Rupert, Blanshard, in ill-health, was censured
by the Colonial Office and resigned his post. Grey accepted his
15resignation and appointed Douglas in his stead.
Douglas* relationship with the colonists and the Indians
was relatively peaceful. He set up the first Indian reserves on
the Island and they helped to reduce tension between the two groups
until the gold rush in 1858. Also of great importance was the high
personal regard of the Indians for Douglas and the threat of the
Royal Navy's gun-boats. The fact that there was a modicum of land
hunger was, however, crucial and it proved to be both an advantage
and a disadvantage.
Before i860 the Hudson's Bay Company was unable to attract a
significant number of British settlers and thereby fulfil the terms
of its charter of grant. Blanshard had reported that the Company was
entirely responsible for this state of affairs because it was
charging the colonists too high a price for provisions, agricultural
implements (which had to be imported from the Oregon Territory) and
land. The Company was confronted by two problems over which it had
little control. In 18^9 Grey, under the influence of Wakefield's
scheme of "systematic colonization", had set the price of land at
2 shillings to £1 an acre. In the Oregon Territory, only a few
miles to the south, there was plenty of fertile and cheap land 
17available. The other major difficulty was the location of Vancouver 
Island, which was a great distance from Britain and the other 
British North American colonies. The Company could not afford to
promote emigration on a large scale and the potential unassisted 
emigrant could always find a colony which was closer and cheaper. 
Given these economic circumstances the Company hoped to develop the 
Island's non-renewable resources. This idea also proved to be 
illusory when the coal mine at Fort Rupert failed because of labour 
problems. At the same time, learning of the discovery of gold in the 
Queen Charlotte Islands, the Company decided to establish a trading 
post to barter its goods to the Haida for gold. Revenue would also 
be obtained by licensing prospectors. These hopes came to nothing 
because insufficient quantities of gold were found. The few hundred 
adventurers who came soon left and the Queen Charlotte Islands were
once again the domain of the Haida, although they were now formally
l8
part of the British Empire.
In the Pacific Northwest there was clearly a conflict between 
the imperial objectives of trade and settlement and between the 
agencies responsible for developing the region, the Hudson's Bay 
Company and the Colonial Office. By 1852 both the Company and the 
Office were completely dissatisfied with the material development 
of the area, especially Vancouver Island. Moreover the Company was 
experiencing a decline in its trade in all of its territories. In 
London, Eden Colville, one of the Company's directors, concluded that 
this deteriorating situation was largely attributable to "... the 
farming operations carried on by the fur trade in Vancouver's T sic3  
Island, and the expenses incurred at Fort Rupert and elsewhere along 
the coast. It is clear that the business must be carried on for the 
future on some different principle or the loss in the Columbia will
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soon devour all the profits made in the rest of the country.”
Under Simpson’s guidance the Company gave up the idea of colonizing
19the Island and began to limit its activities to the fur trade.
In all these matters Merivale remained in the background, It
was not until Grey left in 1852 that he began to conduct negotiations
and act as the Colonial Office's liaison to the Company's officials
in London. He attempted to change the situation but to no avail.
Aware of the great impact of American land policies Merivale advised
the Secretary of State, Sir John Pakington, to lower the price per 
20acre of land. Recognizing the limitations of "systematic coloniza­
tion” on Vancouver Island, Merivale argued that ”... if it is really 
hoped that this island & this neighbourhood should be settled the 
'Wakefield' plan will hardly stand competition with the neighbouring 
American occupants— the H.B.C. are only bound by their grant to sell 
at a 'reasonable price' — the actual price of £1 an acre is only
fixed by themselves, though in full accordance with the understood
21views, at the time, of government.” By 1857 the Colonial Office,
witnessing the repeated failures of the Company, began to reconsider
22
its decision to let the Company develop the colony. Ironically by
this time the Company had also had enough of its "only bad adventure”
27)in North America. Both the Colonial Office and the Company wanted 
to change their relationship to the Island but prior commitments to 
each other made it difficult to do so.
In 1857, with reports of the discoveries of gold, the future 
of the region became bright once again. Merivale's reaction was an 
example of the supremacy of the economic motive for early and
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mid-Victorians who were involved in imperial affairs. The first
tangible evidence of gold immediately kindled his interest:
The region referred to is within the North West Territory, 
on which the H.B. Co. possess the exclusive right of trade, 
under licence, until l859» If the governor's request for the 
appointment of a British officer in that country were acceded 
to, there would be nothing unreasonable in saying that the 
H.B. Co. who at present derive the sole & exclusive advantage 
from that country, should pay him so long as their licence is 
maintained. But it is impossible to consider these questions 
in a mere insulated way. If any interference is to take place,
I believe it will be necessary to except this district out of 
the renewed licence: to form it into a colony: to incur the
cost of the necessary first establishments. If the extension 
of dominion is not worth our while, then the proposal must 
be rejected or at least adjourned until more definite ^
information of the real importance of the gold field reaches us.
By the spring of 185 8, with thousands of foreigners, chiefly Americans,
entering British territory, the Colonial Office and James Douglas
acted quickly to contain what they regarded as an invasion.
Merivale realized that he and his colleagues had no other
25alternative but to rely on James Douglas to maintain law and order.
The problem was complicated because, as Merivale explained, ”... the
H.B. Co. have under Act of Parlt. a licence for exclusive trade with
the Indians in that territory until May 18^9» hut they have no other
authority whatever. Douglas ... has no authority from the Crown
beyond Vancouver's jjsi<TJ Island 'and its dependencies' whatever that 
26may mean." The Office was forced to create a new crown colony 
on the mainland with Douglas governor of both colonies. This course 
of action was followed in August 1858. Once again the Office had 
decided on a policy of withdrawal, been confronted with an opportunity 
for economic advantage, had reversed its decision and was now once 
more bent on territorial expansion.
288
The Hudson's Bay Company also reacted to the gold discoveries
in a similar vein, with of course their own economic self-interest
uppermost in mind, George Simpson wrote to' his superiors in London
that the "... gold discoveries,., which seem to be extending rapidly
will open up a profitable market for the Company in that quarter,
in supplying the miners who it is expected will proceed thither in
large numbers this season." He asked the directors to send out more
27goods to meet this demand. As the Company soon discovered, the
gold rush which ensued meant that its licence would cease and the
charter of grant to Vancouver Island might not be renewed.
While the Company was discussing these new developments the
Colonial Office was preparing for the colonization of British Columbia.
Working closely with the Secretary of State, Sir Edward Bulwer
Lytton, Merivale acted too hastily in suggesting the immediate
development of the new colony. Once the gold rush ended in 18^9
many of the thousands of prospectors did not become farmers and
settle in the area but moved on to more promising gold-bearing 
28regions. Negotiations with the Company, however, dragged on for 
the next two years because, in Merivale's view, the Company "...cannot 
be forced by government to surrender their grant of the island, 
unless government is willing to purchase their trading plant as well 
as their land. But, on the other hand, if the terms prepared by 
the Company are thought exorbitant the Company cannot force government 
to take the island at all, and must continue their occupation."
A deadlock was created with the Hudson's Bay Company demanding too 
much for its establishments and the economy—minded Colonial Office
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29refusing to grant the Company's requests*
Throughout the gold rush Merivale and Lytton relied upon
30
Douglas for accurate information. In exchange the Office demanded
complete loyalty and forced Douglas to cut off his financial
31connections with the Hudson's Bay Company. The initial effect 
of the gold rush had been to create boom conditions at Fort
Victoria. Prices for food and other necessities rose rapidly and
32
land speculation was rife. For example the Colonial Office
received a petition from a group of speculators in San Francisco
inquiring whether they would be allowed to develop a town in the
vicinity of Fort Victoria. Merivale replied that the land which had
been purchased from the Amerindians belonged now to the Hudson's
Bay Company, not the British government. On the question of setting
up regulations to control the sale of land, he minuted:
No one will believe— till they have seen it proved— that 
"regulations" to check land jobbing are not worth the paper 
they are written on. Only one speculative writer ever had a 
clear perception of this— E.G. Wakefield, who was eminently 
also a practical man. He therefore, preached the doctrine 
that all land should be sold at so high a price (fixed or 
asset) as will render it rarely worth the "land jobbers" 
while to buy: and the proceeds spent in helping the bona fide 
purchaser to labour. All favourers of cheap and easy schemes, 
meant to look well rather than work, have abused him ever 
since. But the proof of his sound views is in the steady 
thriving of the only colony in which they were ever thoroughly 
adopted— -South Australia. However, fortunately or unfortunately, 
we cannot try his scheme in North America, with the States, the 
land of cheap sales & land jobbing close by.^3
The Colonial Office was unable to control the development of British
Columbia or Vancouver Island. If the Office drew up a set of land
regulations and ordered Douglas to implement them it knew that they
3^would be disregarded and land speculation would occur m  any event.
Within a month of the above minute Merivale’s worst fears 
concerning land speculation were confirmed. Employees of the 
Hudson's Bay Company were selling their lands to the newcomers at 
great profits while the British government or the colonial govern­
ments received virtually nothing for economic improvements in the 
35colony. Before the gold rush the Office had wanted to push 
the Company aside, now when the colonies were beginning to prosper 
it could not, at least until the charter of grant expired in May 1859*' 
Vacillating once again the Colonial Office became embroiled in another 
futile controversy with the Hudson's Bay Company.
As far as the Hudson's Bay Company was concerned the gold 
rush could not have come at a better time. Simpson suggested to 
the Company's directors that they should sell out while they were 
still able to get a good price for their establishments. Pessimisti­
cally he asserted that the "fair promises" brought by the discovery 
of gold "... will inevitably end in disappointment, owing to the very 
unsatisfactory state of the Company's business, arising from neglect,
mismanagement and injustice —  and by making them subservient to
37colonial interests." Clearly the objectives of the Company and the 
Colonial Office were contradictory.
Under Lytton's supervision the Colonial Office wanted to make 
British Columbia become wholly self-sufficient. In order to compete 
with the United States for settlers, however, the price per acre of 
land had to be lowered. Revenue was needed to build roads and other 
public works and to accomplish this objective Lytton decided to 
maintain the high prices for land and not allow pre-emption. By 
i860 with the gold rush all but over the Colonial Office had to pay
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the cost of administering two relatively poor colonies. The new
chief factor, Alexander G. Dallas, (Douglas' son-in-law) wrote to
Edward Ellice giving a striking portrait of the colonies in July 1859:
Both colonies are now very much brought to a standstill from 
want of a resident English population. There are heavy natural 
obstacles to be overcome 8c a liberal government is absolutely 
necessary. The roving classes from all parts of the Pacific 
will not be satisfied with ordinary wages, viz. $3 to $5 per 
day. A great drawback is our distance from the mother country. 
The route by Panama is now out of the question for the working 
man & family. By Cape Horn there is a stormy voyage of six 
months to be paid for 8c endured. Australia can easily be 
reached in three months. A comprehensive system of emigration, 
assisted by government in the shape of money or land, is the 
only means I think in which the Colony can be peopled, & 
attached to the Mother Country. The strong plea for asking
assistance from government in one shape or another, is, the vast
political importance to England, with English sympathies, in this 
connecting link between the Eastern & the Western world.
It is the most important position for a naval station, 
in the whole Pacific — looking to California on one side 
8c the Russian possessions in America 8c Asia on the other—  
to Japan, China 8c the eastern A r c h i p e l a g o . 3°
However, Merivale and Lytton's successor, the Duke of Newcastle,
refused to change their policy because they agreed with Douglas that
opening these colonies to "American squatters" should best be
avoided.^ They also could not countenance spending large amounts
of money to assist emigrants. The presence of the United States was
far more influential in affecting the future of these colonies than
any policy formulated in Downing Street by Merivale or his colleagues.
By i860 negotiations between the Company and the Colonial Office
concerning the former's posts on Vancouver Island had still not been
settled. An agreement was not concluded until 1867 when the Company
was paid & 5 7 ,500 which was much less than it had originally demanded.
In addition the Company was allowed to retain the land on and around
its trading posts. Merivale spent many futile hours trying to work
out the details of the compromise with the Company's officials in
ko
London. Nevertheless the Colonial Office's policies towards its
colonies in the Pacific Northwest had certainly been ineffective.
Based on this experience Merivale concluded that the British
government should never again put its faith in the ability of the
Hudson's Bay Company to act as a colonizing agency. Instead he
suggested that the British government should buy out the Company's
establishments especially the "... whole city of Victoria —  a place
destined, in reasonable probability, to be a very great & very
kl
speedy advance to opulence." He was much too optimistic because 
both colonies remained largely undeveloped and economically stagnant 
in the i860*s. In 1866 they were amalgamated and then, in 1871, 
British Columbia joined the Canadian Confederation when it received 
promises from the Canadian government of the building of a trans­
continental railroad. In the Pacific Northwest from 18^9 to i860 
Merivale and his colleagues placed themselves at the mercy of the 
Hudson's Bay Company by agreeing to the charter of grant. When the 
Company failed to colonize the Island the Colonial Office was in no 
position to change the situation. Nevertheless even this failure 
revealed clearly the significance of the economic motive for British 
imperialists in the raid-nineteenth century.
In Rupert's Land the Colonial Office's record in dealing with 
the Hudson's Bay Company was even more dismal than in the Pacific 
Northwest because the Company had a royal charter to the entire area. 
The only function of the Colonial Office was to act as guardian of 
the native peoples, to see that they were not exploited by the Company 
or private traders. Until the select parliamentary inquiry met and
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investigated the problems of Rupert's Land in l857> the Office 
believed that Rupert's Land was only suitable for trade rather than 
agricultural settlement. The only exception was the Red River 
colony, originally founded by Lord Selkirk in l8ll. The Company 
did nothing to dissuade the British government from this attitude.
After l857» when it was discovered that the southern parts of Rupert's 
Land were prime agricultural areas and colonization was possible, 
the mandarins in Downing Street still refused to take on the weighty 
responsibility of creating a new colony as it had done in the Pacific 
Northwest. In the Hudson's Bay Company territories Colonial Office 
policy was as inconsistent as it was ineffective.
In the l8*f0's and 1 85 0's the Hudson's Bay Company was adjusting
its operations to the changing social and economic conditions in
Rupert's Land. At the same time the Company was being barraged
by complaints about the manner in which it was conducting its affairs
with the Amerindian and Metis population in Rupert's Land in general
and in the Red River colony in particular. ^ Fearing adverse publicity
the directors in London relied on Edward Ellice to use n... his wide
and intimate associations with influential British politicians... to
extract concessions favourable to the Company or to defend its
interests against its enemies." The relationship between Ellice and
Merivale was therefore very important but there is no doubt that
Ellice had a great advantage because of his knowledge and experience
bk
with conditions in Rupert's Land.
In the late 18^0's the Hudson's Bay Company's monopoly was 
threatened by private traders in the Red River colony, the Metis,
29k
the "Country-Born" and Americans. In l8*t8 George Simpson warned
J.H. Pelly, one of the Company's directors, of this danger:
If licences be granted to settlers, the Company's exclusive 
rights of trade might be considered at an end, and a legalized 
• system of competition would be established by the Company, 
ruinous to their own interest; and, from what I know of the 
character of the trade, I feel satisfied that, if the system 
of licensing be introduced, the whole concern would be 
broken up within a period of ten years, as the business would 
not clear its expenses. Should the government urge any such 
licensing system, I should think the only safe course for the 
Company would be to surrender the charter to Government, if 
anything like a moderate compensation could be obtained, as 
the territory without the trade would, to the Company, be 
altogether useless.^
The Company's strategy was direct. If the licensing system was
adopted by the British government and free trade was permitted then
the Company would cease to govern Rupert's Land. In the early lS^O's
private traders were allowed into the Red River colony but no
licensing system was introduced and the Company did not surrender
its charter.
Until 1857 the Hudson's Bay Company was less inclined to 
continue to administer Rupert's Land because it was being drawn into 
the middle and far north of the continent in search for higher quality 
furs. The fur trade, however, always dependent on European markets, 
declined. The relationship between the Company and the Amerindians 
also changed with cash replacing the traditional system of barter.
The native peoples were becoming employees of the Company and almost
kG
completely dependent on the latter for their survival. These 
changes produced unrest in the Red River colony.
The maintenance of law and order became more difficult for 
the Company in 185^ when the military pensioner corps, another one 
of Grey's schemes, was disbanded and most of the former soldiers
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departed for Canada. As well, when Canadians began to arrive each 
year in greater numbers the Company found itself outnumbered.
Simpson warned that the Canadians were a danger because they "... 
from similarity of language and habits, prove to unite with the Half- 
breed population, usually marrying natives and settling at Red River, 
where they swell the numbers of the French Halfcaste community, who,
if not very soon checked by military force, will become masters of
W7and give law to the country." In this situation the Company turned
to the Colonial Office for support.
The presence of missionaries appeared to the Company to present
another threat to their position. Exaggerating this problem to. his
superiors, Simpson wrote that "every mission was becoming a 'trading
station1" and that the Company’s monopoly was being eroded:
... the Halfbreeds and Indians are very apt in picking 
up information bearing on their temporal interests and 
the missionaries find it, no doubt, more easy to enlighten 
them on the relative value of goods and the difference in 
tariffs, than to induce them to adopt the habits of civilized 
life or to imbibe them with the principles of Christianity*
These mission villages, whose present inhabitants are just 
emerging from the savage state, are destined to be the germs 
of future colonies, so that the evil, now in its infancy, 
must increase from year to year, to the serious injury of the 
fur trade; but I lament to say it is an evil for which there 
does not appear to be any remedy.
Simpson concluded that since the charter was almost a "nullity" the
Company should negotiate with the Colonial Office for the "voluntary
surrender of the charter on receiving compensation on some such basis
as was allowed to the East India Company." The Company would not,
however, have to withdraw from the fur trade altogether because
with its "experience, organization & capital" it would be able to
ZfQ
retain without any difficulty a virtual monopoly on the fur trade.
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Before the select parliamentary committee met in 1857 to inquire
into the charter and the general management of the Company Merivale
and Henry Labouchere, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, were
made aware of the Company’s position by Ellice. On September 30, 1856
Ellice wrote privately to Labouchere advising the latter of the
consequences if the Hudson’s Bay Company was forced to withdraw from
Rupert’s Land. Ellice's view, although biased, was most convincing:
The H.B. territory has been governed with consummate skill 
& success— the use of spirits, the great cause of the de­
moralization of the Indians, completely put a stop to—  
education & religious instruction, so far as it was possible, 
encouraged & the Colonial Office has few complaints— & these 
upon examination proved to be either unfounded or unavoidable 
— & less trouble with what might have been— & may still be, 
the most difficult dependence of the Crown to administer & 
keep in peace & order— than with any other colony.
Comparing Rupert's Land to southern Africa and New Zealand, Labouchere
and Merivale believed that Ellice’s assessment was most reasonable.
They accepted his warning that they would have to either find a
substitute for the Company or administer the region themselves.
The only other alternative was that Rupert's Land might be unloaded
on the Canadian government. However Canadian politicians were having
great difficulty managing their own affairs and were in no position,
politically or economically, to undertake this task.
Ellice went on in his letter to state exactly what actions the
Hudson's Bay Company would take if the Colonial Office continued
to question the Company's activities. Ellice’s words must have
given the mandarins in 13 and 1^ - Do-wning Street a rude jolt:
The H.B. Co. are quite willing to dispose of their 
territory and their establishments. It is a question of 
a million of money. If either this Gov't or the Gov't of 
Canada wish to take the affair into their own hands, I can 
tell them the cost of the undertaking. But in ray mind as
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far as the maintenance of order & peace throughout the vast 
territory is concerned, that is the smallest part of the 
question.
Ellice then noted that Merivale was the only person in the Office 
who completely understood the problem and its implications. A  
few months later Labouchere replied and took the line of least 
resistance and expense to the British government. Ellice was 
informed that the Colonial Office would wait until a decision wa3 
made by the Company or the Canadian government. Wavering once more,
50
the Office waited for the report of the select parliamentary inquiry.
In 1857 the select parliamentary committee investigated the 
Company's affairs in Rupert's Land. George Simpson, one of the most 
important witnesses, assured the members of the committee that the 
primary duty of the Company, other than trading in furs, had been to 
"instruct and civilize" the native population gradually in order to 
"preserve" them from the "contaminating influence" of other white 
settlers and traders. He argued that the Amerindians should be 
allowed to "... retain their primitive habits, following the occu­
pations for which alone they appeared to be suited by nature— -that 
of hunters." For this reason he asserted that the Company had 
attempted to discourage other traders in Rupert's Land. Obviously 
this rationale would not conflict with the Company's major objective 
which was to derive profits from the sale of f urs.^ If the Company 
lost its "authority" for whatever reason Simpson believed that the
Company would not suffer but the native population would, at least in 
52
the long term. The latter would be "... left without regular 
supplies of clothing, ammunition and other absolute necessaries, to
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perish miserably of want, as during the time they have been under 
the Company’s control, they have lost many of the arts by which, in 
their aboriginal savage state, they were able to maintain life."'^ 
Simpson’s dire predictions were never confirmed at this time because 
the Canadian government declined to challenge the legal validity 
of the Company's charter although the report of the select committee
5*f
enabled them to do so.
Merivale played a significant role in the outcome of these 
proceedings insofar as they were decided in London. He did not take 
part in the inquiry as a witness but he was responsible for recommen­
ding that the question concerning the validity of the Company's 
charter be sent to the Law Officers in 1858. This agency reported 
that the Canadian government or any other body could challenge the 
charter but would have to do so in the courts which would involve 
a long and very expensive process. Merivale drafted a letter to 
Edmund Head, then governor of Canada, warning him to advise the 
Canadian government of the difficulties if they decided to undertake 
the task. Echoing Ellice, Merivale concluded that the chief reasons 
for not opposing the Company at this time were:
1. The extreme practical difficulty in devising any substitute 
for the system of the Company in those distant regions, and 
2ndly, by the belief I have been led to entertain that 
that system at once maintains peace 8c order among the Indians 
to a considerable extent, and also develops in the most 
advantageous way the only present wealth of the country, namely 
the produce of the fur bearing animals, of however little 
importance this may ultimately be to civilized man . 58
Far from developing a consistent and effective policy for Rupert's
Land Merivale and his colleagues had become in fact, by the late
l850's, creatures of the Company. With this advice from the Colonial
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Office the Canadian government, confronted with a commercial crisis 
in I857-I858 and political instability, did not challenge the 
Hudson's Bay Company's charter. The Company retained control over 
Rupert's Land until 1869.
The only other problem was the length of the Company's licence 
of exclusive trade which would come up for renewal on May 30, 1859.'^ 
In this aspect of the relations between the Hudson's Bay Company and 
the Colonial Office Merivale had some success. From the beginning 
of the negotiations he took a hard line and rejected the Company's 
assertions that there would be serious trouble in Rupert's Land if
the licence expired without any agreement. He believed it was
imperative to reassure both "parliament" and the British "public" 
that the Colonial Office did not have any "intention to favour the
58
Company". Perhaps Merivale had learned from the Vancouver Island
debacle. In any event proposals and counter-proposals were sent
back and forth from Downing Street to the Company's headquarters
in London. The Company wanted another twenty-one year extension
which the Colonial Office adamantly refused to grant. The two
adversaries also could not agree on the amount of compensation to be
59paid. By the spring of 1859 with the licence due to expire,
60
Merivale gave up hope of reaching a settlement. The licence was 
terminated on May 30* 1859 without any serious repercussions in 
Rupert's Land. With this sole exception the Colonial Office was not 
able to limit the power of the Hudson's Bay Company.
Meanwhile the Company had already made arrangements with George
Simpson to adapt to this new situation. In the summer of 1859 Simpson
reported optimistically to his superiors on the use of a steamboat
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to transport the Company’s goods to and from the Red River colony.
This mode of transportation was cheaper, safer and quicker than the
traditional methods and steamboats became widely used in the middle
and far north in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The
Company was not concerned about competition from private traders
because its goods were cheaper and of a higher quality than those of
its competitors and, above all, it had firm trading contacts with the
61
native population. In 1859 Merivale correctly observed that the 
immediate effect of the loss of the licence in Rupert's Land would be
little or none". The Company would have to change its methods but
62otherwise it would be "business as usual".
Merivale's minute accurately characterized the failure of the 
Colonial Office to modify significantly its relationship to the 
Hudson's Bay Company in the 1 8 5 0's in the Pacific Northwest and 
Rupert's Land. The changes which were made, specifically the creation 
of two new colonies, were costly additions to the British Empire. In 
Rupert's Land it was "business as usual" for the Hudson's Bay Company. 
The impotence of the Colonial Office and its anomalous support of 
the Company's monopoly proved to be a strange aberration in the 
mid-nineteenth centruy, the so-called era of free trade imperialism. 
Nevertheless once again Merivale and the other members of the 
Colonial Office discovered that their policies had made little 
impact upon the formal or the informal parts of the British Empire.
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Chapter 9: The India Office, l860-l87*f
Merivalefs transfer from the Colonial' to the India Office 
might be interpreted as a promotion.1 In fact his workload greatly- 
lessened, his new position became virtually a sinecure and his 
knowledge of the British Empire was entirely wasted from i860 to 
187 -^. Before i860 Merivale had very little interest in India and 
what he wrote was commonplace without any of the insights which 
characterized his writings about other regions of the Empire.
At the India Office he was more a spectator than a participant in the 
administration of India. If Merivale had been more knowledgeable 
about India it is still highly unlikely that he would have been 
influential because the office of the permanent undersecretary was 
severely circumscribed by the structure of the India Office, the 
great influence of the Council of India and also the virtual in­
dependence of the Supreme government in India. The India Office, 
as Merivale discovered, was much less able than the Colonial Office 
to control imperial affairs because India in the mid-nineteenth 
century had for all practical purposes internal self-government.
The reasons for Merivale1s change to the India Office are not
entirely clear. Herman Charles Merivale incorrectly surmised in
his autobiography that his father left the Colonial Office at the 
"special request of the Duke of Argyll". The latter was not, however,
Secretary of State for India in i860 but only later from 1868 to
187^. It has also been suggested that Merivale "... as a life-long 




under the ex-Peelite, N e w c a s t l e . I t  may have been true that
Merivale wanted to work with Sir Charles Wood but he certainly had
no aversion to toiling in Downing Street with Newcastle. Newcastle
and he had been colleagues for three years and moreover had a most
k
amicable professional relationship. Merivale undoubtedly accepted 
Wood's offer because of the administrative changes which were being 
made in Leadenhall Street.
After the Indian Mutiny the British government re-organized 
the manner in which it governed India. The Secretary of State for 
India and his Council, the permanent officials in the India Office 
and the Governor-General of India were now given the responsibility 
of governing India, replacing the East India Company and the Court 
of Directors. Sir George Russell Clerk, one of Merivale's colleagues 
at the Colonial Office, was appointed the first permanent under­
secretary under this new regime in 1858. Two years later he was
sent to Bombay as governor and it is likely that he had recommended
5
Merivale to Wood. Merivale probably became Clerk's successor 
because of his reputation as a capable administrator at the Colonial 
Office rather than for his knowledge of India and its problems.
Before i860 Merivale had shown scant interest in India. During 
the first Afghan War he published an article in the Edinburgh Review 
concerning the "Court and Camp of Runjeet Singh". Runjeet Singh 
(Ranjit Singh) was an important leader in the northwest of India in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. His death and the lack 
of a capable successor led directly to the breakdown of the Punjab 
and its annexation to the British Empire. In April iSkO Merivale
described Ranjit Singh as a "barbarous chieftain" who was involved 
in "detestable profligacy". Compared with other "Eastern despots", 
he was one of the few "who will have left a better personal character 
in history, when little or nothing else is left of his name, and the 
fabric of his policy shall have fallen to pieces." The British 
government had failed to maintain the stability of Ranjit Singh's 
regime because of disunity within his kingdom and the enormous task 
of defending the great extremities of its borders. Military alliance 
or British occupation appeared to be the only alternatives but 
Merivale was sceptical of the efficacy of both. He argued that it 
was a "delusion" to "maintain Indian armies disciplined after the 
European fashion” because the latter would still require "... a 
great number of European officers, strong control by those officers 
over their men, regular pay and good treatment; and, above all, a 
systematic perseverance which no Indian government had ever shown.
In 1840 he believed the key to British rule of India was the ability 
of the Supreme government to control the native population. That 
view would be changed only by the Mutiny.
In l8*H in his Lectures Merivale had mentioned India only twice.
It was, he wrote, not a colony like the others, that is, "... a
territory of which the soil is entirely or principally owned by
settlers from the mother country." India was, like the Hudson's
Bay Company territories in British North America, and other "conquered
districts, possessed by native inhabitants with a very slight
7
admixture of the conquerors." The native population had "... an 
established religion, a literature, and an ancient though imperfect
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civilization...." As a result these people could not be easily 
assimilated by Christian missionaries. Merivale agreed fully with 
Thomas Macaulay's minute on education in 1833 that "Hindoos" could
only be prepared for their adaptation to European civilization by
8
means of education. Despite being entirely unremarkable 
Merivale*s attitudes to India and Indians were in l8*fl representative 
of his contemporaries. He displayed no unusual interest in or concern 
for India as he had done for the rest of the British Empire at the 
same time.
At the Colonial Office, except for comparing the East India
Company to the Hudson's Bay Company, Merivale remained unconcerned
about India. In 1836, in reply to his brother's letter concerning
the latter's comparison of the Roman with the British Empire,
Merivale wrote: "I think you writers about Rome rather darken counsel
by a multitude of comparisons. The Black Town of Calcutta, for all
9
I ever heard of it, is a collection of huts...." One year later, 
writing to Charles from the Colonial Office, Merivale*s immediate 
concern was the impact of the Mutiny of 1837-1838. The "terrible 
massacres" were, he trusted, "only the first eruption of the disease—  
and if so, the hatefuland brutal spirit of murderous revenge which 
has been excited here will subside." The next few years would 
probably be spent "punishing" Indians rather than on reconstruction.
He doubted that there was anyone in Britain with a "definite plan" or 
whether "a standing committee of both houses on Indian affairs" would 
be able to find a satisfactory solution. He suggested that the 
answer could be found if parliamentary committees could be created.^
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Tinkering with the political and administrative framework of the
government of India was simply another ineffective liberal panacea.
As he was to discover a few years later at'the India Office neither
he nor his colleagues were in a position to change fundamentally
the ability of the British government to govern India.
A few months later Merivale revealed that he had begun to
reflect on the causes of the Mutiny. The primary cause was the
lack of "foresight" and "action" by the British government and the
Directors of the East India Company, specifically "... the double,
or much more properly triple, government— no unity of will, and a
fatal division of responsibility." He concluded that "Anglo-Indian
government of the last fifteen years had been a very indifferent one
indeed." With the Mutiny almost over, however, the question of
blame was a secondary consideration. India's future was more
important and he was "... inclined to think (though with very little
confidence) that the main point is to strengthen the local Indian
government...." In order to implement this proposal a "makeshift
11Council" should be set up temporarily. After the Mutiny a Council 
of India was created and it became an extremely important part of 
the India Office, thereby circumscribing Merivale's role as 
permanent undersecretary within the India Office.
From i860 to 187^ Merivale continued to write on imperial 
affairs but his work on India remained insignificant. In 1867 he 
edited the second volume of the Memoirs of Sir Philip Francis.
Francis had been a controversial member of the Council of Bengal
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in the late eighteenth century. Merivale became interested in this
subject because of speculations concerning Francis* authorship of
the Junius letters. Merivale*s primary interest was literary
rather than imperial and consequently the Memoirs contain very little
12concerning Merivale*s attitudes toward India. His Life of Sir
Henry Lawrence (1872) was insignificant and often hagiographical.
Sir Henry Lawrence (1806-187*0 was an Anglo-Indian administrator and
a hero during the Mutiny. In his Preface Merivale confessed
his own ignorance of this subject: "...was personally unacquainted
both with Sir Henry Lawrence and with India, and am fully conscious
how little my own literary habits could do towards redeeming such 
13disadvantages." This work revealed that Merivale had learned very 
little about India since his appointment to the India Office twelve 
years previously.^
At the Colonial Office Merivale had become more critical of 
certain aspects of the British Empire and the manner in which it was 
being governed. His comments on Lawrence and the Mutiny reveal that 
the opposite was true with regard to India. In 1872, comparing the 
Mutiny to the French Revolution in 1789* Merivale wrote that although 
the "... air was full of vague presentiments of danger, the wisest 
and the weakest alike were unable to forecast the actual shape which 
that danger was to assume." Nevertheless, and somewhat contradictorily, 
he argued that the "catastrophe" could have been averted if Lawrence 
had been prescient and had used his "influence and prestige". He 
concluded that Lawrence's "lasting and crowning servies" included:
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••• the statesmanship and wisdom through which the Punjab 
became available in other hands than his as a main reservoir 
of the counteracting force, by which that mutiny was at last 
subdued, —  these, as regards the crisis in which he perished, 
constituted the lofty claim of Lawrence to rank among the 
highest in the rank of heroic fellow-labourers, military 
and civil, who saved for us the empire of India.-^-5
Merivale, far from becoming more critical of Anglo-Indians or
British rule of India, had enshrined Sir Henry Lawrence in the
pantheon of British imperialists.
Until his transfer to the India Office Merivale's views on
India were not unusual. Clearly he believed that India should be
ruled by British administrators, like Sir Henry Lawrence, because
the native population was incapable of doing so. When the Mutiny
occurred he could merely advocate constitutional changes to obviate
another one. Merivale’s "biographies" of Francis and Lawrence
reveal that he changed his ideas about India only slightly from
i860 to 187^ because he had only a very minor role in the administration
of India.
In i860, at the age of fifty-three, Merivale was confronted 
with the enormous task of learning how to help govern a part of the 
Empire of which he had scant knowledge. He was not given much 
opportunity by his colleagues to rectify this deficiency. His son's 
comment that Merivale enjoyed his new position "less" was certainly 
an understatement. The cause of this dissatisfaction, he explained 
to his son, was the "old story of 'too many cooks'". The formation 
of policy was divided unequally among the permanent staff, the
l6
Secretary of State, the parliamentary undersecretary and the Council. 
Moreover the Office was virtually powerless because of the influence 
of Anglo-Indians on the Council of India.
The Secretary of State and the civil servants were largely 
concerned with administrative routine, essentially the same 
functions which were performed by assistant undersecretaries, clerks 
and the Secretary of State at the Colonial Office. Instead of being 
able to make important decisions Merivale soon discovered that he 
was being bypassed at the India Office. As one historian has 
argued recently, Merivale was "... ignorant of the greater part of 
Indian administration for some years after his appointment and 
preferred to let sleeping dogs lie." Primarily limited to "legal 
and constitutional questions" in the Judicial and Legislative De­
partment Merivale*s minutes were inconsequential compared with those 
of his colleagues. Most despatches were drafted by the secretaries 
or assistant secretaries of the various departments and then sent 
to committees for reappraisal. Lastly the despatches went to the 
permanent or the parliamentary undersecretary and the Secretary 
of State and the Council for final changes and approval. Unlike 
the Colonial Office procedure in which all despatches went through 
and were co-ordinated by the permanent undersecretary, at the 
India Office the despatches could be, and in the case of Merivale 
often were, subject to the careful scrutiny of the Council rather 
than the permanent undersecretary and the Secretary of State.
Merivale spent his fourteen years at the India Office merely commenting 
on a limited number of despatches. Seldom was his advice ever 
considered."^
In 1862 in a letter to Sir George Russell Clerk, then in India, 
Merivale assessed his new situation: "I am very comfortable in your
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old employment ... and find the change of work, and its comparative 
lightness, very satisfactory after several years at the Colonial
lS 1
Office." Perhaps Merivale was satisfied with the lack of work 
because it gave him more time for his literary endeavours but it was 
a sad conclusion to his career as an administrator. Compared 
with his work at the Colonial Office Merivale's minutes and memoranda 
reveal that he did virtually nothing useful from i860 to l87*f.
It would, however, be an exaggeration to argue that Merivale's 
impotence caused ".... a lack of unanimity which was to have a
19deleterious effect on despatches and therefore on Home control."
The "rulers" of the British Empire, whether in Downing or in 
Leadenhall Streets, had, for very different reasons, virtually no 
control over imperial affairs in the early and mid-Victorian 
periods.
From i860 to 187^ the India Office was relatively stable in 
its permanent and political components. There were six Secretaries 
of State but Wood and Argyll accounted for 12 of those l*f years.
This continuity was reinforced because policies of the India Office 
were based on the "tyranny of the past". The Council contained an 
overwhelming number of Anglo-Indians. The latter had an extremely 
important role in the formation of policies in the l8 6 0's and 
usually supported the objectives of the Supreme government in India. 
In addition the Council had a greater influence on policies within 
the Office because it was "interposed" as a filter between the perma­
nent and political members of the Office. The Council had a similar 
function to the permanent undersecretary at the Colonial Office.
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Confronted with a very different administrative process, lacking 
direct experience with or detailed knowledge of India, Merivale 
was redundant.^
At the Colonial Office Merivale had, at various times, a great 
deal of influence over the Secretary of State# In Leadenhall 
Street, even if Merivale would have had the same impact, it would not 
have mattered. The Secretary of State was, in many ways, in an 
almost impossible position. The first Secretary of State with whom 
Merivale worked was Sir Charles Wood (later Viscount Halifax).
Wood and Merivale complemented one another but they were buffeted 
by a surfeit of information and conflicting policies. They were 
preoccupied with attempting to reconcile differences of opinion 
among members of Council and other members of the Horae and Supreme 
governments. Wood’s quietist policies were not distinguished by 
any ’’originality of thought” or action. The objective of these 
policies was to maintain stable relations between Britain and India 
and thereby prevent another Mutiny. The gradual and incomplete 
reforms introduced by Wood’s administration were ’’cautious” and 
’’unconstructive”. Naively Wood believed that the self-help and 
industry of the native population would enable the British govern­
ment to implement his policies. The latter were, however, divorced 
from the realities of life in nineteenth century India. He soon 
discovered, as Merivale had at the Colonial Office, that the British 
Empire could not be governed from London. Merivale did not
influence Wood in any significant way and watched him make the
21
same mistakes he himself had made at the Colonial Office.
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Merivale did not have as much sympathy for Wood's successors and he
22remained a spectator on Indian affairs.
Merivale's work within the India Office was largely confined to
the Judicial and Legislative Department and even here he had little
influence. The India Office was not, like the Colonial Office,
organized by geographical area but rather according to the subject
matter. In Downing Street Merivale tended to specialize in regions
of the Empire in which he had a particular interest, most notably
British North America and southern Africa. At the India Office this
mode of operation did not exist and Merivale never became thoroughly
familiar with any subject or any particular part of India. In the
Judicial and Legislative Department he continually attempted, with
great futility, to apply legal precedents developed in Britain or
in the colonies to India.
At the Colonial Office Merivale had relied on the colonial
governors to obtain information concerning the problems of individual
colonies. From 1866 to 1869 he had the advantage of corresponding
with someone in India but only twice did he and Sir Henry Maine write
about Indian matters. The bulk of their correspondence was concerned
with domestic British politics. The Indian matters were confined
to Maine's request for a second term in India, which Merivale
succeeded in obtaining from Lord Cranbourne, with the consent of
23the Council of India. In return Maine promised to find posts in
2b
India for a few of Merivale's friends. In addition Merivale and 
Maine wrote in 1867 about the influence of Indian and British 
newspapers on the Home and Supreme governments. Merivale acknowledged
that he had not read Indian papers and was "indifferent” to their
views# He also told Maine that the English press was seldom
influenced by the Indian papers. The only exception was "#.. when
capital is to be made by attacking the Indian or home government
on matters for instance of commercial interest, or (more rarely)
when some complaining Rajah is concerned, then Indian papers are
eagerly read and have their effect.” For the most part, however,
when there were ”#.. Indian quarrels between authorities and
subordinates ... the general inclination is, in a languid way, to
take part with the authority and smile at the press.” The India
Office, although not "newspaper-proof", was not frightened by what
was printed in these papers because of "public indifference" to 
25India# By 1867 Merivale was still in a state of ignorance of 
India and appeared to be taking a more rigid approach to its 
governance, which was in stark contrast to his views on colonial 
self-government in the 1 85 0*s. India continued to be governed by 
the Supreme government rather than the India Office and Merivale's
26
ideas simply did not matter. The opening of the Suez Canal and
the regular use of the telegraph in the l870's would do more to
27
change the relationship between Britain and India#
As permanent undersecretary Merivale was involved in many 
miscellaneous questions most of which he undoubtedly did not fully
pQ
comprehend. He was circumscribed by his limited knowledge of 
India and his general knowledge of imperial affairs, so useful at the 
Colonial Office, was wasted. Sometimes he was responsible' for
India's relations with the other parts of the British Empire, but, 
still in his "colonial world", Merivale was not an effective admini­
strator at the India Office.
Merivale's primary concern was the migration of Indian labourers 
to other British colonies. Before i860 he had taken a strictly 
legal interpretation of the rights of migrant labourers, had viewed 
them as a surplus commodity and was relatively insensitive to their 
plight. They were subordinated to his economic plans for the 
development of each region within the Empire. At Leadenhall Street 
he believed that Indian labourers should be exploited as much as 
possible without, paradoxically, adding to their hardships. In 
l86l, for example, he argued, in a letter to his successor at the 
Colonial Office, Sir Frederic Rogers, that convicts in the Straits 
Settlements had the right to stay where they were or to migrate to 
another part of the Empire after they had completed their obligations. 
At the same time, although pointing out the abuses which occurred 
during the transportation of Indian labourers to Trinidad and
3
Mauritius, he did not question the practice of migrant labour itself. 
Merivale also supported this form of quasi-slavery in dealing with 
the re-emigration of "Indian coolies” from Reunion to New Caledonia 
and Queensland; to Penang in the Straits Settlements in 1871; to the 
West Indies and British Guiana in 1872; in the Coolie Convention of 
l86l. Three days before his death Merivale was still contemplating
31the question of Indian emigration to the West Indies. He did not, 
however, act as a liaison between the India Office and the Colonial 
Of f i c e ^  or other government departments as he had done at the
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Colonial Office in the l85Q's. In this respect Merivale's
abilities were wasted at the India Office.
Merivale’s lack of specific knowledge about Indian problems in
the i8 6 0's and 1 8 7 0*s helped to make him an impotent permanent
undersecretary. He was given no opportunity to influence, much less
to decide, important questions. Instead he merely commented on such
3k
miscellany as the slave trade on the east coast of Africa, an
35invasion of the Sultan of Muscat's kingdom in 1866, disarming
36operations on the northwest frontier, laws concerning divorce
37and wills for Indians, a proposed telegraph line between Rangoon
38 39
and Singapore, irrigation schemes designed to relieve famines, and
ko
the problems encountered by the Archeological Survey of India.
Merivale must have been disquieted to see these questions being 
decided by his colleagues and the Supreme government in India. The 
tragedy of Merivale's administrative career was complete now that 
he was confined to trivia.
From i860 to 187^ Merivale, as an administrator at the India 
Office, had no knowledge of India or any direct experience in dealing 
with the particular problems of that part of the British Empire.
His role at the India Office was limited to trivial and miscellaneous 
questions and his impact on the formation of policy was almost 
non-existent especially if it is compared with his work at the 
Colonial Office. Sir Lev/is Mallet, Merivale's cousin and successor, 
greatly exaggerated Merivale's importance when he wrote: "I worked
all day in his place, and sometimes more. Yet an assistant 
undersecretary and a legal advisor had to be both appointed to
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help me through. He seemed to do the whole of it without turning 
4l
a hair.” The last sentence was probably the most accurate.
Merivale's obituary in The Times was also misleading: “Mr. Herman
Merivale, whose name has been long and well known to Anglo-Indians
as that of an able and painstaking Under-Secretary at the India
Office, but whose merit as a writer has given him much wider and 
42enduring fame." A critical commentator on imperial affairs for 
twenty-five years, an imaginative, if not always a successful 
administrator at the Colonial Office, Herman Merivale was completely 
out of his element at the India Office. His impotence during his 
years in Leadenhall Street did, however, reveal that India, like the 
rest of the British Empire, was not ruled by policies developed by 
civil servants and politicians in London.
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Conclusion
A study of Herman Merivale's career as an administrator 
and his association with the British Empire from 1837 to 187^ 
reveals a discrepancy between his imperial ideas and his actions 
at the Colonial Office. His official connection with the Empire 
was largely characterized by his repeated failure to implement the 
liberal panaceas which he had espoused in the l830's and had later 
developed comprehensively in his Lectures on Colonization and 
Colonies in l84l. From i860 Merivale was at the India Office and 
lacked any opportunity to make an impact upon the administration of 
the Empire. As an intellectual in imperial administration Merivale 
was never able to accomplish the extraordinarily unrealistic 
objectives to which he had adhered. In this sense his official 
life could be seen as a tragedy.
Like many of his British contemporaries Merivale had high 
expectations for British society at home and overseas. The sources 
of these ideals, at least in Merivale's case, came from liberalism, 
particularly the idea of progress, and his training at and connections 
with Oxford. Merivale's ideas were not unique, nevertheless his 
position was unusual because he was given the opportunity at the 
Colonial Office to carry out the suggestions which he had made 
as a commentator in the l8*f0's. In l8*+7i because of his Lectures, 
Merivale came to the attention of James Stephen and Lord Grey and was 
subsequently appointed assistant and then permanent undersecretary
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at the Colonial Office. During the next four years Merivale 
underwent an administrative apprenticeship with Stephen and Grey 
and, with a few exceptions, was relatively uninfluential.
From 1852 to i860 Merivale had a significant impact on 
British imperial policy. When dealing with such important questions 
as free trade, colonial self-government, the "native" question and 
the Hudson's Bay Company he found that he was being continually 
frustrated by the pragmatism of his colleagues and the inability 
of the Office to carry out its mandate, much less "rule" the 
colonies. Paradoxically, as his influence at the Colonial Office 
grew, Merivale discovered that his overall ability to effect the 
changes which he had advocated in his Lectures in l8*fl decreased.
His knowledge was disregarded by other members of the Office or 
was made irrelevant by the social and economic circumstances of 
individual colonies. As he observed in l86l in the second edition 
of his Lectures, when reassessing British "native" policy, his 
ideas had been continually caught between "principle and immediate 
exigency". The greatest administrative fiasco occurred in 1858- 
1859 between Merivale and Sir George Grey in the Cape Colony over 
the important questions of "native" policy and colonial federation. 
These events may have greatly contributed to Merivale's resignation 
in March i860.
When he left the Colonial Office Merivale became permanent 
undersecretary at the India Office. In Leadenhall Street Merivale 
realized that his position was severely circumscribed, especially
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by the Anglo-Indians who dominated the Council of India.
Moreover he lacked sufficient knowledge and experience and was 
lost in the complexity of the administration of India. As a 
consequence he remained in his "colonial world" for the last 
fourteen years of his life, rarely becoming involved in the process 
of decision-making and never doing more than commenting on miscel­
laneous problems, usually in the Judicial and Legislative depart­
ment. Unlike his experience at the Colonial Office, Merivale 
discovered that he had an inordinate amount of time to pursue his 
literary interests. At the same time his interest in the Empire 
waned considerably. His relationship to the British Empire was 
symbolized by his honorary status with the Royal Colonial Institute. 
Only once, during the colonial "crisis” of l869-l870,^ did he 
venture to take up his pen and review the "colonial question" for 
the third and the last time.
In February 1870, in the Fortnightly Review, Merivale published 
a fitting epitaph to his imperial career. This article was only 
slightly different from his previous work in 18^1 and l86l. Still 
largely thinking of the Empire in constitutional terms, he continued 
to assume that the existing relationship between Britain and the 
colonies would ultimately be strengthened by some method of imperial 
centralization. Merivale was not alone in maintaining this 
idealistic belief and this imperial idea was debated well into the 
twentieth century in Britain and in the white settlement colonies. 
This imperial idea, however, contradicted his experience as an 
administrator because he had contributed to the devolution of the
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Empire at the Colonial Office in his advocacy of colonial self- 
government. Conversely he had also indicated in l86l that he 
had been disappointed by the consequences of responsible govern­
ment in the British North American colonies. In 1870 he expressed 
scepticism concerning the future of the new Dominion of Canada.
In I87O Merivale wrote that British attitudes toward the 
Empire were characterized by a prevailing doom, that is, "... in a 
certain sense, the doom of Athens is already ours." Although the 
power which the Empire possessed was almost the same as it had 
been earlier in the nineteenth century, the constitutional ties 
which held together Britain and the colonies were becoming much 
weaker. Merivale was fairly optimistic despite the fears of his 
contemporaries that the British Empire was close to disintegration. 
In 1870 he tended to take a quietist position because he believed 
other commentators were exaggerating the extent of the problem.
In this regard he failed to distinguish the differences between 
the constitutional and the sentimental ideas of the British Empire. 
He dispelled what he regarded as alarmist statements, by pointing 
out the degree to which the sentimental idea of Empire still 
existed in the white settlement colonies. Consequently Merivale 
misinterpreted the "colonial question" as it existed in 1870.
In his earlier analyses in l8*tl and l86l Merivale had proposed 
two general reasons for the maintenance of the British Empire.
The Empire was supposed to benefit British trade and emigration 
as well as British policy. He had quite correctly regarded these
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reasons as being essentially practical rather than sentimental.
Of course his definition of "policy” was very general and often
included many other ancillary motives. Changing circumstances
rendered many of Merivale's imperial ideas obsolete by the lS70's.
In 18^1 at Oxford he had written in an expansive tone that
"the world seemed all open to us". In 1870 it appeared that all
the best regions of the world had been colonized:
Emigration exists and multiplies; colonization is dead 
and buried. There is not an available space on the 
earth's surface, under a temperate climate, in which we 
or any one else could found a new colony on a large scale, 
if we would; and we have given away all the unoccupied land 
of our old provinces. But with colonial trade thrown open, 
and colonisation at an end, it is obvious that the 
leading motives which induced our ancestors to found and to 
maintain a colonial empire no longer exist. And the mere 
passion for additional conquest— for annexing to our 
dominion insulated spots all over the earth— has apparently 
ceased among us.
The best example of the British avoidance of this "mere passion
for additional conquest" was, he argued, Fiji, which Britain had
not annexed despite the rivalry of other imperial powers in the
Pacific. Clearly Merivale had forgotten that at the Colonial Office
he had been a participant in the "additional conquest" of the
northern frontier of southern Africa, the colonies of Vancouver
Island, British Columbia, the Queen Charlotte Islands and the
expansion of the Hudson's Bay Company territories into the middle
and far north of British North America.
It is significant that, in this article, Merivale did not
anticipate the scramble for Africa because he did not believe that
this continent was suitable for European colonization. He cited
environmental problems and the presence of hostile "native" 
populations as reasons for this attitude. His inability to 
implement the panaceas of insulation and amalgamation satis­
factorily, the failure of the policy of withdrawal after the 
Kaffir War as well as the conflicts with Sir George Grey all 
contributed to his belief that Africa should best be left alone.
His successors were forced to relearn the fact that the "native" 
question was extremely complicated and could not readily be 
solved, if at all. In 1870, of course, Merivale did not believe 
that Britain was threatened by other European empires in Africa. 
Paradoxically, therefore, Merivale stood on the brink of, but was 
unable to see the beginning of the development of a new "dependent" 
Empire. The "old" Empire, to which Merivale had devoted his 
official life, was nearly dead and he was out of sympathy with 
and could not understand the new energies and patterns which were 
taking shape and which would produce the scramble for Africa in 
the late nineteenth century. To assume that Merivale should have 
had the foresight to view events in this light would be to endow 
him with a greater prescience than he possessed.
Another important change which had led ostensibly to the 
"disintegration" of the British Empire in l8?0 was the British 
policy of granting colonial self-government. The most prominent 
example was responsible government. The Colonial Office had 
bestowed responsible government on the eastern British North 
American colonies in order to avoid conflict between imperial
and colonial interests. In Merivale's view, responsible govern­
ment, designed as a panacea to reform the imperial relationship 
and to enable the colonial governments to gain the experience of 
managing their own affairs, had proven to be a failure. The 
colonies had taken this political freedom only too readily and 
had then proceeded to quarrel over the forms of patronage which it 
gave to them. Their political institutions or their civil service 
were not developing as the Colonial Office had hoped. In southern 
Africa, Natal and the Cape Colony did not receive responsible 
government because of the great danger of frontier wars between 
the white settlers and Africans. This problem was similar to that 
which existed in Rupert's Land and in the Pacific Northwest. In 
these areas the presence of the Hudson's Bay Company mitigated 
against any form of self-government being granted. In 1870 
Merivale concluded that, despite the "unparalleled progress of 
wealth and social improvement" in those colonies which had 
received responsible government, it was a "mere delusion" to 
believe "... we could combine both systems —  that of local 
independence and that of imperial centralization". Although he 
was not a separatist, Merivale was critical of the consequences 
of colonial self-government. The same was true for his views on 
free trade.
Merivale, a disciple of Adam Smith and the free trade movement 
of the 1 8 3 0's and 18^0's, was at the Colonial Office when the last of 
the Navigation Acts were removed. Although he was not responsible
for the advent of free trade in the British Empire, Merivale had 
to deal with the problems raised by its adoption. He became very 
disillusioned by the reaction of the British North American 
colonies to free trade. The colonies, which had been given the 
freedom to develop their own economies, immediately put up tariff 
barriers, either for the purpose of raising revenue or to protect 
their infant industries. In addition, losing their imperial 
preference, the British North American colonies, with the aid of 
Lord Elgin, agreed to sign a reciprocity treaty with the United 
States in 185^. The particular circumstances of each colony helped 
to determine its response to the British policy of free trade 
rather than any sentimental idea of Empire. Many of the white 
settlement colonies, in Merivale's words, "violate our cardinal 
principles of free trade". It could not have been otherwise 
because, once responsible government had been granted, there was 
very little that the British government could do to reverse this 
trend. It was only after his years at the Colonial Office that 
Merivale began to understand the contradictions inherent in British 
imperial policy, particularly the alarming and ever increasing 
discrepancy between imperial policy formulated in London and its 
practical implementation in each colony*
In 1870 Merivale wrote that the motives for British imperial 
policy in the early and mid-Victorian era, with respect to colonial 
self-government, were largely a product of self-interest: "to
encourage the colonies to prepare for independence for their own
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sake" and also"to relieve the people of this country from the 
share which they formerly bore in contributing towards their 
administration and defence." Since l8*f0 the British government 
had first of all reduced contributions to the governments of the 
white settlement colonies and then began to cut selectively 
their military establishments. This last development was still 
in progress when Merivale was writing in 1870 and it was a great 
problem for Lord Granville's administration.
Merivale, as we have seen above, completely supported all 
the major changes which had occurred in the British Empire since 
the 1 8 3 0's when his interest was first kindled in the subject. 
Colonies should become financially self-sufficient as soon as 
possible and self-government would help these "flourishing young 
communities" to learn to rely on themselves. He warned, however, 
that this prescription for British imperial policy must be 
introduced gradually and not in a doctrinaire manner by British 
officials in London. If it were done otherwise separation might 
be considered by the white settlement colonies. These colonies 
would assume that "... Britain does not really care for a connection 
for which she steadily refuses to disburse anything more than 
she can possibly afford." At this juncture of his argument, 
ostensibly supporting Lord Granville's administration, Merivale 
concluded "... if there be such, who really imagine that the pride 
and 'prestige' of a vast empire are to be maintained without 
either paying for it ourselves or forcing our subjects to pay for
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it, are dreaming of making ropes of sand and bricks without 
straw." By 1870 Merivale realized, at least as far as the white 
settlement colonies were concerned, that the tie which bound 
these colonies and Britain was only a "voluntary" one and therefore 
would last only as long as it was in the self-interest of both 
parties to maintain it. The best example was British North America.
By 1870 a number of the British North American colonies had 
become part of the new Dominion of Canada and in their domestic 
affairs had become completely independent of Britain. Canada 
was therefore related to Britain and the rest of the Empire by 
"allegiance" and by one further substantial connection —  the 
presence of British garrisons. The latter had remained and, in 
some cases, notably in the Pacific Northwest and Rupert's Land, 
had been augmented by Merivale's support in the l850*s. In British 
North America imperial defence was necessary to maintain law and 
order with respect to the native population and because of the 
presence of the United States. In southern Africa the garrisons 
remained to quell wars between the white settlers and Africans 
and to safeguard the sea routes to India. In 1870 Merivale concluded 
that there was little Britain could do except "at once sever the 
existing ties or to watch the course of events". Given his advocacy 
of the sentimental idea of Empire, Merivale chose the latter 
alternative.
It is significant that Merivale did not mention the British 
colonies in the Pacific Northwest and Rupert's Land in I87O
considering the degree to which he had been involved with them 
at the Colonial Office. One year earlier, however, the Hudson's 
Bay Company had given up its charter and Rupert's Land had become 
a part of the Canadian west. Manitobe entered Confederation as a 
new and self-governing province. In the Pacific Northwest, which 
then consisted of British Columbia which had representative 
institutions, there was growing strength among the British element 
of the population for entry into the Canadian Confederation. 
Nevertheless the problems which had plagued individual colonies 
in the l8 5 0's still remained and continued to be sources of 
regional discontent in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The Hudson's Bay Company was not as politically influential as it 
had been when Merivale was at the Colonial Office. The Office's 
inability to control chartered companies was another lesson which 
was to be forgotten by the next generation of imperial administrators. 
The most notorious example was the British South Africa Company.
Merivale also realized, from his experience in the l850's, 
that the federation of the British North American colonies would 
not, like the panacea of responsible government, solve the political 
problems of Canada but would merely institutionalize them. The 
one dominant factor in Canadian life was the presence of the 
United States. Canadian economic development would be slow because 
large amounts of capital and skilled labour would be drawn to the 
United States. Whereas in l8**l Merivale had regarded the British 
North American colonies as important to the British Empire, in
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1870 he observed them in much the same way he had viewed the 
United States in the lS^fO's. The revolution, which had begun 
in the British Empire in 1776, was, by 1870, almost complete.
As far as the "colonial question" existed it now chiefly concerned 
the Australian colonies.
In 1870 Merivale argued that the Australian colonies were not 
very important to the British Empire, except for their proximity 
to Britain’s developing informal empire in the Far East. As he 
expressed it aptly, because of "... the enormous extent of our 
trade, our influence, our empire in almost all but in name, over 
the east coasts of Asia, and the vast archipelago which lies between 
them and Australia." These colonies were less trouble, despite 
the fact that they were not federated, because they had no "native" 
problem. There was, therefore, no need for large numbers of British 
troops to be stationed there. The colonists paid for the cost 
of the British military presence and, in addition, there was no 
need for large-scale naval defence. It must be noted, however, that 
the situation in New Zealand was very different because of the 
presence of the Maori. Besides these practical advantages which 
existed in Australia, the Australians themselves appeared to be 
extremely loyal:- "Add to loyalty the pride of a common empire, 
and the kindly emotions of a common race, and we have ranged on 
our side a mass of sound and disinterested sentiment, which it 
would not be easy to overrate." Obviously Merivale was struck 
by the possibility of developing a Commonwealth of Nations, based 
upon an extension of the sentimental idea of Empire. The Australian
3^ 0
colonies would provide a suitable model for the development of an 
imperial federation in the future. Neither Merivale nor his 
British contemporaries were able to reconcile imperial federation 
and its implied centralization with colonial self-government.
Early in his career Merivale believed that schemes designed to 
strengthen the imperial connection would not succeed. In l8?0 
he argued, because colonial self-government had become an essential 
ingredient of British imperial policy, that any future plan for 
imperial federation must not attempt to take away the independence 
which had .already been granted. Yet, paradoxically, he never gave 
up the idea that it might be possible to unify the Empire. If 
imperial unification was to work, however, it had to be practical.
It would therefore not be possible to send colonial representatives 
to an imperial parliament. In the 1 8 5 0*s his experiences with 
colonial governors, and the problems created by the distances 
involved, led him to dismiss this suggestion as well as other similar 
ones. The vagaries of colonial politics also led him to conclude 
that imperial federation was against the "political tendencies" of 
his age. Federation, if it was to be secured, should be in 
accordance with imperial realities. The only realistic proposal 
was to develop a "council of colonial delegates" which would advise 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The council would only have 
a consultative function because the interests of Britain and the 
colonies were so different. All other schemes would, he reiterated, 
be either "useless or inconvenient". Merivale's critique of
3 ^1
imperial federation was based on his experience at the Colonial 
Office, was limited to the sentimental idea of Empire and did not 
go beyond the constitutional framework of the British Empire, 
as it existed in 1870.
In the late nineteenth century Merivale could foresee only 
one possible change in the nature of the British Empire* As he 
had predicted in the 18*1-0's, the imperial connection might undergo 
significant modification if technological changes occurred. The 
increased use of railroads and steamships had been important 
changes in the l8*K)'s and 1850*s. In 1870 he believed that the 
opening of the Suez Canal and the increased use of the telegraph 
would, if properly used, lead eventually to the development of 
"one central management" for the Empire, Although he only mentioned 
this idea, Merivale was again thinking of increasing the power 
and the efficiency of the Colonial Office, The Colonial and the 
India Offices would be amalgamated with other branches of govern­
ment which had jurisdiction over the Empire, such as the Crown 
Agents Office, in order to rule both the formal and informal parts 
of the Empire, Only with improved imperial communications and 
increasing centralization would it be possible to rejuvenate the 
British Empire. Despite Merivale's suggestions in 1870, the 
British Empire expanded and, particularly in its informal aspects, 
became more dependent on Britain. In this process increased trade 
with and the strategic value of new colonies became important 
in the creation of a dependent Empire in Africa and the Far East.
Clearly Merivale's career symbolized the changes in imperial 
thought from the l8*f0's to the 1870's. In the l8*f0’s Merivale, as 
an intellectual, represented the radicalism of this period with 
its advocacy of sweeping reforms on such important problems as 
the "native question", free trade and colonial self-government. 
Ironically Merivale had nothing to contribute to the most important 
example of this radicalism, the changes in the East India Company's 
rule under the influence of utilitarian doctrines. In the 1850's, 
as a practical administrator, Merivale was confronted with all 
the constraints which intellectuals in power discover, usually to 
their dismay or chagrin. He also experienced the increasing 
gloom of imperial thought because of the cumulative failures in 
southern Africa, British North America, the West Indies, and, above 
all else, the Mutiny in India. The radicalism of the l8**0's had 
been tamed and moreover had produced a conservative reaction by the 
l860's which was to continue until a new dependent Empire was created 
in the late nineteenth century. By the l870*s Merivale epitomized 
all these imperial moods. The tragedy of his official life was 
also that of the nineteenth century Empire. The monstrosity, 
called the British Empire, which had been acquired sometimes by 
design and other times almost in a "fit of absence of mind" was too 
large and complex for the Colonial or the India Office, much less 
Merivale, to control from London.
Notes to Conclusion
Eldridge, England’s Mission, contains the best analysis of 
this ’’crisis". See especially 53-91*
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